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Summary 
This thesis will examine theatrical changes which were taken place in Britain 
in the 1990s as an influence of Thatcherite capitalism. There are two bases in 
developing that subject. The first is that arts subsidy, namely, money, has been more 
responsible for the changes than directors and playwrights have. The second is that 
the changes were basically undesirable, because they resulted in the dominance of 
capitalist values in theatre, under which theatre companies inevitably compete with 
each other, and are, thereby, increasingly inclined towards safe, popular, commercial 
products. By contrast, alternative oppositional activities that can play a role in 
checking and balancing the dominant capitalist cultural values becoming 
marginalised. It can be, thus, said that this thesis will critically explore the undesirable 
legacy of Thatcherism on the theatre economics and management of the 1990s. 
To this end, it will examine several sub-subjects. Chapter I deals with the 
British politics and economics of the 1980s and 1990s as background for the changes 
which also took place in theatre during the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 11 will explore 
the two different attitudes of the Arts Council which has been in charge of distributing 
money [arts subsidy] to theatre companies since its formation in 1946; one prior to 
Thatcher's government and the other during Thatcher's government of the 1980s. 
Chapter III will examine the general theatrical economics and management of the 
1990s. Chapter IV will deal with money from the national lottery in order to see how 
much it has contributed to theatre companies in terms of theatre economy. Chapter V 
is a case study to illustrate how the West Yorkshire Playhouse as one of the leading 
regional theatre companies has been managerially affected by post-Thatcherite theatre 
economy. Chapter VI is another 6se study to illustrate how Red Ladder as one of the 
leading political theatre companies in the 1970s has been deradicalised by Thatcherite 
capitalism in the 1980s and post-Thatcherite theatre economy of the 1990s. 
This thesis, with its critical tone on the changes, will illustrate, implicitly or 
explicitly, ways by which the undesirable state of the British theatre in the 1990s may 
be rescued. At the same time, I hope this thesis to serve as a ground for debates for the 
betterment of the British theatre in the future. 
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Introduction 
This study will examine theatre management and economics in the wake of 
Thatcher's government. The main reason for my choosing this subject comes from my 
belief that Thatcherite capitalism had a deleterious effect on the theatre management, 
economics and production of the 1990s by pushing the theatre back into the 
commercial market. Dominated by the market ethic, the serious theatre, which 
although superficially flourishing, by its nature, may be unattractive to the general 
public, has inevitably been brought to an unhealthy state in which theatre companies 
compete with each other, and increasingly are inclined towards safe, popular, 
commercial products. As a result, alternative oppositional activities that can play a 
role in checking and balancing the dominant culture are becoming increasingly 
marginalised. Many books and articles have been published concerning the unhealthy 
theatrical climate since Thatcher's goven-iment, such as John McGrath's The Bone 
Won't Break (1990), Baz Kershaw's The Politics of Performance (1992), Nadine 
Holdsworth's Good Night Out: Activating the Audience with 7: 84 (England) (1997), 
D. Keith Peacock's Thatcher's Theatre (1999), and Sir Peter Hall's The Necessary 
Theatre (1999). This study will take a similarly critical tone to those above, but will 
explore the unhealthy climate from a different perspective. The books of John 
McGrath and D. Keith Peacock deal with theatre under Thatcher's government in the 
1980s. Baz Kershaw's book deals with the perforniance efficacy of alternative and 
community theatre covering the post-war period up to the end of the 1980s. The main 
focus of this study is on theatre in the 1990s. Nadine Holdsworth's article deals with 
theatre in the 1990s, but only briefly deals with the state of political theatre. Sir Peter 
Hall's book deals with the critical state of theatre in the late 1990s, but is a personal 
account from his own experience in the institutional theatre, and focuses on the 
problem of arts subsidy. What makes this study different from those above is that it 
will explore, perhaps, for the first time, the critical state of the British theatre in the 
1990s in a broad perspective encompassing such issues as political Thatcherism and 
its impact on Labour Party, cultural and economic Thatcherism and its impact on the 
Arts Council, ideological Thatcherism and its impact on political theatre, and 
Thatcherism's impact on theatre economics and management in the 1990s. 
Logically, the starting point of this study is the investigation of what changes 
Thatcher's government accomplished in the 1980s. This is due to the fact that the 
1980s marked a most significant stage for social, political, economic and cultural 
change in British post-war history. Generally speaking, post-war political, economic 
and cultural politics prior to Thatcher's goverm-nent was based on consensus -a tacit 
agreement between the two political parties; Conservative and Labour. After the war, 
people in Britain optimistically chose the Labour Party in the hope that it would 
restructure war-damaged Britain in a socially progressive manner. In response to their 
expectations, the Labour government introduced policies associated with socialism 
such as a certain amount of public ownership through nationalisation. Prior to 
Thatcher's government, Conservative governinents accorded with the so-called 
Keynesian social democratic policies adopted by the post-war labour government, 
believing that such policies were socially necessary. 
However, under Thatcher's government of the 1980s, consensus disappeared. 
Margaret Thatcher regarded consensus as "the bleak and dismal past". She believed 
that from consensus came, what she called, "the English disease" - "creeping 
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socialism". Under Thatcher's government the post-war past was to be rejected, and it 
forced progressive values, movements and organisations associated with the 
progressive age of consensus - miners' strikes, metropolitan councils, state 
ownership, and dependent culture - into submission or retrenchment. It replaced them 
with Thatcherite capitalism, namely - monetarism, market economy, belt-tightening 
expenditure policY, individual ownership, and enterprise culture. 
Chapter I will examine Thatcherism as a new order, in terms of the emergence 
of the New Right, its attack on socialist values, its ultimate aim of an enterprise 
culture, and will evaluate social/economic consequences of Thatcherism. It will also 
explore Thatcherism's influence on John Major's government, and the influence of 
Thatcherite popular capitalism on Labour's "desociali sing" process from Neil 
Kinnock (1983-1992) to Tony Blair (1994 -). In doing so, this chapter will serve one 
purpose - to illustrate Thatcherism as a driving force of change in the British theatre 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Thatcherite capitalism made an enon-nous impact on the arts and theatre world. 
The climate of this world in the 1980s was starkly different from that in the 1970s. 
This change in the climate was primarily effectively made by the Arts Council whose 
strings were being pulled by Thatcher's government. Chapter 11 will explore the 
change which took place in the 1980s by comparing the two differing attitudes of the 
Arts Council - one prior to Thatcher's governrnent and the other after it. 
The main reason for the exploration of the two different attitudes in the Arts 
Council between that during and that preceding the 1980s is my belief that the 
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economics of the Arts Council rather than playwrights and directors has been 
responsible for bringing changes in theatre in terms of production style, programming, 
and theatre worker's mentaliýy- In other words, I believe that the changes taking place 
across the theatre world in the 1980s were directly related to the matter of arts 
subsidy, namely, money. This chapter will serve a base for the exploration of the main 
subject of this study - theatre management and economics in the 1990s - in 
subsequent chapters. Thus, due to its importance, it is necessary to examine the 
Council's pre-Thatcherite attitudes. 
The performing arts in Britain were not systematically integrated in to public 
policy until 1946 when the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) was formally 
established. The Council grew from its wartime predecessor, the Council for the 
Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) whose aim was to sustain with 
informal government support the performing arts going under wartime constraints, so 
as to keep up public morale by organising music and drama tours throughout the 
country. By the end of the war, members of the CEMA were being appointed by the 
Minister for Education and their activities were supported by central government 
funding. Recognising the necessity for the arts funding, the incoming Labour 
govenunent determined to continue it by reconstituting the CEMA as the Arts Council 
of Great Britain. In this sense, the emergence of the ACGB can be seen as related to 
the social structure based on a welfare system after the war. If the National Health 
Service was in charge of free-of-charge medical service for the public, the Arts 
Council, as a sympathetic funding body for the arts, was in charge of the arts for the 
quality of people's life in the 35 years following the war. 
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In its first Royal Charter (1946), the ACGB briefly outlined its objects; "for 
the purpose of developing a greater knowledge, understanding and practice of the fine 
arts exclusively, and in particular to increase the accessibility of the fine arts to the 
public, to improve the standard of execution of the fine arts". It also outlined a prime 
task in achieving those objectives - to persuade funding bodies, either central or local, 
to devote proper resources to the arts by making them understand the significance of 
those objective. It wrote; the ACGB "advise and co-operate with Our Govemment 
Departments, local authorities and other bodies on any matters concerned directly or 
indirectly with those objects [mentioned above], and with a view to facilitating the 
holding of and dealing with any money provided by Parliament and any other 
property, real or personal, otherwise available for those objects, it is expedient that 
the Arts Council of Great Britain should be created ... with powers and subjects to the 
provisions hereinafter contained". ' 
Initially, the Arts Council was a small organisation with a comparatively small 
government grant to distribute - E350,000 in 1956/47. However, as the British 
economy was rebuilt and social expectations - demand for the arts and artists - grew, 
the financial demands rose accordingly. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the annual 
grant-in-aid to the Council was increased steadily from E675,000 in 1950/51 to 
f 112 10.000 in 1959/60. 
However, the real increase in arts subsidy came with Harold Wilson's Labour 
government in the mid-1960s. Under Wilson's government arts policy was more 
sharply defined. The policy was contained in the Arts Minister, Jennie Lee's white 
paper, A Polic. vfor the Arts - The First Steps, which aimed to make the arts prevail in 
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"everyday life". Accordingly, the Arts Council, with its second Royal Charter, 
redefined its objectives more broadly by replacing "the fine arts" with, simply, "the 
arts", and more specifically with an intention "to develop and improve the knowledge, 
understanding and practice of the arts, and to increase the accessibility of the arts to 
the public throughout Great Britain". 2 
The Council's general view on the arts at this time was that art was to do with 
aesthetic and spiritual values. Thus, the Council felt that the arts needed protection 
from market forces under which spiritual and aesthetic aspects are pushed into the 
second place by the market ethic. In its annual report and accounts in 1967, which 
contained a new Charter, this is clearly indicated; 
As a matter of economic theory it might be argued that the livelihood of 
artists ought to be provided by the people who enjoy their work. In practice 
it never has been: and the action of successive Governments in this country, 
in setting up the Arts Council and empowering local authorities to 1-ý 
subsidize the arts from the rates, recognize the absolute necessity, in 
modem times, of public patronage. 3 
The Council managed to maintain this view of the aits throughout the 1970s. 
For instance, Sir Roy Shaw, Secretary General of the Council from 1975 to 1982, 
asserted the view again by approvingly quoting Iris Murdoch's claim that art is "a 
training in the love of virtue ),. 4 Naturally, to secure "the livelihood of artists", which 
in turn enabled them to pursue aesthetic and spiritual values, arts subsidy had been 
rapidly increased in the late 1960s and the 1970s, from f3.2m in 1964/65 to E51.8m in 
1978/79. The Council also held a liberal view on the arts. This was seen by the fact 
that it xvas willing to support political theatre companies which, in Sir Roy Shaw's 
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view, 646onsistently I bite the hand that feeds them" -5 For instance, the political theatre 
company, Red Ladder which I shall examine later, received sustained increasing 
subsidy between 1975 to 1980; E187950 (1975/76), 00,000 (1976/77), f37,500 
(1977/78), E43,457 (1978/79), and E48,470 (1979/80). 
However, under Thatcher's government, the Arts Council was no longer as 
benevolent and sympathetic as it used to be. Her government embarked on the 
transformation of the Council into a more business-like organisation in an attempt to 
make it correspond to a new market-dominant order. Its S ecretary- General, writing in 
its annual report in 1984/85, exemplifies how the Arts Council differently conceived a 
view of the arts in the mid- I 980s, which was very different from that of the 1960s and 
1970s. Luke Rittner regarded the arts basically as an "industry"; "What do I see today 
from my privileged view of the arts? ... I see ... a 
developing commercial support, 
better box office and export market that is the envy of the world". He also indicated 
the restraint in arts subsidy exercised by Thatcher's government by saying that; 
"However, this small but highly successful part of Great Britain Inc. is once again 
under threat through lack of investment". 7A detail of the changed nature of the Arts 
Council in the 1980s will be explored later. 
This study will give attention to the fact that one particular feature of the 
Council's charter promoted a type of theatre that, in the Council's view, was vital to 
the public's cultural and spiritual welfare. Although the arts at this time was not as 
diversified as nowadays, the feature has been evident from its formation to the end of 
the 1990s - its support of institution. The metropolitan "centres of excellence", the 
national companies in opera, dance and theatre have been the main beneficiaries of the 
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Council. In its second Charter, the Council placed this as its "second major concern" 
next to "artists"; 
A second major concern of the Council is the well-being of the great 
national institutions which embody the achievements of the nation's artistic 
efforts in the best attainable conditions, and form as it were an international 
show-case. It is, simply, essential that the capital city of a civilized country 
should have fine theatres. The international reputation of the Royal Opera 
House, the Royal Ballet, the National Theatre, and the Royal Shakespeare 
Theatre must be sustained for this reason, and the Arts Council is glad and 
proud to have the main responsibility for ensuring it, as a matter of national 
policy. The lead and stimulus provided by these institutions is also 
invaluable for the welfare and vigour of the lyric and dramatic theatres 
throughout the country. 8 
The Council justified this practice by claiming that those companies embodied 
aesthetic/spiritual standards against which other companies could or should measure 
their own. However, the Council's practice has often evoked criticism. For instance, 
John Elsom cynically rebuked the Council's motto of 'State support for the arts, 
without state control' in 1976; "it had always been a doubtful maxim, but now it had 
lost all credibility. By establishing its list of priorities, the Arts Council was inevitably 
controlling the pattern of arts activity in the country ... 
inevitably furthering one 
species of theatre at the expense of another". 9 There have been many who have taken 
John Elsom's view such as Robert Hutchison who devoted a book in 1992 to The 
Politics of the Arts Council. 
This chapter will briefly, but critically, examine how this practice evolved by 
quoting from influential figures in the Council and arts world, and by examining the 
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way arts subside had been distributed on its basis from the fon-nation of the Council to 
the end of the 1970s. After Thatcher's government, an additional justification for the 
practice emerged. Since then, the Council has justified it by claiming that "centres of 
excellence" have set standards in terms of arts business against which other 
companies should measure their own. This study will take a critical view of this 
practice when it examine the theatre economics of the 1980s and 1990s, because it is 
my contention that it has played a significant role in consolidating the dominant 
capitalistic cultural values which, this study will argue, have produced an unhealthy 
cultural state. 
Chapter III will examine the cultural and theatrical legacy of Thatcher's 
government. To this end, firstly, this chapter will examine the state of arts subsidy 
under the government of John Major (1990-1997) and Tony Blair (1997-). Then, it 
will explore how the state of arts subsidy has affected the state of theatre management 
and economics. This will be done in three broad categories - the state of regional 
theatres, a boom of musicals, the state of new writing. As I believe that the critical 
state of new writing in the early 1990s summed up the undesirable effect of 
Thatcherite capitalism on theatre, so this chapter will thoroughly examine the factors 
resulting from political, financial and cultural Thatcherism. which led to this critical 
state. From about the mid-1995, several young playwrights, such as Jonathan Harvey 
and Mark Ravenhill, began to be spotlighted in the media. This study will consider 
them as "Thatcher's Children", whose sense of values concerning society and theatre 
was largely formed during Thatcher's goverm-nents. This chapter will examine how 
their theatrical and dramatic discourse was affected by Thatcherite theatre economy. 
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Lottery funding, distributed from 1995, has come to play an important role in 
the theatre economy. From the first year of lottery operation, the Arts Council of 
England received more money from the Lottery's Arts Board - E250 million - than 
from the government -1186 million. Lottery funding for the arts has come from the 
pocket of the general public. For this reason, many questions can be raised concerning 
the use of lottery money. This chapter will explore the rationale behind lottery funding 
for the arts - how the lottery funds have been distributed and what problems have been 
regarding lottery spending for capital purposes. The main objective of this chapter is 
to explore whether lottery funding has been the saviour of the subsidised sector of the 
theatre after the ravages of Thatcherism. 
Chapter V will examine the Playhouse in Leeds as a case study of theatre 
management in the 1990s. Leeds city has had a playhouse since 1970 - the Leeds 
Playhouse (1970-1990) and the West Yorkshire Playhouse (1990 -). The latter is the 
replacement of the former. This chapter will briefly examine the Leeds Playhouse, but 
its main concern will be given to the West Yorkshire Playhouse (WYP). The reason 
why the VVYP has been chosen is that the company, under its artistic director Jude 
Kelly, clearly demonstrates the main subject of this study, the nature of theatre 
management and economics in the post-Thacherite era of the 1990s. This chapter will 
clarify the management and economics by revealing the company's theatrical and 
business strategies such as its partnership with industry and commerce, and by 
comparing the progressive spirit of the Leeds Playhouse of the 1970s with the post- 
Thatcherite spirit of the West Yorkshire Playhouse. 
Chapter VI will examine Red Ladder as a case study to demonstrate 
Thatcherite capitalism as the cause for the near demise of political theatre in the 
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1990s. The reason why Red Ladder has been chosen is that, since its formation, the 
company has continuously modified itself to cope with the changing political and 
cultural climate of the times. Thus, a thorough examination of the company will give a 
clear idea of how/why political theatre collapsed under Thatcher's government. In 
order to clarify the change that have taken place within the company, this chapter will 
compare Red Ladder's radical ideals and activities of the 1970s with the modified 
ones of the 1990s. 
For these two case studies, comprehensive materials such as pamphlets, 
programmes and the annual reports of the Playhouse and Red Ladder will be 
consulted. Interviews with important people such as Maggie Saxon, WYP's Managing 
Director, and Wendy Harris, Artistic Director of Red Ladder from 1998 will be also 
quoted to support what has been discovered in those materials. 
As has been mentioned earlier, this study has arisen from a view that what has 
taken place in the theatre world in the 1990s in the wake of Thatcher's governinent 
has been undesirable and potentially dangerous for the role of the theatre in society 
envisaged after the end of the second world war. I hope to explicitly and implicitly 
suggest ways by which the British theatre may be rescued from that spiritual and 
cultural decline which it has evidently experienced during the past two decades. 
II 
1 The Royal Charter (1946) of The Arts Council of Great Britain, quoted from Andrew Sinclair, Arts 
and Cultures: The History of the 50 Years of the Arts Council of Great Britain (London: Sinclair- 
Stevenson, 1995), p. 401. 
2 The Arts Council of Great Britain: Annual Report and Accounts in 1966167, 'A new charter', p. 6. 
3 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
4 Sir Roy Shaw, The Arts and the People, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), p. 23. 
' Secretary General's Report, The Arts Council Annual Report and Accounts, 1978-79, p. 7. 
6 The Arts Council of Great Britain: Annual Report and Accounts from, 1976/76 to 1979/80. 
7 The Arts Council of Great Britain: Annual Report and Accounts, 1984/85, Secretary-General Preface, 
p. 3. 
8 The Arts Council of Great Britain: Annual Report and Accounts, 1966/67, 'A new charter', Op cit, p. 
13. 
9 John Elson, Post-war British Yheatre, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 130. 
12 
Chapter 1: New Right, New Order, and New Lahour 
I often wonder if Mrs Thatcher or her advisers have not studied Gramsci better than the left - indeed whether they have not appropriated Rudi 
Deutschke's 'Long March Through the Institutions'. She certainly set about 
consolidating the corporate nature of the capitalist state, re-affumffig its 
basis as the legitimation of the power of capital and private enterprise, and 
incorporating every aspect of public life into its detailed control. ... In t4e 1980s the Labour Party had capitulated almost entirely to the smart 
efficiencies of the market economy, which of course leads them to an 
acceptance of an individualist, competitive ethic. They justify this by their 
need to attract the middle-class and professional-class vote. ' 
Blair, Brown and Mandelson, the gang of three, coined the name of New 
Labour ... Their mission, quite clearly, is to manage British capitalism 
more efficiently than the Tories have been able to do. 'New Conservative' 
rather than 'New Labour' would be the most appropriate name for the party 
that they have created ... Where it differs from the defeated Conservative Party is in the dynamism and drive that New Labour has injected in its 
project to regenerate British capitaliSM. 2 
Introduction 
As Catherine Itzin noticed, Margaret Thatcher's "landslide victory in the 
General Election of 1979" was seen by many as "an event which was clearly to mark 
13 the beginning of the end of the post-war era of British social economic history. At 
the same time, her victory was the beginning of Britain's movement in a more 
capitalist direction. Socialist values - state interventionism, nationalisation, 
collectivism, trade unionism, welfare culture - were rapidly eroded by Thatcher's 
government in the 1980s. Instead, such capitalist values as laissez faire economy, 
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privatisation, individualism, employment and trade union acts, and enterprise culture 
were praised and established. By the end of 1990s, even under the Labour 
government, these capitalist values are still a dominant force in the British way of life. 
This chapter will examine the changes which have taken place especially in 
British politics and economics during the 1980s and 1990s. The main purpose is to 
illustrate the political and economic background for the changes which also took place 
in the arts and theatre world during the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, this study will focus 
on issues relevant to the arts and theatre, for instance, the emergence of the New Right 
and its efforts to establish enterprise culture will be examined as relevant to 
Thatcher's appointment Sir William Rees-Mogg and Luke Rittner as the Art's 
Council's Chain-nan and Secretary General respectively. Also, New Labour's 
comprehensive acceptance of Thatcherism will be dealt with as a relevance to its 
acceptance of Thatcherite arts policy. 
In examining the change, this chapter will consult a wide range of views from 
politicians and scholars irrespective of their political and ideological belief in an 
-- I- attempt to present an unbiased point of view. 
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The Emergence of the New Right and Free-Market Economy 
The demonization of the sixties has been a characteristic of the New Right 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, the New Right phenomenon itself can 
be seen as a backlash against the social radicalism of the decade, as well, of 
course, as a reaction against the economic refon-nism of the thirties and 
forties. 4 
A new order in the British political economy in the 1980s came with the 
emergence of the New Right. The New Right formed a cohesive group. As David 
Edgar pointed out, many of them came from the same Cambridge college; 
In 1978, Maurice Cowling, Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge, edited a 
selection of Conservative Essays, in which the essayists included 
Peterhouse graduates Roger Scruton, Peregrine Worsthorne and George 
Gale, and the college's present dean, Eduard Norman. Other Peterhouse 
men prominent in the advocacy of social-authontarian positions include 
John Vincent (like Scruton, a Times contributor), Colin Welch (like 
Worsthorne, a regular writer for both The Spectator and the Telegraph 
group), novelist Kingsley Amis and Patrick Cosgrove, Mrs Thatcher's 
biographer. 5 
These people were rigorously authoritarian. For them the ultimate goal of the 
state was order, so they wanted a strong state to fulfil such an order. Roger Scruton 
wrote; 
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... Conservative attitude seeks above all for government, and regards no 
citizen as possessed of a natural right greater than his obligation to be 
ruled. ... It is basic to a Conservative view of things ... that the individual should find his completion in society, and that he should find himself as 
part of an order. ... He must see himself as the inheritor, not the creator of the order in which he participates, so that he may derive from it ... the conceptions and values which determine self identity. 6 
For the New Right, the post-war tolerant consensus political economy was the 
cause of disorder and the declining authority of the state. In the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s they regarded the rise in organised industrial militancy and the rise of new 
social forces grouped around issues of sex and race, as a gradual breakdown of social, 
moral, legal, and economic order. Civil liberty was for them not a major 
consideration. On the contrary, the pursuit of freedom by individuals or groups was 
often seen as an evil. For instance, according to Roger Scruton strikes were 
"tantamount to rebellion". He added that employers should "reward extravagantly 
those servants who are essential; but make them servants. As for the others, let them 
strike, and permanently". 7 Society had to be protected from strikers, subversives, 
ethnic and feminist agitators, homosexuals. In this sense, it is understandable why the 
New Right including Mrs Thatcher was intolerant of dissenting organisations such as 
the Greater London Council, and of oppositional cultural movements such as political 
theatre. 
To eradicate the evidence of past disorder as well as to construct a new order, 
the New Right also wanted authoritarian leadership as prosecutor and judge in its own 
case. Such a return to strong government leadership appealed to the public, who 4: n 
appeared fed up with the continuous sociaUpolitical/econornic instability of the 1970s. 
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Mrs Thatcher's Public persona, an uncompromising "warrior style", exactly 
corresponded to the New Right's expectation. It appealed to the electorate. The 
Observer reported in 1988; 
Polling data suggests that the nation at large regards the Prime Minister in 
much the same way as do her colleagues in Government; personally 
unappealing, but an unstoppable force of nature who commands respect. 
After Edward Heath, she is the second most unpopular premier since the 
war. Yet, according to [Ivor] Crewe, her warrior style - setting objectives, leading from the front, confronting problems, holding her position - is an 
essential mgredient of the Conservative's electoral strength. Cohesion, 
purpose and success take precedence over policy and ideology in voter's 
eyes; That is the lesson of Thatcherism's astounding success. 8 
Stuart Hall, who coined the idea of Thatcherism as having evolved from the 
New Right "authoritarian populism", described the "hegemonic" nature of the New 
Right; 
Authoritarian populism is a way of characterising the new form of 
hegemonic politics which emerged on the British scene with the formation 
of the 'new right' in the mid-1970s. It described a shift in the balance of 
social and political forces and in the forms of political authority and social 
regulation institutionalised in society through the state. It attempted to shift 
the centre, of gravity in society and the state closer to the 'authoritarian' 
pole of regulation. It attempted to impose a new regime of social discipline 
and leadership 'firom above' in a society increasingly experienced as 
rudderless and out of control. 9 
While the New Right pursued a strong interventionist state in the sense of 
restructunng a new order by disconnecting the past, it advocated a laissez-fare 
economy. In the case of the economy the New Right believed that government 
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intervention was unjust and did not work, and thus, that all alternatives to the free 
market were deeply flawed. 
It was Friedrich Hayek's free-market theory that offered the basis for the New 
Right's economic policy. Hayek, in his influential book The Road to Serfdom (1944), 
argued that any state intervention in the economy would distort the operation of the 
free market forces which, in his view, worked automatically for the benefit of all. In 
the interventionist world, the economy had been effectively politicised by the growth 
of state organisations and interest groups which urged the central government to 
increase its expenditure. This inevitably caused the government to remove itself from 
the market place in purchasing its services. Hayek argued that the whole idea of this 
centrally planned economy was flawed, because the infon-nation needed to run the 
economy was so vast and so complex that it was impossible for the government to 
assimilate it. According to him, what the socialists promised as the "road to freedom" 
was in fact the "high road to servitude". By contrast, the market, assimilating the 
information as part of itself, was provider of entrepreneurs whose tireless quest for 
profit made society advance and develop. He firmly believed that most economic and 
social ills were the natural outcome of the erosion of the principles of the free 
market. 10 
There was, however, an inherent contradiction between the New Right's 
advocacy of a centralised authoritarian control and its advocacy of liberal free-market 
economy. This contradiction often led to the accusation that Thatcherism as a 
synthesis of the New Right ideal was not actually an ideology but a set of values 
intended for a certain social area and people. Thus, the contradiction generated such 
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polarised attitudes as those between the rich and the poor and between the north and 
the south. These polarised attitudes will be examined later in detail. The Economist 
pointed this out in 1993; 
Why was a politician who celebrated the individual over the state [in 
economic terms] such a relentless centraliser of government power, and so 
careless of civil liberties? ... The reason was that Thatcherism was never a 
coherent set of economic and political ideas. Rather, it was a list of 
instinctively selected fiiends and enemies. At a rough approximation, the 
friends were the property-owning (and would-be property-owning) middle, 
lower-middle and aspiring working classes. The enemies were trade unions, 
public-sector workers, the intelligentsia and (as she saw them) spongers of 
every kind who were content to live off the state. " 
For Mrs Thatcher, the most intolerable enemy was "creeping socialism". On 
coming to power, she was determined to battle against it. 
Thatcher's Attack on the Post-war Socialist Values 
During the ten years since the last series of talks I gave here [A Good Night 
Ow], the government of our country has used all the techniques to poison 
the sea of Britain, with the purpose of asphyxiating socialism. ' 2 
In her whole political career, Mrs Thatcher seemed to have one particular 
political aim - to break away from the political past. Her predecessors such as Edward 
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Heath accorded with the Keynesian social democratic consensus, believing that it was 
politically and socially necessary to maintain policies such as nationalisation, the 
welfare state, full employment, high levels of public expenditure, and conciliation 
with the trade unions. The post-war consensus politics continued between Macmillan 
and Gaitskell, Wilson and Heath. However, it was disappeared under Thatcher's 
goverm-nent. After the election victory in 1979, Margaret Thatcher set out to eliminate 
the consensus on the right of the Conservative Party. In 1979 She said; 
The Old Testament prophets didn't merely say: 'Brothers, I want a 
consensus. ' They said: 'This is my faith and vision. This is what I 
passionately believe. If you believe it too, then come with me. ' Tonight I 
say to you just that. Away with the recent bleak and dismal past. 13 
Again, in Australia in 198 1, she unambiguously replied to criticisms from 
Edward Heath that she was abandoning consensus politics: "For me, consensus seems 
to be the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies in search of 
something in which no one believes". 14 One explanation for her hostility to consensus 
is that it advocated and protected a set of values which she could not tolerate - 
"creeping socialism". In her view, socialism was one of the main culprits of the 
"British disease", and it had led to social, moral and economic decline in Britain. 
Thus, those who had shaped that consensus, for instance, the socialist Labour or the 
Tory consensualists, were turned by the New Right into the villains of society. In 
1987, she asserted; 
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For my first 25 years in politics it was socialist ideas that were influencing 
Conservatives. But the world has seen socialism now, and it is not for free human being, it is not for the British character. It produces neither 
prosperity nor human dignity. As you know, it is not the opposition I want 
to get rid of, it is central planning and control, the centrally-controlled, 
Socialist society in which your rights come from the government and you do as you are told. 15 
Thatcher's government in the 1980s tried hard to "roll back" the socialist 
frontiers of the state. First of all, it restructured the nation's industry by transforming 
the ownership of big companies through a privatisation programme. During the 1980s, 
assets worth more than E40 billion were sold by the government. David Marsh wrote; 
"The scale of privatisation is immense. In fact, by 1991: over 50 per cent of the public 
sector had been transferred to the private sector; 650,000 workers had changed sectors 
; the nationalised sector accounted for less than 5 per cent of the UK output 
compared with 9 per cent in 1979". 16 Among the major public companies privatised 
from 1979 to 1989 were British Petroleum (1979), British AerosPace (1981 and 
1985), British Telecom (1984), British Gas (1986), British Airway (1987), British 
Steel (1988). By the end of the 1980s a few remained to be privatised, and the three 
remaining large nationalised companies - British Rail, British Coal and the Post Office 
- were on the government list for privatisation. 
Thatcher's government, unlike previous governments, sustained its belt- 
tightening spending policy. This spending policy was closely related to monetarism 
which was developed by Milton Friedman in the 1950s and 1960s. His monetarist 
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theory had several aims for capitalist economy. One of them was to stabilise the 
inflation rate through the central government's controlling of the supply of money. In 
Britain in the late 1970s, the inflation rate was soaring. Under the Callaghan, s Labour 
government (1974-79), a monetarist policy was already applied, making massive, 
ideologically contradictory, cuts in public expenditure which led to a series of 
protracted national strikes up to 1979. However, the Labour government's version of 
the new monetarism was combined with traditional state intervention. After 1979, a 
purer monetarist policy began to be applied. The man who presided over this 
monetarist doctrine was a committed monetarist Nigel Lawson, who became the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1982. In 1981 he unveiled his financial strategy to 
tackle primarily the rise in inflation which had dogged with early years of Thatcher's 
govemment; 
... It is essential 
from now on to secure a lower rate of growth of broad 
money... The heart of our economic policy is the Government's published 
and indeed quantified Medium Tenn Financial Strategy, the core of which 
is a steady deceleration in the rate of monetary growth over a four year 
period, buttressed by a gradual reduction in the size of the underlying 
budget deficit, which in turn is to be achieved by a steady reduction in the 
real level of total government spending. 17 
No less than five different sets of monetary targets were announced; 1979-82: 
Sterling M3; 1982-84: Sterling M3, MI, PSL2; 1984-87: MO, Sterling M3; 1986: 4D 
MO, raised Sterling M3 target. According to year-on-year changes in the 
government9s total spending from 1979 to 1990 analysed by Maurice Mullard, the 
spending only increased in 1980 and 198 1. After 1981 the spending continuously fell, 
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with sharp reductions being made in 1985,1986 and 1987.18 Over the 1980s, the 
government rhetoric was consistent, for instance, in condemning overspending 
councils. 
Thatcher's government also restructured the welfare benefit system. There 
were many cuts and abolitions in welfare benefits, for instance; the abolition of the 
earnings-related supplemental unemployment benefit (1980); the making of 
unemployment benefit taxable (1980); the cutting off of benefit for unemployed young 
people; and abolition of emergency one-off payments. In addition, these cuts and 
abolition were coupled with caps on local goverment spending which resulted in the au 
closing of residential homes and day programmes for children, the elderly and 
disabled people, and in cuts in the number of social workers. 
If we accept Ben Pimlott's claim that "the collateral of British socialism and 
leftness has been trade unionism", 19 for those who wanted to banish socialism in 
Britain, one of the most effective ways would be to begin with an attack on the trade 
unions. Thatcher's govenunent was very detennined in its battle against the trade 
unions. It introduced five Employment Acts and the 1984 Trade Union Act to try to 
curb their power and to restrict their immunities. With these acts, it abolished the 
closed shop, outlawed secondary picketing and made pre-strike ballots compulsory. 
Strikes dwindled to very low levels especially after the miners' defeat during 1984-85. 
In 1988 Ben Pimlott described the gloomy state of trade unions whose power and 
membership were greatly diminished; 
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At the end of a decade of a decline in power, rights and membership, trade 
union are not fashionable. Bewildered, divided and under siege, unions in 
Britain have been less confident and more uncertain about their goals 
during the Thatcherite era than at any time since the Second World War. 20 
Mrs Thatcher often proudly claimed that her government had changed almost 
"everything". Here, "everything" certainly included post-war British socialist values. 
By the end of 1987, in an interview with the Financial Times, she unreservedly said 
that a third successive election victory would fulfil her aim of "killing off 
Socialism". 21 For her socialism was inherently bad, and she forced its adherents into 
submission. For instance, in the mid-1980s she and her government abolished the 
Labour-controlled metropolitan counties and the Greater London Council, which were 
seen as centres of left-wing opposition. All these were intended, as she said as early as 
in 1983, to "banish from our land the dark, divisive clouds of Marxist socialism and 
bring together men and women from all walks of life who share a belief in freedom 
and have the courage to uphold it )'. 
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However, in tenns of the post-war socialist history, it is not entirely correct to 
say that British socialism has been based on Marxist socialism. It is true, however, 
that there was a period of a radical socialist movement in post-war Britain. 
Immediately after the war the working-class in Britain were optimistic about social 
change. Catherine Itzin, while examining the political background of the proliferation 
of the left-wing theatre companies after 1968, wrote; 
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The optimism after the war was immense and the expectations of the 
Labour govenunent of 1945 were great - in anticipation of the 
nationalisation of industry and the creation of the welfare state. Clive 
Barker, who worked with Joan Littlewood and with Centre 42 and was of 
the Arden/Bond generation himself, remembered the euphoria on the 
occasion of the nationalisation of British Rail: 'Three of us took a train 
journey that ran over midnight, so after twelve we could say, "It's ours. It's 
ours. "' 23 
However, there was growing disillusionment with successive governments 
which, the public thought, had not done enough to fulfil their expectation of socialism 
in Britain. Catherine Itzin wrote; 
'But then, ' said Barker, 'our families, working in steel, would come back 
and say, "It's no different, the same people are still in charge and it's less 
efficient than it was before. "' There was great disillusionment - particularly 
amongst that first generation to be educated out of the working class - with 
the tokenism of Labour governments in nationalising industry and setting 
up the welfare state. .... With the Labour government of 1964, there was 
some hope for social change. Within twelve months, however, it became 
clear that Labour was not going to alter anything. 24 
In 1968 the failure of anarchist student protests to achieve social change 
triggered strong political activism which appealed to Marx as the symbol of radical 
change. In the 1970s, the economic instability under Heath's government and 
Callaghan's Labour government further stimulated this radical movement. Alongside 
frequent workers' nation-wide strikes, the far-left group, the Trotskyist Militant 
Tendency, adopted the tactic of "entryism", to infiltrate its members into the structure 
of the Labour Party in order to seize leadership at the grassroots level and to promote 
political revolution. 
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Such a radical movement was, however, remote from the public's conception 
, of the post-war British socialism. Generally speaking, in the post-war Western Europe 
including Britain, socialism referred to a socialist humanist economy. This comprised 
a substantial amount of public ownership, some degree of central planning, a general 
increase in public expenditure, and the reduction of inequality and class difference 
through progressive taxation, redistributive benefits and educational Policies. 
In general, the radical socialists did not believe in post-war consensus politics. 
For them this was merely reformism in the society still dominated by capitalism. The 
policies advocated by them included nationalisation of the top two hundred 
companies, extension of state control over the whole economy and workers' control in 
state-owned industries. In order to move radical social change they often resorted to 
extra-parliamentary actions such as industrial disputes. Their resort to drastic means 
gained, however, little support from the British public. " It is, therefore, highly 
questionable to identify, as Margaret Thatcher did, the post-war socialist tradition with 
the far-left radical movement. 
Moreover, Margaret Thatcher's concept of freedom also demands scrutiny. 
What she meant by the people "who share a belief in freedom and have the courage to 
uphold it" did not refer to the majority of the British public. It embraced only the 
people who, as she often mentioned, were "one of us". So the freedom she espoused 
did not apply to those who, for instance, wished to belong to trade unions, because 
organisations such as trade unions were not one of us". When she talked about 
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"freedom", she eliminated certain freedoms long assumed by many as necessary 
rights. In this sense, Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister was indeed dogmatic, having, as 
The Economist pointed out, "a list of instinctively selected ffiends and enemies" 
without "a coherent set of economic and political ideas". Paul Hirst adds; 
The Prime Minister believes that there is one legitimate set of values, her 
own. She has acted as if other plural political and social organizations are 
illegitimate and ought to have neither influence nor the right to exist. She 
has stated her aim to be the elimination of 'socialism' and claimed that it is 
'alien to our British way of life'. She believes that only one party is really 
fitted to rule, her own. ... she 
has acted and thought in such a way that in 
the long run would reduce democracy to the bare formal minimum: to 
national elections that would be little more than a plebiscite to decide who 
should rule. 26 
From the start of the new conservative era, the left and its constituency were 
concerned about what would become of those left behind. In 1988 Ben Pimlott 
anxiously summed up the dismal state of British socialism; "There has never been a 
, 27 time since the 1930s when the prospects of the British Left seemed bleaker'. This 
was one year after the Conservatives had won a third national election. However, it 
was not merely a matter of the Labour Party losing an election. Rather, it was a matter 
of the whole fabric of British socialism unravelling as Thatcherite values continued to 
weaken the left in all its fonns. By the end of the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher styled 
Britain as the post-socialist society by stamping socialism as an intrusion, or an 
obstacle to Britain's progress towards an enterprise society. 
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Thatcherism and Enterprise Culture 
During the course of the 1980s, the idea of enterprise emerged as a central 
motif in the practice of Thatcher's government. Towards the end of her Premiership, 
Mrs Thatcher said; 
I used to have a nightmare for the first six years in office that, when I had 
got the finances right, when I had got the law right, the deregulation etc., 
that the British sense of enterprise and initiative would have been killed by 
socialism. I was really afraid that when I had got it all ready to spring back, 
it would no longer be there and it would not come back ... But then it came. The face began to smile, the spirits began to lift, the pride returned. 28 
As Mrs Thatcher herself claimed, to move Britain into the acceptance of a 
more overtly enterprise society, "Economics are the method; the objective is to change 
the heart and soul of the nation". 29 By the end of the 1980s, Lord Young [David 
Young], Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry, who believed that 
g4private enterprise is the key to prosperity", talked about two key "pillars" of 
enterprise - "openness of markets and the initiative of individuals". 
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In the enterprise culture, priority always lies in wealth creation. Its supporters 
argue that if the economy does not produce sufficient national wealth the state would 
28 
not be able to afford desirable public support for health, education, arts and other 
services. In its proponents' view, the cake must be created before it is divided up. 
Thus, the market economy, where what matters is to increase the wealth creation, is a 
I 
primary force. If people are to prosper, not to mention retain their jobs, they have to 
compete for consumers, to cost their activities and to think of themselves as 
producers. In this way, the discipline and rigour of the market helps to construct a 
mode of selfhood defined in terms of the virtues of enterprise. The market becomes 
the only sphere of social action. 
The enterprise culture advocated by Thatcher's government aimed, first of all, 
to transform people's or organisations' consciousness from simply relying on 
established positions and incomes to appreciating the fact that they now belonged to a 
culture in which the world did not owe them a living. Thus, it became a major weapon 
in disconnecting the past by attracting those who have fallen foul of dependency 
culture. David Young argued; 
In a centrally controlled economy the value and values of enterprise are 
thwarted. In addition the welfare state stifles enterprise by generating 
dependency and creating poverty traps, which are most difficult to break 
out of ... We must encourage their 
individual talents rather than use the 
wealth created by enterprise to perpetuate the sins of the past. We must 
have an enterprise culture, not a dependency culture. 31 
Doctors, nationalised company managers, and artists also now had to think in 
terms of economic enterprise culture. Doctors could no longer simply give treatment 
without paying proper attention to its cost, and without being properly accountable. 
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Company managers were stimulated to become more commercial in their attitude and 
practice, and more financially efficient. Arts subsidy was squeezed, so that artists were 
expected to raise a greater proportion of their income from business trading and other 
sources. 
Ultimately, the New Right's economic theories and its efforts to eliminate the 
post-war British socialist values were a passage towards the enterprise culture. 
Consequent changes made by Thatcher's government, from an internal market for the 
N. H. S through selling-off of council houses to the government's squeeze of arts 
subsidy, should be understood in terms of the enterprise culture. In theoretical terms, 
Sir Keith Joseph, who was considered to be a disciple of Friedrich Hayek, Nigel 
Lawson, and David Young were the key figures in the fonnation of the enterprise 
culture in Thatcher's era. 
After the Conservative's election defeat in 1974, Sir Keith Joseph began to 
formulate a new meta-narrative that would explain not only the defeat, but also British 
politics in the whole post-war era. He argued that all governments since 1945 had 
been engaged in the pursuit of a "semi-socialism" - government intervention and 
union power - that had "forced the private sector of the economy to work with one 
hand tied behind its back". 32 He saw this as the culprit for Britain's economic decline. 
As an antidote to this decline, Joseph urged economic reform to restore private 
enterprise under a free market monetarist model, with government's role largely 
reduced to controlling the money supply. In 1974, he established the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) to learn lessons from successful enterprise-oriented economies like 
Japan and West Gennany. He became its first Chairman and Margaret Thatcher its 
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Vice-Chairman. The CPS quickly established itself as an alternative to the party's own 
research department, namely, a think tank. In the early years of Margaret Thatcher's 
leadership, the CPS, "thinking the unthinkable", played a most significant role in the 
formulation of new Conservative policies, later called Thatcherism. These policies, 
which largely advocate free market economy and freedom of individual choice, are 
contained in its publications; Keith Joseph's Monetarism is Not Enough (1976), 
Margaret Thatcher's Let our Children Grow Tall (1977), Nigel Lawson's The New 
Conservatism (1980) and The New Britain (1988). 
If Joseph and the CPS offered a theoretical basis, Nigel Lawson was 
instrumental in putting the enterprise culture into practice. In 1984 he delivered a 
lecture entitled, The British Experiment, at the City University Business School. Apart 
from arguing for reversing the post-war interventionist economic policy, in the last 
section of the lecture, entitled The Enterprise Culture, Lawson argued that an 
economic policy alone, such as the abolition of controls on wages, progressive 
reductions in the burden of taxation and privatisation, was not enough. He insisted 
that the post-war Keynesian culture and "psychology" should be transformed in order 
to create the enterprise culture. In his view, although all these economic measures 
should free the market, their effects would be thwarted by the post-war culture and 
psychology. Thus, what was needed, he argued, was education in enterprise. 
Enterprise was, therefore, now considered to be teachable, and not simply a 
psychological trait possessed by the few. 
David Young became the chief missionary in educating the enterprise culture 
as well as in constructing its architecture. In October 1984, he was appointed, as 
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Minister without portfolio, to run the new Enterprise Unit in the Cabinet Office. His 
prime task in the Unit, largely responding to Lawson's analysis, was to promote the 
enterprise culture in the economy and society. Particular emphasis was given to the 
co-ordination of enterprise education for 14-18-year-olds. He said; 
In the past, there was an unfortunate and unnecessary bias against 
enterprise in British culture. In future, that bias must be overcome. 
Individual entrepreneurs need positive encouragement to take an active part 
in the creation of prosperity. We must strive to bring schools, universities, 
and other educational institutions to a closer understanding of the needs 
and hopes of the enterprises in which their pupils and students will one day 
work. 33 
In the mean time, the Prime Minister requested that the Manpower Services 
Commission (MSC) under the chairmanship of David Young, should set up a 
Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) in November 1982. The TVEI 
scheme was launched nationally and developed from the Enterprise Unit, through the 
White Papers Better Schools in March 1985 and Education and Training for Young 
People in April 1985. A new scheme was introduced in 1987 by the MSC under the 
auspices of the Department of Employment, Enterprise in Higher Education (EHE). 
The document's ultimate aim was to stimulate students' entrepreneurship in order to 
make them into; 
a person who has belief in his own destiny, welcomes change and is not 
frightened of the unknown, sets out to influence events, has powers of 
persuasion, is of good health, robust, with energy and willing to work CP 0 
beyond that which is specified, is competitive, is moderated by concern for 
others and is rigorous in self-evaluation. 
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David Young became Minister of Employment in 1985. During the period 
between 1985 and 1988, he delivered many lectures and speeches promoting the 
enterprise culture; the Gresham Lecture entitled The Fall and Rise of the Entrepreneur 
in July 1985, the Barnett Lecture on the inner cities in 1986 and many unpublished 
speeches in the 1987 and 1988. The main rhetoric of these lectures and speeches was 
that enterprise is the most central aspect of human personality, not just for business 
entrepreneurs but for everyone. Thus, enterprise has to be the only basis of national 
unity, creating "one nation". While he tried to make a collectivist post-war cultural 
legacy - welfarism, nationalisation and trade unionism -a symptom of "the British 
disease", he also tried hard to make the public understand that the enterprise spirit was 
good for Britain. 
In June 1987 Young was appointed Secretary of State at the Department of 
Trade and Industry, which was subtitled the Department for Enterprise (DTI) in June 
1988. In the White Paper of that month, he put forward the encouragement of 
enterprise as his major task for the DTI until 1993. From 1988, the DTI produced 
enterprise strategy schemes coupled with education -a partnership between 
government and individuals, commerce and industry - ranging from the Enterprise 
Allowance Scheme and the Private and Business Enterprise Programmes, to various 
training schemes for school leavers and the unemployed. 35 According to young, their 
success was soon evident: "the Enterprise Allowance Scheme, in just under three 
years to July 1989, has enabled more than 450,000 people to set up their own 
businesses". 36 
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By the end of the 1980s, enterprise was seen to be the basic factor, the most 
fundamental prime mover in government policy, not just for, in Thatcher's words, 
"economic progress", but for renewing "the spirit and solidarity of the nation". 
However, the question remains whether Thatcher governments' efforts to spread the 
enterprise culture were comprehensively successful. 
The Consequence of Enterprise Culture 
During the 1980s beggars reappeared on the streets of many British cities, 4: 5 
and increasing number of people took to sleeping in the open-sights once 
associated with the Victorian and Edwardian period ... 
Homeless families 
had numbered 56,000 in 1979, but as a result of government policies ... 
by 
1989 no fewer than 128,000 families, including 370,000 people, were 
officially classed as homeless The emergence of large 'underclass' 
alienated from the mainstream of society was marked by the outbreaks of 
rioting in many of the depressed urban district. Beginning with the Bristol 
riots of 1980, this phenomenon spread to ... 
Brixton in 1985, and 
Newcastle in 199 1. The governinent's proposals to require even the poorest 
to contribute towards the new poll tax resulted not only in massive non- 
payment, but also in the failure of around a million people to register as 
parliamentary voters. Thus many of the poorest people lost their political 
37 influence just as they had during the Victorian period ... 
Britain, by the end of the 1980s, looked as though it was entering a new era 
with the Thatcherite enterprise culture. This seemed to be true particularly of the 
attitude and behaviour of the young generation. In a decade after Margaret Thatcher 
had been Prime Minister, a number of newspapers surveyed the group aged 15-24 in 
May 1989 who were too young to vote in the 1979 election. This group, nicknamed 
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"Thatcher's Children", had no adult knowledge of any government but hers. A MORI 
poll, commissioned for the BBC programme, Ten Years On in 1989, to mark the tenth 
anniversary of Conservative govenunent under Margaret Thatcher, found that 
aspirations of "Thatcher's Children" were similar to characteristics of Thatcherism, 
materialism and individualism. The majority wanted to own their own home (more 
than 80%), to have a private pension (more than 50%), and to run their own business 
(almost 50%). 38 
It seemed, however, that Thatcherism had not triumphed with the general 
population. This was clearly demonstrated by the results of another opinion poll 
conducted by MORI in 1988. The public was asked to choose between socialist values 
and "Thatcherist" values. The results were; 
Socialist v. Thatcherist valueS39 
People have different views about the ideal society. This card shows a number of 
alternatives. Q. (I) Please read each pair of statements and then tell me which one, 
in each case, comes closest to your ideal - statement A or statement B. Q(2) Now, 
for each pair of statements, please tell me whether you think statement A or 
statement B is most like Britain today? 
(I) 
A 'A mainly capitalist society 
in which private interests and free 
enterprise are most important'. 43 77 
B. 'A mainly socialist society 
in which public interests and a 
more controlled economy are 
most important'. 49 17 
A. 'A society which emphasises 
the social and collective 
35 
provision of welfare'. 55 27 
B. 'A society where the individual is 
encouraged to look after himself. 40 66 
A. 'A society which emphasises 
keeping people in even where 
this is not very efficient'. 42 25 
B. 'A society which emphasises 
increasing efficiency rather than 
keeping people in work'. 50 68 
A. 'A society which allows 
people to make and keep as much 
money as they can'. 53 73 
B. 'A society which emphasises 
similar incomes and rewards for 
everyone'. 43 19 
A. 'A society in which the creation 
of wealth is more highly rewarded'. 16 75 
B. 'A society in which caring for 
others is more highly rewarded'. 
------------------------------------------------- 
79 19 
----------------------- 
Market Source: & Opinion Research International, British Public Opinion, 
10/6 (July-Aug. 1988), p. 4. 
According to the table above, on the one hand, it is clear that a large 
proportion of the public perceived the current state of Britain to be close to the 
Thatcherite ideal. Britain was a mainly capitalist society in which private interests and 
free enterprise were more important (77%) than public interests and a controlled 
economy (17%); "the creation of wealth (75%) was more highly rewarded than caring 
for others" (19%); efficiency (68%) took precedence over "keeping people in work" 
(25%); individuals were encouraged to look after themselves (66%), and people were 
permitted "to make and keep as much money as they can" (73%). 
On the other hand, it was also clear that the public's ideal was very much 
different from the perception. Asked to choose between a Thatcherite and socialist 
society, the public opted for the Thatcherite one on two out of five dimensions, but 
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only by small majorities. They preferred a free society "which allows people to make 
and keep as much money as they can" (53%) to an egalitarian society which 
"emphasises similar incomes and rewards for everyone" (43%), and chose efficiency 
(50%) in preference to "keeping people in work even where this is not very efficient" 
(42%). 
Nevertheless, a large majority preferred a society "which emphasises the social 
and collective provision of welfare" (55%) to one in which "the individual is 
encouraged to look after himself' (40%). A massive majority preferred a society in 
which "caring for others" (79%) was more highly rewarded than "the creation of 
wealth" (16%). A small majority still preferred a "mainly socialist society in which 
public interests and a more controlled economy are most important" (49%) to a 
"mainly capitalist society" (43%). Thatcher's government had undoubtedly 
transformed the British political, economic and social structure, but this seemed to 
have been done without a cultural concomitant revolution in the thinking of ordinary 
people. 
The majority's belief in socialist values was demonstrated by statistics. On the 
issue of privatisation, between 1979 and 1983 the net majority preferring privatisation 
to nationalisation hovered around 20% -a peak for the post-war period. However, this 
percentage was declining. By 1987 the majority was a mere 4%. In addition, Gallup 
Political Index in 1988 reported that a majority was "heavily opposed to the 
privatisation of the remaining public industries - electricity, water, coal and 
railways ". 
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Although Mrs Thatcher significantly weakened the power of trade unions, she 
failed to persuade the public that trade unions were undesirable or unnecessary 
institutions. Throughout the decade a majority still regarded the unions as positive 
institutions rather than negative ones for their welfare. The percentage of people who 
regarded trade unions as a "Good thing" was continuously increasing; "55% (Wilson- 
Callaghan, 1974-8), 56% (Thatcher 1,1983-6), 64% (Thatcher 11,1983-6) and 70% 
(Thatcher 1111987-8)"41 
According to a survey, in 1979 17% of voters thought that welfare benefits had 
"not gone far enough". By 1987 the percentage had more than doubled to 34.9.42 This 
was a clear indication of a growing fear in the 1980s that the benefit system as a social 
safety net was failing to catch people in need. The public was increasingly willing to 
accept tax-increases for proper public expenditure. This was demonstrated by official 
statistics which showed that public preference for such tax-increases steadily rose - 
"34% (1979), 49% (1983), 59% (1985), 61% (1987), 73% (1989)51 - as opposed to 
service cutting. 43 
By contrast, from the start, Thatcher's government constantly spoke of the 
need to reduce the level of taxation. In Thatcher's own words, "tax cuts are the 
incentive to create the wealth which pays for higher benefits ),. 44 It was often claimed 
by Tories that the government's popularity resulted from its tax-cutting. In reality, 
however, the overall tax burden was higher in 1989 (43%) than it was in 1979 (39%). 
Indeed, there was a reduction of the tax burden, but mostly for the rich. On coming 
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into power, Thatcher's government restructured tax codes in favour of the better-off, 
45 for instance, by reducing income taxes on the top earner from 83% to 40% . 
In 1979 Catherine Itzin rightly foresaw an intention of the New Right "to alter 
the tax system to favour the wealthy rather than the workers". 46 The treasury's loss 
was made up for by increasing the tax burden on the less well-off by increasing 
National Insurance contributions, domestic rates, and VAT, all of which became a 
heavy burden particularly on the poor. For example, it increased VAT (the Valued 
Added Tax -a fonn of sales tax) from 2.5% to no less than 17.5%. Owing to these 
alteration and introductions, chief executives and their workers would pay the same 
VAT on a new pair of socks, despite a large gap in their income. 
A logical consequence of Thatcherite reforms for capitalist enterprise culture 
was a growing inequality. A survey done by the Institute for Fiscal Studies revealed 
that "half of the total giveaway in ten-ns of benefits and tax reductions has gone to the 
richest 10 per - cent of households". 
47 According to A Statistical Analysis 1979- 
1988189, in 1979 the top 20 per cent of wage earners had enjoyed 37 per cent of all 
income after tax, by 1988 they had 44 per cent. By contrast, the poorest 20 per cent of 
the population, who had received 9.5 per cent of income in 1979, earned a mere 6.9 
per cent by 1988.48 It appears that after the cake was created, most of its benefit went 
to the rich. Under Thatcher's government, the rich looked included as "instinctively 
selected ffiends" and the poor looked unfriendly excluded as "enemies". 
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A direct effect of this was that the living standard of the poorest section of 
society had been deteriorating since 1979. Between 1981 and 1987 the percentage of 
the population living in "Households below 50 per cent of National Income", which is 
where the EU draws the poverty line, 49 more than doubled from nine to nineteen - 
more than 10.5 million people. 50 
Supporters of the enterprise culture defended this, on the one hand, by 
attributing poverty to, what the Victorians called, "fecklessness" which blamed the 
individual's lack of effort and laziness. On the other hand, they defended it by highly 
prizing the Victorian value of self-reliance, a typical Thatcherite rhetoric which 
emphasised the individual's responsibility to stand on his/her own feet. 
However their defence did not appeal to the public. According to the Gallup 
Political Index, in 1977, before Mrs Thatcher came to power, 35% of voters thought 
that if people were poor their own lack of effort was probably to blame. By 1985 that 
figure fell to 22%, while 50% blamed 'circumstances' such as injustice in society. 
Asked in November 1987 whether "the unemployed have usually themselves to 
blame", 87% of them disagreed; only 13% agreed. 51 
In fact, people who claim state benefits are often forced to do so by their 
inability to find work and constraints of unemployment and poverty traps. For these 
people, their job or pension was financially all they have, and when unemployed they 
have nothing to fall back upon but the benefits. The problem seems not to lie in 
individual's lack of effort but in social organisation. Thus, what Mrs Thatcher claimed 
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- state-induced dependency may lead to people becoming "moral cripples 15 , 
52 or her 
supporters' argument that cutting state support for the least well-off would eliminate 
dependency, are not convincing. Rather, their argument caused a serious social 
division. 
Bob Jessop et al argued in a book, Margaret Thatcher's Two Nations, that 
"Govenunent policies are having a complex and uneven impact on such societal 
cleavages as productive/parasitic, rich/poor, North/South, employed/unemployed, 
etc. " They explained the reason for these "societal cleavages"; 
Thatcherism has broken with the Conservative 'one nation' 53 approach to 
the KWS [Keynesian Welfare State]. In both its social democratic and Tory 
cone nation' versions the KWS was presented as an attempt to integrate the 
poor, deprived and underprivileged into membership of the community 
through economic growth, full employment and, increasingly, universal 
welfare benefits ... 
The KWS rested on an image of social divisions in 
terms of multiple, horizontal strata with more or less access to desired 
values ... 
In contrast Thatcherism presents an image of social divisions 
based on a single, vertical cleavage stretching from top to bottom of 
socie ty ... 
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Barry Brian cynically wrote; "The remarkable ideological success of 
Thatcherism is to identify the selfish, anti-social choice with self-interest, so that the 
choice in favour of the interests that we share is treated as a piece of self-sacrifice". 55 
This sounds like a perfect explication of the 1980s dictum - "greed is good". 
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PoPular- Capitalism 
If Thatcherite enterprise values failed to instil themselves into the public, it 
appears to be strange that Mrs Thatcher had been elected as Prime Minister three 
times in a row. There emerged some factors to explain this ironic fact. The 1979 
election looked to be not so much the one won by Margaret Thatcher as the one lost 
by Labour which was viewed by the public as being hopeless in dealing with a social 
disturbance and an economic decline. For the 1983 election, the "Falklands Crisis" 
which briefly revived a wartime feeling of solidarity, gave some life back to Margaret 
Thatcher who, according to public opinion surveys at that time, had been the least 
popular Prime Minister next to Heath. In addition, in 1983 and 1987 Labour's in- 
fighting also made a contribution to Thatcher's victories. As has been noted, 
Thatcher's public persona, an uncompromising "warrior style - setting objectives, 
leading from the front, confronting problems, holding her position" also may have 
accounted for an appeal to the electorate as "authoritarian populism". However, these 
factors could not explain her victories entirely. The Guardian offered a more 
convincing hint of the answer for her victories, reporting on the 1987 Social Attitude 
survey; 
Mrs Thatcher may win the votes, but 'Thatcherite' values are becoming 
less popular, the survey finds. Support for new Conservative ideology 
stagnated between 1985 and 1986, following a gradual shift to the left over 
the previous two years. The key change in public opinion towards the 
political parties during the pre-election year was less to do with underlying 
values than with a sharp improvement in the electorate's evaluation of the 
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economic situation. People became much more optimistic about inflation, 
unemployment and about their own household incomes. So they voted 
Tory. 56 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Britain was in a state of economic crisis. 
Facing a world recession prompted by a further rise in oil prices, in 1980 inflation rose 
to a peak of 21.9%, and unemployment passed two million for the first time since the 
1930s. As recession deepened, manufacturing output shrivelled, and there was a 
succession of cuts, closures and bankruptcies across industry. However, the damage 
was not evenly spread. As has been briefly noted in "Margaret Thatcher's Two 
Nations", unemployment, for instance, was concentrated in some part of the country, 
particularly in the northem England; "Regionally, the South-East now has 2% fewer 
jobs than at the time of the 1979 peak; the South-West has 2% fewer; the West 
Midlands has 10% fewer; the East Midland has 3% fewer; Yorkshire and Humberside 
has 12% fewer; the North-West has 15% fewer; the North has 13% fewer". 57 This 
uneven regional unemployment figure was one of the explanations to an uneven 
geographical division of income and wealth. 58 The table below shows this; 
The gap in re4, yional wealth veneration: Gross Domestic 
Output per capita, 1975-86 
Region GDP per head relative to LTK average 
1975 1986 
South East 112.9 117.5 
Great London 125.8 124.6 
Rest of S. E. 103.6 112.6 
East Anglia C, 92.8 100.8 
South West 90.3 96.1 
East Midlands 96.7 96.1 
West Midlands 100.0 90.6 
Yorks. & Humberside 94.1 93.2 
North West 96.2 93.5 
North 93.6 91.9 
(Source: Economic Trends, 1977,1988) 
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As the table above shows, average personal disposable income in the South 
East region was more than 20% higher than in the Yorkshire & Humberside, the North 
West, and the North. The table unquestionably reveals that a principle of Thatcher's 
government was to protect the interests of people in the South where more of the 
managerial and professional classes live. These classes have traditionally been strong 
Conservative supporters. In the 1987 election, 57% of them voted for Conservative. 
However, Margaret Thatcher knew that in order to win elections, the party required 
the support of a majority of qualified and skilled workers who had stood between the 
lines of Conservative and Labour. Well aware of this, Margaret Thatcher and the New 
Right focused on an economic means to increase the support from them. Since such 
economic means gained popular support from them, 59 it has been generally called 
4C popular capitalism". 
Amongst the means, government's encouragement of a share in ownership 
through privatisation was most noticeable. The fact that nearly all the industries were 
sold off for much less than they were worth, provided a boost to people who could 
afford to buy shares of the industries. For instance, one of the big privatisation, British 
Telecom, attracted two million investors, and more than half of them experienced 
share-holding for the first time. In 1990, the number of individual shareholders 
reached nine million - almost three times as high as that of 1979.60 
There was no definite evidence as to how much electoral profit the 
Conservative party gained from privatisation sales, but the government must have 
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broadened its support group. Besides reinforcing traditional support from professional 
and managerial classes who were mostly rewarded by the privatisation sales, the 
government succeeded in gaining a considerable popularity from qualified and skilled 
workers, many of whom became shareholders in the 1980s, as has been noted by 
David Marsh. Indeed, in the 1987 election the Conservative party received the support 
of a majority from them; about 36%, compared with 32% in the 1983 election. 
According Ian Gilmour, "This was as good a way of bribing voters with their own 
money (and other people's) as has ever been invented"'. 61 
Thatcherite capitalism did not receive support from all strata of society. It 
could not increase support from manual and unskilled workers or the unemployed in 
the northern area, who were little benefited from the privatisation sales simply 
because they could not afford to buy shares. This is precisely the main characteristic of 
Thatcherite capitalism. It was popular only to those specifically targeted people for 
election victories. Thus, what made the Thatcher's govenu-nent different from 
previous post-war administrations was their lack of concern for the elements of 
society, those who did not, by and large, vote Conservative, but who still had to live 
with her policies. As has been noted with its restructuring tax system and welfare 
benefit system, the poor looked excluded by Thatcher's government as "instinctively 
selected enernies')'. 
As Thatcherite popular capitalism, promoting the dream of home ownership 
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and of financial success, increased Conservative's support base, it further weakened 
that of Labour, shattering its hope of immediate political power. Many of the Party 
members must have come to realise that without a significant transfon-nation of its 
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left-wing policies there would have been little hope of its being re-elected. These 
people including Tony Blair have been called Labour modernisers. They must have 
leamt lessons from the presence of Thatcherism as a distinctive brand of 
contemporary populism. After the three consecutive election defeat, the leftist 
magazine, Marxism Today observed in October 1988; 
Increasingly, at the heart of Thatcherism, has been its sense of New Times, 
of living in a new era. V4iile the Left remains profoundly wedded to the 
past, to 1945, to the old social democratic order, to the priorities of Keynes 
and Beveridge, it is the Right which now appears modem, radical, 
innovative and brimming with confidence and ideas about the future. 63 
Indeed, the sheer impact of Thatcherism was on the Labour Party. This will be 
dealt later. It can be seen that Britain, in the 1990s, after Thatcher's government, 
entered a new Thatcherite era with John Major's government and Tony Blair's New 
Labour, both of which inherited and developed Thatcherite enterprise policies. 
Thatcherism in Maior's Government 
In November 1990 John Major succeeded Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister. His 
premiership continued with the general election victory in 1992 until April 1997 when 
the Conservatives were defeated by New Labour. John Major was generally seen as a 
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relief after the stem and unbending Margaret Thatcher, and his brand of Conservatism 
has been seen by many as "Thatcherism with a human face". 
With John Major there came a change in style. In the 1980s Margaret Thatcher 
had a long list of enemies - the dependent society, the undeserving poor, left-wing 
local authorities, trade unions, and much of the non-market public sector. To conquer 
these enemies, she adopted a confrontational, or even abrasive style, smashing the 
socialist past and anything which, in her view, was not "one of us". It was like a 
continuous war or revolution as the Prime Minister tried to change the hearts and 
minds of the nation. John Major's style, however, was more that of a healer than of a 
warrior, preferring to console rather than to confront. Whereas Margaret Thatcher 
liked challenging people in debate, John Major simply liked meeting them. Like many 
of his Tory predecessors, he has been said to have been a "balancer". 64 
Major was able to get rid of unpopular policies such as the "Poll Tax". He did 
not agree with the well-known Thatcherite phrase - "There is no such thing as 
society". He tried to reduce the influence of the Thatcherites in his cabinet, for 
instance, by bringing Michael Heseltine, who was the main opposing force against 
Mrs Thatcher's leadership in 1990, back into the Cabinet. 65 Moreover, on some issues 
Major's view was to the left of Thatcher's. His view on the public services is one 
example. In place of the Thatcherite premise that all public services were suspect, he 
maintained the assumption that many of them were an unavoidable obligation of the 
modem state and only needed to be reformed. This is clearly seen in the Citizen's 
Charter introduced in 1991 which could be claimed as one of the few original policies 
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of Major's government. According to the 1992 Conservative manifesto, the Charter 
was trumpeted as "the most far-reaching programme ever devised to improve quality 
in public services". 66 Subsequent individual C4arters for particular public services 
followed - the Taxpayer's Charter and the NHS Patient's Charter. 
However, in reality, if the policies of Major government are closely examined, 
it is not difficult to see that their overwhelming thrust was based on the Thatcherite 
enterprise culture. The Citizen'S Charter Second Report said that "The Citizen's 
Charter is not only changing attitudes and culture but also the structural and 
managerial reforms - privatisation, market testing, the establishment of agencies - that 
are changing the systems which deliver public services". 67 At the heart of the Charter 
are the important conceptions of enterprise, market testing, and contracting out to a 
consumer-driven market. 
It is true that Major was viewed as a more consensual and pragmatic politician 
than Thatcher, but this does not mean that his policies were very different from hers. 
Rather, it is correct to say that he was acting in line with the Thatcherite enterprise 
culture. According to Ian Lang, he was "more Thatcherite than the lady herself', and 
he was "taking the Conservative agenda further than his predecessor did". 68 For 
instance, a government plan, the 1992 Private Finance Initiative, opened up the public 
sector by ending goverranental blocks on private involvement in public projects - rules 
intended to keep a clear distinction between public and private. With the plan, private- 
public ventures were promoted, pumping the market ethic into the public services 
such as coal, British Rail, and part of the Post Office as well as into many forbidden 
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areas of the welfare state such as the National Health Service. In 1992 in the 
quintessential Thatcherite capitalist forum of the fifteenth anniversary of the Adam 
Smith Institute, John Major claimed that; 
we have privatised State-owned industries. We have cut taxes. We have 
liberated businessmen [sic] and investors. We have deregulated and opened 
the market. We have spread wealth and we have spread ownership. We 
have seen a phenomenal growth in personal pensions and savings. There is 
no going back on this. 69 
Indeed, one of the main contributions to the general election victory in 1992 
was Major's continuous efforts to brand the Labour Party as "the badge of Socialism", 
being stuck in "the same old groove", 70 even if the Labour Party at this time was 
significantly moderate in its policies. Just after the victory, the Prime Minister, in an 
interview in the Sunday Express, confidently confirmed the demise of socialism in 
Britain; 
Socialism of course is dead and gone: Finished, passed, out of the window. 
Nobody believes in it any more. Nobody. Not in this country, not abroad. It 
is now a museum piece, nothing more. Time has passed it b Y. 71 
Major's government passed the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment 
Rights Act which aimed to further reduce the unions' power. The subsequent 
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legislation authorised employers to offer workers inducements to decertify their union. 
Gillian Shephard, then Employment Secretary, described it in the White Paper in 1992 
as signifying the end of the Conservative government's long-running "war" with the 
trade union movement. John Redwood argued; "Reports of the death of Thatcherism 
have been greatly exaggerated. The principles of Conservatism are not being killed off 
or interred. They live on". 72 The Conservative Party was finally defeated in the general 
election of May 1997. However, an influence of its 18-years regime was unstoppable. 
Charles Leadbeater wrote about this a few days after its defeat; 
The Tories may have departed but they - and Thatcher in particular - have 
mapped out the path down which we walk. We were all inescapably 
touched by their ideas and policies, willing or not. ... they have had such a 
powerful influence on us. They preached an ethic of responsibility but 
relieved most of the middle class of guilt or obligation to the less fortunate. 
That legitimised a low-level, everyday culture of greed ... . the Victorian 
values of work and thrift, have given way to the lottery culture of random 
selection and the Cedric Brown culture of rampant greed. ... whatever improvements the Conservatives made were bought at a high price of 
rising, intractable inequality which has left millions of people living on the 
margins of decency. 73 
Thatcherism's Impact on the Labour Party, and New Labour 
In some respect Mrs Thatcher had more effect on the Labour Party than she 
has done on the Conservative Party. Labour is now in many respects a party 
of European social democracy. It speaks cautiously on public spending and 
taxes, and abandoned unilateralism, is steadily weakening its connections 
with the trade unions and has given up on public ownership. The 
leadership's rhetoric now invokes 'consumers' or 'citizens' not 'workers'. 
Socialism, on the rare occasions that the word is uttered, is not about public 
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ownership but about supply side socialism, diffusing power, giving people 
more choice and freedom. 74 
After the defeat of the 1983 election, the Labour party has been significantly 
transformed by the impact of Thatcherite popular enterprise capitalism. As John 
McGrath observed, "The old Parliamentary Labourism made endless compromises 
by their need to attract the middle-class and professional-class vote". 75 After the 
defeat, the so-called Labour's "desocialising" process has begun with its fearful 
realisation that if the Party clung to its traditional socialist politics, it would never 
again be elected. This section will firstly examine the "desocialising" process which 
took place under the leadership of Neil Kinnock. Secondly, it will deal with the period 
of New Labour under Tony Blair, during which the process has been radically 
accelerated. 
Generally speaking, the post-war Labour Party has been conceived as a 
socialist party. There have been two ideological poles in it. One is based on 
"revisionism" which does not follow Marxist revolutionary principles. Its central idea 
is the discontent with the Marxist prediction - the collapse of capitalist societies 
before revolutions established left-wing governments. Revisionists such as Hugh 
Gaitskell (1906-63) and Roy Jenkins argued that the prediction had been proved 
wrong because workers, the main revolutionary forces, had not become materially 
poorer or revolutionary in outlook. Thus, for the socialist goal of a more equal society, 
rejecting revolutionary means, they pursued parliamentary means such as progressive 
taxation and redistributional welfare state. 76 
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The other pole is the hard left which have refused to accept the revisionist 
idea. Members of the hard left, as has been briefly examined, argued for their 
alternative economic strategy such as workers' control in state-owned industries. They 
were constantly in conflict with such revisionist party leaders as Wilson and 
Callaghan. They were, in one way or another, responsible for the social upheaval in 
the 1970s. When the 1979 election was lost to the militant New Right led by Mrs 
Thatcher, the hard left insisted that a similar return to the roots of socialist ideology 
was necessary. Defeating and discrediting the revisionists, the hard left imposed 
Michael Foot as Labour's leader in 1980. With a manifesto of a radical left-wing set 
of policies - promising the unilateral abandonment of Britain's nuclear weapons, 
extensions of nationalisation, and oppositions to the (Capitalist) EEC, Labour failed to 
gain support from the electorate in the 1983 general election. After this, its policies 
have gradually changed from the left towards the centre. 
Labour's "desocialising" process began with Neil Kinnock, who succeeded 
Michael Foot as the Party's leader in 1983. Neil Kinnock began to realise that if 
Labour was to broaden its electoral appeal and regain political power "there would 
have to be profound changes in the mentality of the Labour Party". One of them, he 
thought, was to overcome an element within the Party which had, in his words, 
"treated realism as treachery ... and scorned any emphasis on the 
importance of 
winning elections as a contaminating bacillus called 'electorism )" . 
77 
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First of all, Kinnock changed his own ideological mentality in the 1980s. This 
was evident in his two different views on miners' strike. In the early 1970s, his 
proletarian credentials were undoubtful. He defended miners' mass pickets in I 
parliament and violence by saying that; 
Hon gentlemen opposite have bemoaned picketing. If they had been on 
strike for five weeks, if their families' total income was Va week social 
security benefits, if they were worried about smoking their next cigarette, if 
they were worried about paying the rent ... what would their reaction be? What would be the instinct of any red-blooded man in this House, having 
put his family to all that inconvenience and near misery if he saw someone 
riding roughshod over his picket line? I know what my attitude would be. 
In fact, I should be worried if it were not the case. 78 
However, according to Tony Cliff and Donny Gluckstein, Neil Kinnock 
underlined; 
his insistence that the labour movement should respect the Tory law by 
denouncing both miners' leader Arthur Scargill and the Militant-influenced 
Labour-controlled council in Liverpool at the party conference in October 
1985 ... Under Kinnock Labour moved 
further to the right... 79 
However, Kinnock was cautious about making "major forays into changing 
policies" because of his belief that any attempt to institute major policy changes would 
have been doomed "without long preparation and a variety of actions to push and 
53 
persuade people and organisations into changed positions". 80 Nevertheless, during, 
what Kinnock called, the "first innings" - from 1983 to 1987, some changes were 
made in the party's policies. One was the introduction of the new conception of a 
"third way" of "democratic socialism", an ideology which, in Kinnock's words, was 
C49 81 separate and distinct from the stale vanguardism of the ultra-left' . It was not clear, 
however, that what it was ideologically meant at this stage. What was clear was that 
the "third way" was a stepping stone towards the Party's accommodation of the 
market economy in the near future. For example, as one of the strategies of the third 
way, in 1986 the Party accepted "social ownership". In Kinnock's words, it was in 
opposition to old-style nationalisation and supported diverse, wider forms of social 
ownership, ranging from "small co-operatives to municipal enterprises and right 
through to the major utility corporations like British Telecom". 82 
As a result of his rather cautious revisionist attempts, the 1987 Labour's 
General Election manifesto, Britain Will Win, scaled down the socialist proposals of 
1983, such as pledges to extend public ownership, to renationalise privatised assets, 
and to massively increase public expenditure. 
The defeat at the 1987 election offered a definitive lesson for the Labour party. 
The party witnessed the electoral success of Thatcherite popular capitalism which 
continuously diminished the working-class population and trade union membership, 
who had traditionally been the strongest supporters of Labour. This led to Kinnock's 
realisation, as Patrick Cosgrave wrote in his book of The Strange Death of Socialist 
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Britain, that "the left-wing policies which he had espoused all his life made it virtually 
impossible for a Labour govermnent to be elected". He added; 
There were two elements in Kinnock's nature. The first one was belief in 
socialism. The second was ambition. After the crushing defeat of 1987, 
ambition, in Neil Kinnock's mind, gained the ascendancy. One after the 
other the policies which he had espoused were jettisoned. Suddenly the 
Labour Party was in the business of promising, not to overturn reforms that 
had been put in place by successive governments headed by Mrs Thatcher 
but to refine them. 83 
A comprehensive review of the party's policies came after the defeat in 1987. 
Basically, this was a response prompted by the electoral success of Thatcherite 
popular capitalism. Its aim was simple; to attempt to widen the Party's appeal to the 
voters by eliminating electorally unpopular policies such as nationalisation and high 
taxation. The so-called "centripetal tendency" was seen in a series of policy review 
documents - Meet the Challenge, Make the Change (1989), as well as two subsequent 
policy documents, Looking to the Future (1990) and Opportunity Britain: Labour's 
Better Wayfor the 1990s (199 1). 
A theory of "New Times" offered a crucial theoretical basis to the party's 
Review. As has been noted, it first appeared in Marxism Today in October 1988. 
Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, who began the "New Times project"' explained; 
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The "New Times" argument is that the world has changed, not just 
incrementally but qualitatively, that Britain and other advanced capitalist 
societies are increasingly characterised by diversity, differentiation and 
fragmentation, rather that homogeneity, standardisation and the economics 
and organisations of scale which characterised modem mass society. 84 
According to them, Margaret Thatcher transfon-ned Britain from a society of 
the old post-war settlement to a new world, seeking to appropriate that new world for 
itself, "ideologically ('socialism is dead', 'the market determines everything'), 
materially (giving it shape, a Thatcherite inflexion, through policy and practice), and 
culturally (the attempt to promulgate a new entrepreneurial culture)". 85 Thus, they 
suggest that the Left should seek to promote the long overdue modernisation by 
accommodating or adopting many of features of Thatcherism. Whether their argument 
is right or not, the idea of "New Times" has certainly given the revisionists basic ideas 
about how a contemporary British society has been transformed by Thatcherite 
capitalistic economic and cultural forces. 
The party's positive accommodation of the market economy was a natural 
choice. It was clearly seen in Meet the Challenge, Make the Change (1989), which 
was one of the key documents to result from the Policy Review. It stated that; "in very 
many areas of the economy the market and competition are essential in meeting the 
demands of consumers, promoting efficiency and stimulating innovation, and often 
the best means of securing all the myriad, incremental changes which are needed to 
take the economy forward". 86 The "economic role of modem government", Neil 
Kinnock argued, was therefore "to help the market system work properly where it can, 
will and should - and to replace or strengthen it where it can't, won't or shouldn 
9r) 
. 
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If this statement had been published in the 1970s, British voters would have thought 
that it came from the Conservatives. 
Shortly after the fourth consecutive election defeat, Kinnock resigned and in 
July 1992 John Smith became the Party leader. Even during the short period of his 
leadership terminated by his sudden death in May 1994, the "desocialising" process 
continued. During Smith's time, there emerged the growing scepticism about "Clause 
IV") of the Party Constitution -a symbolic commitment to a basic socialist value, 
namely, "common ownershipI9. 
With the new leadership of Tony Blair, "Clause IV" was doomed. Indeed, it 
was Tony Blair who made the decisive break with the Labour's past. He has been the 
most determined revisionist, accelerating the pace of the "desocialising" process. He 
knew that society had changed radically. Its core vote in the working class and trade 
unions had shrunk and many of its associated interests notably with the trade unions, 
local government and public sector, had been weakened. He believed that the party 
accordingly must change radically. 
Tony Blair has shown little respect for old Labour's socialist values - public 
ownership, economic planning, tax-and-spend welfarism and the close link with the 
trade unions. In his hand, the name of socialism was transformed into "social-ism" 
which advocates enterprise culture in the market economy. He made a significant 
contribution to such journals as Marxism Today as early as 199 1. Here, he argued for 
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re-establishing "the agenda for public action without the old failings of collectivism"; 
"the battle over theoretical forms of economic organisation is dead ... We need to 
develop instead, a new economics of the public interest, which recognises that a 
thriving competitive market is essential for individual choice". 88 
The culmination came with the removal of Labour's main constitutional 
objective -"common ownership" - defined in Clause 4 as to "secure for the workers by 
hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution 
thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange". 89 When Blair made his leadership speech at 
the Labour Party conference in Blackpool on 4 October 1994, although he did not 
directly mention Clause IV, it was not difficult to discern that this was his target. He 
told his audience that; 
Let us say what we mean and mean what we say. We should stop saying 
what we don't mean and start saying what we do mean, what we stand by, 
what we stand for. It is time we had a clear, up-to-date statement of the 
objects and objectives of our party. ... 
This is a modem party living in an 
age of change. It requires a modem constitution that says what we are in 
terms the public cannot misunderstand and the Tories cannot 
misrepresent. 90 
After wide debates on the "statement of the objects and objectives", at a 
Special Conference on 29 April 1995, held at the Methodist Central Hall, 
Westminster, the party leader finally secured the approval, by a 65 % vote, of a new 
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Clause IV, entitled "Labour's Aims and Values". Removing any trace of commitment, 
however symbolic, to the "Common ownership", the new Clause IV celebrates "the 
enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition". 91 This marked, in Labour's 
history, the moment when Labour abandoned the idea that the capitalist market 
economy was immoral, exploitative and inefficient. In short, it marked Labour's final 
break with state socialism. In fact, Labour was not truly New Labour until Blair. "The 
key difference", David Rubinstein argues, "between the Labour Party of today [New 
Labour] and the party led by Ramsay MacDonald and his successors up to and 
including Neil Kinnock is the absence now of the socialist left, which collapsed 
suddenly in the 1990s". 92 Bill Jones points out Blair's achievements. Amongst them 
are; 
At the 1997 conference he read the unions a humiliating lecture on how 
to pull together with management and not to expect any favours from 
him ... 
He accepted their [Tory] spending plans for the first two years of his 
government. 
He has favoured big business people for a number of key appointments 
rather than more obvious Labour people (e. g. Lord Simon of BP as the 
Trade and Industry Minister, Martin Taylor of Barclays Bank, who is 
advising on benefits, and GeofErey Robinson as a Treasury minister, 
ironically placed in charge of tax avoidance when he was revealed to 
have huge investments in offshore tax havens himself) 
He has accepted privatisation. The left-wing journalist Paul Foot has 
written that during the 1980s Labour pledged to renationalise every 
enterprise privatised by the Tories, but once Blair came to power each 
pledge was systematically abandoned, including, most shamefully for 
some, that of renationalising the railways. 
Blair abandoned any opposition to capitalism, the original source of 0 
socialism and the Labour Party, and regularly praised the 'dynamism' 
of free enterprise as well as accepting the existence of very rich people 
as legitimate. 93 
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Ex-Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd said that "Mr Blair is trying to clamber 
onto our platform, paint it a different colour, and claim it as his own". 94 Indeed, Tony 
Blair has been a Thatcher admirer, and her true successor. He argued that many of 
Thatcher's reforms - tax cuts, enforcing the market economy, weakening the union's 
power, attacking welfare benefits - were constructive. Margaret Thatcher, in his view, 
was a "radical, not a Tory". Arguing that "only a Labour Govermnent could complete 
the economic and social revolution begun by Thatcher in the 1980s", which were now 
imperilled by the revival of the "old boy network" in the Tory Party, he urged those 
who wanted some real "radicalism" to vote for him. 95 That a Labour leader was asking 
the electorate to believe that he would overturn almost everything his party stood for 
in favour of the continuation of a Thatcherite revolution was testimony to the 
powerful appeal of the Thatcherite legend. The Economist pointed out New Labour's 
ardour for the enterprise culture by analysing Brown's pre-budget report for 2000; 
In his pre-budget report this week, Gordon Brown declared that he wanted 
to make Britain a more entrepreneurial place ... ; in 2000-01, EI Om will be 
spent on boosting 'enterprise skills' in primary and secondary schools. For 
grown-ups, he proposes a new employee share-ownership scheme, which 
will give workers a direct stake in the fortunes of their employers. From 
April 2000, firms will be able to give their workers up to E3,000-worth of 
shares free of income tax (the cash equivalent would incur tax of up to 
E1,200). Employees will also be able to buy f, 1,500-worth a year out of 
pre-tax income. 96 
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By the end of the 1990s, Thatcher's ultimate aim to establish Britain as a free 
enterprise society for the next generation seemed to have been fulfilled. In the ten 
years after the 1989 MORI's survey which revealed a materialistic and individualistic 
attitude among the young, the 1999 MORI's survey revealed the fact that "Today's 
youngsters are very hard-headed about money", wanting "to learn more about money 
at school". The Observer, publishing the result of MORI poll, adds examples of young 
people's business ability and enthusiasm; "... One youngster, Tom Hartley, 14, is a 
luxury car salesman in his father's business. His sales patter and ability to close deals 
has made him Britain's youngest self-made millionaire ... For Tom Hadfield, age 16, 
the Net has been a passport to riches. He is the creator of Soccernet, the world's most 
,, 97 popular football website, which is now valued at about E12 million ... By the end of 
the 1990s, Britain was certainly heading for a free capitalist enterprise society. 
Conclusion 
By the end of the 1990s, Britain seemed to have lost its ideological balance. 
Socialist values have been marginalised as capitalistic entrepreneurship has 
dominated. Martin Thomas, a British socialist activist and writer, wrote about his 
bewilderment by quoting a conversation between his friends and young students about 
socialism; 
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"WOULD YOU BE INTERESTED IN A SOCIALIST MAGAZINET' 
some comrades of mine were asking working-class 16-to-19 year olds at 
Further Education colleges recently. The student's response was neither 
more hostile nor less friendly than usual, but more puzzled. Again and 
again they asked: "Socialism? What's that? " We might as well have been 
promoting theosophy or bimetallism. 98 
As a result of two-decades' effort, from Margaret Thatcher through John 
Major to Tony Blair, the capitalist enterprise culture has now penetrated British 
society. The dominance of capitalist values has, in turn, made a significant impact on 
the arts and theatre world. The next chapter will examine the impact on changes in 
arts and theatre. 
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Chapter 11: Two Different Arts Councils 
Introduction 
By the end of the 1980s, British society was apparently different from that of 
the late 1960s and the 1970s. After the ten-year Thatcher regime, the prospect of a 
Thatcherite new age seemed very close. Capitalist values such as the market economy 
prevailed in almost all aspects of British society. Thatcherism seemed to have won the 
ideological battle against, what she called, "creeping Socialism". 
The cultural atmosphere was also transformed during the 1980s. While the 
progressive age of the 1960s and 1970s, in which a counter-culture movement had 
flourished, gradually became a thing of the past, enterprise culture was praised and 
promoted. In the 1980s, the enterprise culture also penetrated into the arts and theatre 
world. This was primarily effected by the Arts Council which had, since the war, 
powerfully influenced the cultural climate and quality of Britain. 
As has been examined in the introduction of this study, there was a clear 
distinction in the attitude of the Arts Council between that prior to Thatcher's 
government and that after Thatcher's government. Before Thatcher's govenunent, the 
Arts Council was rather conceived of as a sympathetic and independent supporter to 
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the arts in general and theatre in particular, despite its traditional role of preferably 
supporting "centres of excellence". This was possible because successive govenunents, 
both Conservative and Labour, persuaded by the Council, had generously kept 
expanding its Grant in Aid. In addition, while doing this, they had also maintained their 
role as merely patrons of the arts. However, in the 1980s, the Council could not and did 
not operate as it used to. It could no longer be a sympathetic and independent supporter 
of the arts. This was mainly because the idea of enterprise advocated by the right-wing 
government penetrated the Council as a prime force. The right-wing Thatcher 
govenunent cut its public spending and also appointed Sir William Rees-Mogg to 
Chairman of the Council. As a result, not only was the Council itself transformed into 
a business-like institution, but also it too imposed business management on its clients. 
Theatre companies were forced to transform themselves into managerial ones. 
Consequently, this had a significant effect on their artistic mentality and activity. 
This chapter will examine the two different cultural climates influenced by the 
Arts Council; one in the progressive 1960s and 1970s and the other in the 1980s. In 
doing so, it will demonstrate, implicitly or explicitly, that it was the economics of the 
Arts Council than writers and directors that was responsible for the changes in theatre 
after Thatcher's goveniment. 
To clearly illustrate the difference, it will explore how differently the political 
theatre movement was dealt with by the Council between in the 1970s when its 
vigorous activities, perhaps made possible by arts subsidy, characterised the 
progressive age of 1970s and in the 1980s when 
its collapse, as a result of cuts in 
subsidy and the imposition of business management, characterised the conservative 
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Thatcherite age. It will also examine the abolition of the Greater London Council as an 
illustration of how the uncompromising right-wing government repressed oppositional 
cultural movement. The aim of this chapter is to offer a basic ground to the 
development of the main subject of this study - the theatre management and economics 
in the 1990s as a direct influence of arts subsidy. 
The Arts Council in the Pro2ressive Age 
Traditionally the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) had subsidised 
producers, mainly through grants to theatre companies. Its policies were 
based on the modernist/liberal-humanist view that the artist has something 
special to offer to society that transcends any particular political or 
economic regime. Art puts people in touch with 'universal' values, so it 
deserves Protection both from market forces and State interference since, 
like education and social security, it is an essential ingredient in the satisfied 41) 
citizen's life. ... In the 1970s, Arts Council policy generally had stuck to this line, though it was tempered by a growing commitment to arts education as 
a way of broadening access to the 'high arts'. ' 
Although it cannot be said that art policies are more significant than economic 
or national security policies in the daily lives of the public, the commitment of a 
goverment to the arts such as its view on arts funding is one thing by which people 
can judge the quality of their life. In Britain, the Arts Council of Great Britain (1946- 
1994) had officially been responsible for that quality. What happened to the Council 
was, therefore, of symbolic importance to the culture as a whole. 
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As has been examined, the emergence of the Arts Council immediately after the 
war can be seen in relation to the social structure based on the welfare system. The 
Council was established as an autonomous state-funded organisation to mediate 
between goverment and the arts, independently deciding which artist and arts 
organisations should receive financial assistance from the Council and what their 
grants should be. In this way the state and the arts were to be kept "at ann's length" to 
avoid such undesirable things as political censorship of the arts and the making of 
state-approved art. 
Until the end of the 1970s, in other words, before Thatcher's govenu-nent, the 
Council's independence from the central government had been maintained. This had 
been possible partly thanks to the Council's own efforts to keep it free from a direct 
political intervention, such as Lord Goodman's conviction published in its Annual 
Report of 1969 - "I remained unrepentantly ... 
divorced from direct government 
intervention, and free ... 
from political slanting ... ... 
2 It was also partly due to the tacit 
consensus of successive governments', either Conservative or Labour, not to deviate 
too far from their traditional role as mere art patrons. Sir Roy Shaw described "the 
ann's length principle" and thought of this as "the pride of British policies for the 
arts"; 
Since both the main parties likely to govem have this year established 
working parties on arts policy ... Hitherto 
it has been the pride of British 
policies for the arts that they were not, as happens in many countries, 
implemented by a government ministry, but were entrusted instead to an 
independent body (the Arts Council), thus keeping politicians, in Lord 
Redcliffe-Maud's phrase, 'at arms length' from the artist. 3 
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Government pays the piper, but makes no attempt to call the tune. The 
situation was described in an Arts Council report over twenty years when 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer was the Minister responsible for the arts: 
No Minister directs its policy or decides how and to who its grant 
shall be made. There is no single instance on record of a Chancellor 
of the Exchequer requiring or directing, or even advising, the Arts 
Council to do this or not to do that, and when from time to time some 
action of the Arts Council is criticised in the House of Commons, 
successive Chancellors have invariably declared that they will not 
interfere with the Arts Council's discretion. 4 
One important element in "the arm's length principle" was that the Council 
should act to make the government recognise the importance of art issues, and to 
persuade it to devote more resources to the arts. The amount of money the Council had 
received was closely related to the performance of the economy - the government's 
response to the economy, and the government's response to the arts. In the 1950s the 
British economy was still in the process of recovering from the war. The structure of 
the arts sector was far less complex and its scope was less extensive, being 
overwhelmingly metropolitan in character. During the period the annual grant award to 
the Council doubled from E675,000 to fl, 218,000, but it was not a particularly vast 
amount of state money for the arts. 
The 1960s was often said to be the decade of economic stability and prosperity. 
The govenunent could afford to use more resources for the arts world. The Labour 
government under Harold Wilson, particularly, had a definite arts policy. It was 
detailed in a white paper, A Policy For The Arts - The First Steps, written under the 
supervision of the first Arts Minister, Jennie Lee. The paper, above all, was an attempt 
to make arts prevail in "everyday life". It stated; 
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In any civilised community the arts and associated amenities, serious or 
comic, light or demanding, must occupy a central place. This enjoyment 
should not be regarded as something remote from everyday life ... Beginning 
in the schools, and reaching out into every comer of the nation's life, in city 
and village, at home, at work, at play, there is an immense amount that could 
be done to improve the quality of everyday life. 5 
The most immediate effect of Lee's white paper was a significant increase in 
the Council's grant. Particularly, in the year when the new Royal Charter was 
introduced in 1967, government subsidy was sharply increased from E3,9 10,000 
(1965/66) to E5,700,000 (1966-67). It reached E8,200,000 in 1969-70 and E9,300,000 
in 1970-1. With the substantially increased arts subsidy, the Council guided the 
expansion of the arts sector. As far as theatre was concerned, amongst others, two 
important things took place. One of them was that the Council encouraged regional 
theatrical activity by supporting the establishment of new theatres in Newcastle, 
Exeter, Leeds, and in various towns and cities across the country. By the early 1970s, 
there were more than sixty subsidised repertory theatres across the UK. The Council 
also served as a springboard for the proliferation of alternative theatre companies in the 
1970s. 
In the 1970s, the Council began to go through a difficult period. The world- 
wide oil crisis in 1973 brought the Council's expansion policy to an end. For the first 
time, the Arts subsidy was not increased in 1975. In the latter half of the 1970s, the 
Council suffered from the devaluation of its grant by inflation. During this period, 
although the Council's grant-in-aid was increased - f28.85m (1975/76), E37.15m 
(1976/77), E42.725m (1977/78), E51.8m (1978/79), the Council found it difficult to 
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meet the demand from the sharply increased regional arts centres and the proliferation 
of the alternative companies. For instance, alternative theatre grew almost by 300%, 
from 56 in 1975 to 171 in 1979. 
Indeed, although the arts subsidy had been steadily and consistently increased 
since its foundation, the Council had constantly felt short of money. The amount of 
money it had received from government had never been great enough to meet the needs 
of its clients. This has always led to accusations of the Council's unfair distribution of 
arts funding. It is necessary to examine this matter in detail because the unfair 
distribution claimed by many people became the main factor in the creation of the 
British cultural climate. 
The council's decision to distribute arts funding was closely related to its value 
judgements concerning the arts. From its foundation, its decisions have been described 
as being highly politically based on cultural elitism. Charles Landstone, the Council's 
first drama director, described this as early as 1949; 
[the Arts Council] must raise the standard of the arts and make them more 
accessible to the people, but it must watch lest the standard be raised so high 
that the people may not desire to access. A constant balance must be kept 
between the artist's self-confidence and the public's fear of the unknown. It 
is like the climbing of a ladder. The artist, self-confident, glowing, with a 
sense of beauty, stands at the top. At the foot stands the man in the street, a 
little apprehensive, yet aching with the desire to share that beauty. The man 
at the top must descend runcy by rung until his down-stretched arm can be r; l 4n 
grasped by the unstretched arm of the would-be climber. Then together, 
rung by rung, they can ascend. The closing of the gap between the two out- tl 6 
stretched arms must be the constant task of the Arts Council. 
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According to the description above, it is assumed that the Council did not hold 
the opinion that art grew out of the nonnal interaction of the people. In its view, the 
Arts were in the hands of the gifted metaphorically standing at the top of the ladder, 
while the public, stood at the bottom of the ladder, ignorant, and incapable of doing 
anything artistic for themselves. Thus to understand or appreciate the Arts, they must 
be introduced to the examples of 'high art'. In the 1970s, the Arts Council's cultural 
elitism was still in effect. In 1976, in a report about arts funding submitted to the 
Gulbenkian Foundation, Lord Redcliffe-Maud wrote; 
... who should we public patrons help? 'The many' and 'the few' do not 
together constitute the whole population. They must be... a whole series of 
concentric rings. The innermost circle consists of the few people of genius... 
Wider than the circle of the genius is the circle of talent... Still wider is the 
circle of those capable of professional teaching of their art... Outside that 
circle are the active amateurs... Beyond them is the still wider circle of those 
who enjoy the arts as an audience... and beyond them. 7 
From the point of Landstone's ladder or Redcliffe's concentric rings, it is not 
difficult to see the message they wanted to deliver on behalf of the Arts Council; to 
support the "the few centres of excellence" first. Indeed, it should be borne in mind 
that in its first Royal Charter, the Council's main objective was "to improve the 
standard of execution of thefine arts". [My Italic] As early as 1950 W. E. Williams, the 
Council's Secretary General, argued that "High standards can be built only on a limited 
scale", so he argued for a role based on a few institutions in deciding what to support. 
8 
This policy remained constant throughout the 1950s. Williams' last report as Secretary 
General in 1961-62 repeated the policy, except changed "roses" to "institutions"; "The 
essence of the Arts Council policy nowadays is to sustain the best possible standards of 
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performance at a limited number of institutions". 9 He added in 1962; "... Even if [the 
Council's] income were larger, it would still prefer to consolidate those priorities [to 
fund a few institutions] than to dissipate its resources upon an extensive provision of 
the second rate. If the power-houses were to fail, there would be a blackout of the 
living arts in Britain". 10 Lord Gibson, the Council's Chairman from 1972 to 1977, also 
argued; "Inevitably, and rightly, most of our money has gone to the traditional arts. It is 
due to its belief that each generation has a right to enjoy its cultural inheritance". ' 1 He 
did not conceal his patronising view on the new cultural movement emerging from the 
late 1960s, regarding the movement's "cultural democracy" as "the romantic notion"; 
There is, however, a new creed emerging, to which we are totally opposed. 
This is the belief that because standards have been set by the traditional arts 
and because those arts are little enjoyed by the broad mass of people, the 
concept of quality is 'irrelevant'. The term cultural democracy has been 
invoked by those who think in this way, to describe a policy which rejects 
discrimination between good and bad and cherishes the romantic notion that 
there is a 'cultural dynamism' in the people which will emerge only if they 
can be liberated from the cultural values hitherto accepted by an elite and 
from what one European 'cultural expert' has recently called 'the cultural 
colonialism of the middle classes'. 12 
According to John McGrath, "Excellence is the key-word of the new 
domineering ideology ... to move towards a standardisation of cultural work". 
13 For 
the better understanding of the implication of McGrath's argument, it is worth listening 
to Malcolm Griffiths who served as a member of the Drama Panel and many of its sub- 
committees from 1971-77. According to him, excellence implies ideological bias; "The 
Arts Council is there to perpetuate the monopoly of an elite, essentially the ruling 
classes, over the national resources, the people's money". To support his claim, 
Griffiths pointed out the Council's potential for an abuse of power caused by its antl- 
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democratic decision-making "concealed in the interstices", setting up policies "without 
regard to reality". In the Council, the Financial Department, in charge of dividing the 
cake, was the only department without a public committee or panel. By its closed-room 
decision making, Griffiths argued, the Council could exert a kind of censorship; "The 
Arts council does have the means by which it can directly affect companies and the 
livelihoods of the theatre workers involved by making decisions which never go 
through committee". 
14 
The problem was that this censorship, in some cases, was politically motivated. 
This was demonstrated in the cases of the two theatre companies, Foco Novo and 7: 84 
(England). What happened to them in the 1970s was generally regarded as an example 
of how a theatre company could become a victim of the Council's politically-motivated 
decisions. Foco Novo' The Nine Days and Saltley Gates and 7: 84 (England)'s The 
Ballygombeen Bequest received attention in the media. The fonner was criticised for 
its advocacy of trade union militancy, and the latter became the target of a libel suit. As 
a consequence of this, the two companies had to face grant reductions in the following 
year. Socialist writer Steve Gooch argued; 
Throughout the late seventies the Arts Council strenuously denied that it 
acted in any way as a political censor. When challenged, it would always 
point to 'standards' ... Consequently, 
it refused or cut grants to the poorer, 
less industrious companies who did not attract the most gifted actors and 
who, by going into the toughest areas to find their audiences, could not point 
to high box-office taking. 15 
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The political nature of the Arts Council was further pursued by Robert 
Hutchison. In his book The Politics of the Arts Council which analyses the nature of 
the Council's internal politics from 1945 to 1979, he asserts that "the Arts Council is 
an intensely political organisation ... to the extent that it controls resources which 
create, transform, and interpret society's values and norms". 16 His claim is convincing 
in view of the allocation of money by the Arts Council. According to Catherine Itzin, 
in 1973/74 the total money sixty alternative companies received - E250,000 - was just 
equivalent to half the grant of the national companies, E500,000.17 According to the 
Cork Report in 1986 - Theatre Is for All, in 1970/1 the two national were receiving 
30% of the total Arts Council funding allocated to drama, and by 1980/1 this had risen 
to 43%. For touring companies and projects - most of which went to alternative theatre 
- the figures were 2% (1970/1) and 13% (1980/1). 
18 
Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between the Council before Thatcher's 
government and the Council afterwards. Most people associated with the arts think that 
until the end of the 1970s the Arts Council had been benevolently supporting the arts. 
As has been noted, this was possible mainly due to the Council's own efforts to 
maintain "the arms length principle" and to the successive governments' restraint from 
interfering in how the money they gave to the Council should be spent. John McGrath, 
despite his argument that excellence has led to "a standardisation of cultural work", 
believed that the Council's allocation of arts funding was based on liberal ideals; 
When I was on the Arts Council drama committee in the seventies those 
values [liberal values] were quite clear: a company was free to make any 
political statement - as long as the quality was high enough, they were 
supported. 19 
76 
The Council's liberal ideal was demonstrated by the fact that, it gave its 
financial support to the "artists who ... consistently bite the hand that feeds them", even 
if the support was small, and even if its high ranking officials such as the Chairman, 
Lord Goodman, often questioned "whether it was the duty of the state actually to 
subsidise those who are working to overthrow it". Their general, basic view on the arts 
was as follows; 
It must be understood that the so-called cultural heritage which made 
Europe great - the Bachs and Beethovens, the Shakespeares and Dantes, the 
Constables and Titians - is no longer communicating anything to the vast 
majority of Europe's population ... It is bourgeois culture and therefore only immediately meaningful to that group. 
The great artistic deception of the twentieth century has been to insist to all 
people that this was their culture. The Arts Council of Great Britain was 
established on this premise. 20 
The Council's Annual Report and Account in 1976-77 listed a total of 18 
companies, which could be described as socialist, a total subsidy of around f400, OOO. 21 
For instance, Red Ladder could receive sustained increasing subsidy from f 18,950 in 
1975/76 through f 37,500 in 1977/78 to E48,470 in 1979/80. The money given to the 
political theatre played an important role in developing its counter- cultural experiments 
in its heyday of the 1970s. 
One of them was its introduction of a collective working principle. Ideally 
speaking, the collective method implies a theatrical structure in which decision making 
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and duties are equally shared by company members. Every member has a say, everyone 
is equally paid, and everyone shares the process of work. They called themselves 
theatre workers, in an attempt to break down hierarchical distinction attached to certain 
roles such as artistic director and leading actor. The aim of this egalitarian democratic 
structure was to eliminate the traditional hierarchical culture of the theatre in order to 
offer within the theatre company a model for the organisation of society as a whole. 
John McGrath, whose company 7: 84 was working on the basis of the collective 
principle, explained; 
It is important here to see theatre not just as 'plays', but as a means of 
production, with bosses, workers, and unemployed, with structural 
relationships and varied contradictions. It is through its structures as much 
as through its product that theatre expresses the dominant bourgeois 
ideology. 22 
Despite internal conflicts and tensions related to personality and working 
methods, strain and fatigue caused by touring - usually one-night stands five times a 
week, and the problem of McGrath himself being a dominant figure and thereby 
contradicting the socialist ideal itself, 23 the collective working principle had been, 
more or less, maintained by 7: 84 throughout the 1970s. Practically speaking, however, 
the usefulness of the collective method is somewhat questionable. McGrath pointed out 
the crisis reached in the late 1970s; 
What happened round about six years after we began was that it was almost 
like built in obsolescence. Many of the cast went all at the same time. The 
guy who built all the sets, played the fiddle, drove the truck, loaded the 
truck, suddenly his back went and he couldn't work. He, at the same time, 
got involved with somebody (his marriage had broken up during the touring 4D 11) 
years) who wanted him to come off the road to live a life. And, at the same 
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time, other people were having problems either worn out with life on the 
road or wanting to go and, being wooed for large amounts of dough, for 
other productions, wanted to start a career. Others were just exhausted. 
Some of them, their voices just went. It all happened over a period of six to 
nine months. 24 
Baz Kershaw has also claimed that "at worst this [the collective method] led to 
the 'everyone must do everything' syndrome, in which the anti-structural tendencies of 
the counter-culture produced theatrical waste and inefficiency". 25 Nevertheless, some 
merits of the collective method cannot be ignored. Apart from its ethical and moral 
merit based on egalitarian idealism, it proved to be particularly significant for actors. In 
traditional theatre work most actors are generally viewed as the least powerful in the 
creative process. This is mainly due to the fact that they, who are not stars, are mostly 
excluded from decision-making. However, the collective creative process, not to 
mention actors' involvement in managerial decision-making, offered them the 
opportunity to get involved in areas of production from which they were traditionally 
excluded. Rather than just learning their parts, they could contribute to creating and 
directing themselves. This was especially liberating for actors who had worked 
primarily in more traditional structures. 
During the 1970s, despite its favouring of "centres of excellence", usually 
building-based companies, the Arts Council maintained "the arm's length principle", 
and played the role of benevolent funding body, supporting the traditional concept of 
Art. Art was lofty, and thus, deserved money from the state. In Baz Kershaw's words, 
"The tradition sees art in essence, as closer to the Church than the market-place". 
26 
However, in the 1980s the tradition was broken by the arts policy of the ideologically 
uncompromising Thatcher govenu-nent. The Arts began to be treated as commercial 
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goods in the market-place. This study now turns its attention to examine the very 
different arts funding and the theatre world of the 1980s. 
The Arts Council under the Enterprise Culture of Thatcherism 
Mrs Thatcher's genius was to use economic means - from the sale of council 
houses, to privatisation of industry, to local management of schools - to 
defeat her political opponents. As in politics, so in culture. What's proposed 
in theatre is an extension of the myth of the universal customer - the notion 
that there is no essential difference in my dealing with my bank, my 
newsagent, my doctor, my football team or my church - into the performing 
arts. 27 
The source of funding and guidance for most of the new theatre work of the 
70s, the Arts Council, was gutted from top to bottom, and left, gutless, in the 
life-extinguishing grip of the then Sir Williarn Rees-Mogg. The whole 
blossoming bough of popular theatre, which was all set to achieve so much 
for British theatre, was clumsily hacked off. Ideological repression and 
fiscal misery combined to change the geography of the arts. 28 
Thatcher's government in the 1980s transformed the previous progressive 
cultural climate into a conservative one. As Margaret Thatcher once said, "Economics 
are the method to change the soul", to transform the soul from dependency culture into 
enterprise culture, her government adopted an arts policy based on free market 
economy. The concept of the arts was redefined as commercial goods and arts 
organisations were forced to reshape their thought in terms of enterprise. During the 
1980s, the word, enterprise, had been elevated to cultural status. In 1987, Arts 
Minister, Richard Luce said; 
Our economic policies, after eight years in office, have led to greater 
prosperity: and that means more in many people's pockets to spend on 
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leisure, including the arts. We are determined to make that prosperity even 
more widely available. 
The prudent restraint of public expenditure has been a key to success. 
Our aim is to ensure that public expenditure takes a steadily smaller share of 
our national income. 
The arts cannot be seen in isolation from'this dramatic change in the 
political and economic climate. There is no argument that enables us to 
claim that the arts are sacrosanct and should be insulated from the real 
world. I would be laughed out of court if I were to claim this to my 
colleagues in government ... But there are too many in the arts world who have yet to be weaned from 
the welfare state mentality - the attitude that taxpayers owe them a living. 
Many have not yet accepted the challenge of developing plural sources of 
funding. They give the impression of thinking that all other sources of 
funding are either tainted or too difficult to get. They appear not to have 
grasped that the collectivist mentality of the sixties and seventies is out of 
29 date. 
In order to eliminate "the welfare state mentality" in the arts world, the 
government, first of all, made the Arts Council submit to its enterprise policy. Until the 
end of the 1970s, the Council more or less maintained the arm's length principle, but 
with the establishment of Thatcher's government, Tom Sutcliff argued, it "started to 
, 30 mouth only the govenunent line'. Indeed, it was always possible that the Council's 
independence could be eroded if the state had an intention to do so. This is due to the 
fact that state-subsidy made it possible to effectively determine the scope of the 
Council's activities by diminishing its money supply. If a goverment adopted a hostile 
view of public funding for the arts, and cut the funding, the Council had no choice but 
to follow "the government line". 
As has been examined in Chapter 1, Thatcher's government adopted a monetary 
policy to stabilise the economy by reducing inflation rates. This led to the reduction of 
public expenditure. On coming to power, Thatcher's government cut the budget of the 
Office of Arts and Libraries by E2.6m. As a result of this, the Council's grant-in-aid 
was cut by fIA million from the grant already voted to the Arts 
Council by the 
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outgoing Labour Government. It was a big shock to the arts world, wrote Roy Shaw; 
"Pre-election assurances, by both Mr St John-Stevas, the first Conservative Arts 
Minister and the Prime Minister, that the Government would not cut arts money, 31 
have naturally been widely recalled". 32 The Council had to cut off 41 of its clients - the 
largest number of cuts in its history. This was the first signal that the Council was 
inevitably going to have to assume a new operational stance in the 1980s, making it 
realise that it was just a quasi-govermnent organisation which was likely to be 
susceptible to the govenunent's intentions. 
If the government's squeezing of arts subsid Y13 was the first step in making the 
Council subordinate to its intentions, its intervention in appointing the Council's high- 
ranking officials was another step in making the Council a conduit through which the 
government's free market principle could flow towards the arts. 34 Sir Roy Shaw 
described his vivid indirect experience of Thatcher's well-known phrases - that 
appointees must be "one of us"; 
One day in 1980, Kenneth Robinson and I [Sir Roy Shaw] went for one of 
our routine visits to see St-John Stevas ... On this occasion, we 
discussed ... 
membership of the Council. St-John Stevas brought up the name of Alistair 
McAlpine (later Lord McAlpine). I demurred, on the grounds that McAlpine 
had publicly expressed his disbelief in public subsidy for the arts ... He 
[Stevas] ... smiling mysteriously said 
"I think you will appreciate that this 
nornination comes from a very high source", with the implication that 
it was 
therefore irresistible. It was obvious that the "high source" was ... in 
fact, 
Mrs Thatcher (I later learned that McAlpine was on dining terms with her) 
... I saw 
his appointment as an omen of the increasing politicisation of the 
Arts Council and the erosion of the celebrated "arm's length principle". 
35 
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In 1981 the Conservative Party's Treasurer, Alistair McAlpine joined the 
Council. His nomination could not be questioned, because it came from Thatcher 
herself McAlpine did not stay long on the Council, and made little impact, but his , 
appointment was a sign of changes to come. Richard Hoggart, whose political stance 
was on the moderate left, was expected, by custom, to be reappointed as Vice- 
Chairman in 198 1, but he failed to be so. According to Roy Shaw, "Number 10 doesn't 
like him". 36 
In 1982 Sir William Rees-Mogg was appointed as the Council's Chairman. He 
had a conservative and commercial background. He had been educated at the English 
public school, Charterhouse, and Balliol College, Oxbridge. He worked for the 
Financial Times, and was an editor of The Times from 1967 to 198 1. He was also 
proprietor of Pickering and Chatto Ltd., antiquarian booksellers, and a Deputy 
Chairman of the BBC. After 1981, he was a Director of the General Electric Company. 
As Sir Rees-Mogg once said; "People who get appointed have some knowledge of 
each other ... the unknown are not appointed", 
37 he seemed to be the perfect choice for 
Thatcher's deputy in the arts. In his first Chairman's report of 1981-1982 when fl. lm 
subsidy cut was made, Sir Rees-Mogg already accepted well "a major change in the 
economic climate for the arts" initiated by Thatcher government; 
... I inherited a system 
in which the first shock of the change in arts funding 
from rising to stable arts funding has been achieved. It has, I think, to be 
established that arts funding is not likely to rise substantially in the period 
ahead of us. The task of the Arts Council, and, more broadly, the community 
of arts will therefore be to make better use of limited resources". 
38 
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His view that arts funding was not going to expand, so arts organisations had to 
develop other sources was in a sharp contrast to Secretary-General Roy Shaw's view; 
"The recent reductions in real tenns of the Government's grant-in-aid to the Arts 
Council forced us to make unpleasant cuts to clients in 1981/2, and to our own directly 
funded activities in 1982/3. Many of our clients, including the largest, live in a state of 
constant anxiety about finance to a degree which has an adverse effect on creative 
work". 39 Roy Shaw criticised his new Chairman's policy for being "undesirably close 
to the policy of the government". 40 In 1985 Sir Rees-Mogg was already using 
Thatcherite rhetoric; 
The quality required for survival in this age will be the qualities of the age 
itself. They include self-reliance, imagination, a sense of opportunity, range 
of choice, and the entrepreneurial action of small professional groups. The 
State should continue to help the arts but the arts should look first to 
themselves, and to their audiences, for their future and their growth. 41 
Finally, in the Council's 1987-88 Annual Report, he made a remark which 
might have emanated from the Centre for the Policy Studies; "I support the Council's 
objective to reduce the arts world's reliance on state subsidy and to lower the 
proportion (but not of course the absolute amount) of grant to the overall turnover of 
arts organisations". 42 Exceptionally, Sir William Rees-Mogg was re-appointed in 1987, 
and received a life peerage from Margaret Thatcher. 
The 1983 general election, which increased the overall Conservative majority 
to 144, gave the right-wing government an impetus to realise its plan of driving 
oppositional movements and dissenting voices into submission. Just as it successfully 
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made miners submit after their nation-wide strike in 1984/85, in 1986 the govenunent 
abolished the Greater London Council (GLC) and the metropolitan county councils 
which. were considered to have a progressive cultural policy. The GLC was 
spectacularly successful in this respect, developing the ideal of cultural 
democratisation. However, new legislation abolished the GLC together with other 
metropolitan councils. The demise of the GLC has often been quoted as one of the 
symbols of how Thatcher's government was intolerant of voices opposed its policies. 
Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London from 1981 to 1986, declared himself 
opposed to Margaret Thatcher. The GLC, during his Mayorship, had a track record of 
support of the arts that was second to none. In 1981 the GLC inherited, from the 
Conservative administration, an arts budget of just over f-9m, of which approximately 
f3m had been shared between the English National Opera, London Festival Ballet, and 
the London Orchestral Concert Board. The Conservatives had focused its funding 
towards large-scale "centres of excellence" such as the National Theatre, the Hayward 
Gallery. Under Labour, Livingstone refused to prioritise artfonns. The GLC funded 
groups in relation to the audiences that the groups themselves wanted to reach. 
Therefore, its arts funding was based on community arts activities for such groups as 
blacks, Asians, other minorities, gay men, women, the elderly, the disabled, and the 
unemployed. In addition, it adopted a wider definition of the arts than the Arts 
Council's to include photography, video, electronic music and community radio, and 
sought to re-radicalise all artfon-ns by allowing representation on its Sub-Committies 
by the most active practitioners. 
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Numerous community arts groups representing a variety of artforms sent 
applications for grants to the Sub-Committee. For instance, for about four months from 
January to April 1983, the Committee received 1,500 applications. Among them more 
than 400 received subsidy. Accordingly, the GLC's arts budget had to be increased. By 
1984 it had more than doubled to over E20m. The GLC was particularly generous to 
ethnic arts groups which had had little or no voice in the traditional structure of 
patronage. The GLC's funding for them grew from E400,000 in 1982-83 to f2m in 
1985-86, which proved a powerful stimulus to black theatre, benefiting companies 
such as Temba, Tara Arts, Black Theatre Co-operative, and Talawa. 
Besides direct financial support, the GLC organised its own festivals and events 
in order to project the GLC's image as a progressive, caring, socialist council. Within 
the GLC the radical counter- cultural climate of the 1970s was still alive. The arts were 
often co-oPeratively and collectively called into service as a medium for a political 
message, such as for the GLC's Peace Year (1983), London Against Racism (1984) 
and the Jobs Year (1985). The collective nature of this encouragement of the arts was 
in marked contrast to the privatising, individualistic, enterprise approach of 
Thatcherism, where the freedom of the market went hand in hand with the increasing 
state authoritarianism. 
One clear example of the GLC's attitudes towards the arts was its confrontation 
with the Arts Council which had already become an arm of government. In 1985 the 
Council took the sole responsibility for the Hayward Gallery in the South Bank arts 
complex. For the GLC, the Art's Council's exhibition programme was not in harmony 
with its cultural policy. It saw the Council's show as implicitly sexist and racist 
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because it had not sufficiently represented the works of women and black artists. The 
GLC threatened to evict the Arts Council - the sitting tenant of the gallery, but was 
unable to do so because the existing contracts took the tenancy to May 1986. The right- 
wing government must have regarded such a resistance as dangerous. Indeed, the 
abolition of the GLC was already a 1983 manifesto commitment by the Conservative 
Party. When rate capping was introduced in 1985, by which central govenunent set a 
limit to the amount local authorities could raise in local taxes, the GLC could not 
favourably fund the arts as it has hitherto. The GLC was finally abolished by the 
government in April 1986. D. Keith Peacock wrote; "Its mortal sin resided in the fact 
that it was one of the few examples of a coherent Left-wing ideolog-ical opposition 
remaining in England, or, as the government would have it, a Labour-dominated, high- 
, 43 spending council at odds with the governrnent's view of the world'. The abolition of 
the GLC indicated a clear example of the authoritarianism of Thatcher's government 
which permitted no opposition. 
The loss of funding by both the GLC and the metropolitan councils was 
detrimental to the Arts Council. In the fiscal year of 1985-86, the Council received 
only 2.5% increase in its grant plus E16m to cope with funding the arts in the I 
metropolitan areas, in spite of the fact that it had also identified ; E35m spent by the 
metropolitan counties for the arts. As a solution for its financial problem Sir William 
Rees-Mogg, with his conu-nercial background, attempted to establish the Arts Council 
more like a business organisation. In 1983, he had already chosen the 36-year-old 
director of the Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA, 1978-1983), 
Luke Rittner, as the Council's Secretary General to succeed Roy Shaw, despite 50 
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members of the Council submitting a petition to Roy Shaw to express their concern 
about the strong possibility of the Council becoming a more business-like institution. 
It was not long before their concern was proved correct. The proof was seen 
with the Council's publication of The Glory of the Garden, subtitled as The 
Development of the Arts in England: A Strategyfor a Decade. This was the first major 
document for the future arts world by the Arts Council, intent on assuming a 
Thatcherite operational stance. There were many proposed strategies in the document. 
One of them was to strengthen partnerships in funding with local authorities and 
sponsors to, in Sir Rees-Mogg's words, "ensure that the arts did not suffer from the 
abolition of the metropolitan counties". 44 
The most significant strategy of The Glory of the Garden was to confirm that 
the Council would conduct the distribution of arts subsidy primarily in the Thatcherite 
business terms - investment, value for money, efficiency. As part of this transition 
toward business enterprise, the Council, first of all, began to restructure itself - one of 
the main parts of the Council's strategy review outlined in The Glory of the Garden; 
The decisions which are announced in this document represent the first, and 
the most important, stage in the Council's strategy review. ... The council 
acknowledges ... that the structure of 
its organisation requires review, all the Zýl lt: ý 
more so in the wake of the new development strategy. During the next 
twelve months, the Council will be considering its internal organisation ... In 
the course of the internal review, the Council will be considering whether it 0 
is beneficial to retain its traditional department structure. It -will also be 
reviewing the structure of its advisory panels and committees. 
45 
C) 
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As the Council itself stated, its restructuring "is designed to enable it to deal 
more effectively with the complex business of supporting the arts". A new 
Management Team was created, consisting of the Secretary General, Deputy Secretary 
I 
General, Financial Director, and a new officer, Director of Arts Coordination who was 
"responsible for evaluation and assessment of clients". 46 A Policy and Finance 
Committee was reconstituted with the intention of making, the Council more effective 0 
by its senior managers overseeing the strategic policy and financial decision-making of 
the whole system. A Marketing and Resources Department was also newly established 
primarily to take responsibility for its clients' marketing and sponsorship to help them 
raise income from other sources. These structural changes aiming to increase 
managerial effectiveness were coupled with retraining and reskilling the Council's 0 
officers to meet the needs of the new reality. A staff appraisal system was instituted. 
While a number of staff had already left, others, notably in the Marketing and 4: -) 
Resources Departments, had been recruited. 
Following The Glory of the Garden, the Council published a couple of 
important prospectuses. When it asked for more money to cover the effects of the 
abolition of GLC and the metropolitan councils, it published The Arts: A Great British 
Sticcess Story in September 1985. When the Council was seeking a subsidy increase in 
1987-8, it published another prospectus - Partnership: Making Arts Money Work 
Hardet-. It was almost tantamount to a business prospectus, tempting the government to 
invest more money in, what the Council called, the "arts industry" where the invested 
money would be returned to the government in various forms such as taxes and income 
from the tourist trade. 
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In this sense, it was not surprising that the Council placed its funding priority 
on "centres of excellence". Indeed, in The Gloq of the Garden, it proposed setting up a 
regional "national theatre" in the II "Major Areas of Poptilation" such as Leeds, 
Manchester and Birmingham. As the document itself emphasised the fact that most of 
these areas already had "receiving houses for large-scale productions toured with Arts 
Council funds", 47 the Council strongly felt the need to consolidate its traditional 
practice in the 1980s. This was precisely because, under the constraint of arts subsidy, 
the capacity of ticket yield became more and more important. 
The big companies such as the two national theatres, with their large seating 
capacity, their geographical advantages, and their reputation, could attract large 0 
audiences. By contrast, small-scale touring companies could not attract as many. Red 
Ladder, in the first half of the 1980s, was constantly struggling to find an audience -tý 
because the public, in the conservative political climate, began to lose interest in 
political issues. For instance, Red Ladder's audience attendance figures in the mid- 
1980s were seriously reduced, so the company often performed to only 20 or 30 
people. 
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In 1982 the Royal Shakespeare Company had moved into the huge concrete 0 
edifice of the Barbican in the City of London. The following year a government- I 
ordered investigation into the RSC, the Priestley Report, concluded that, despite 
government suspicions to the contrary, the company was efficient but underfunded by 
about Elm a year. Thatcher's government endorsed a cheque to the RSC. As the 
,,,, proportion of the total decade progressed the RSC and the NT took up an 
increasing 
arts subsidy allocated for theatre, with 47% on average, 
49 even though their subsidy 
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dropped in value in real terms. By the end of the 1980s the NT received nearly f1 Om in 
subsidy, and the RSC f8m. If the high level of subsidy in the 1970s was customarily 
justified by the fact that the two national theatres set the artistic standards by which the I 
rest of British theatre could be judged, the high level in the 1980s was justified by their 
role as market leaders, their significant economic value to the nation through their 
contribution to national tourist trade. The national theatres were set by the Council as a 
new market-driven model for the subsidised theatre, as the RSC transferred its 
production Nicholas Nickleby to Broadway, making a huge profit for the company. For 
theatre companies pursuing ideologically oppositional theatre practices, such a model 
, 50 was t ga monstrous form of interference'. 
The Council, however, unequivocally introduced the market-driven model for 
all its clients. This was the most important strategy outlined in The Glory of the 
Garden. The model was clearly demonstrated by its three-year funding plan. In 
November 1987 the Arts Minister, Richard Luce, announced that he would 
subsequently provide finn figures of arts funding based on a three-year rolling 4: ) 0 
programme. In a letter to the Council's Chairman, he hoped that the Council would 
accordingly formulate a three-year plan. The Council welcomed the proposal because 
of its stable nature over three years. As it itself stated, the plan aimed, however, to 
promote business management for "the financial self-sufficiency of arts organisations"; I 4-: ý 
If the Arts Council is to help arts organisation in this task, it must become 
less of a traditional funding body, mainly concerned 'with dell,,,, ering 
government money to a portfolio of clients, and more an advocate, an 
adviser and a policy-maker. During the life of this plan, it '. '611 spend much 
of its energies on the provision of advice and information; the exchange of Cý 
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ideas and examples of good management practice among arts organisations; 
the training of arts managers ... . 
51 
All clients were required to make three-year business plans based on the criteria 
outlined by the Council and submit them to the Council which would appraise them. in 
February 1988, the Council announced that it was going to review 21 touring theatre 
companies which were on the revenue grant list to examine whether they were fit to 
compete in a new era of arts business. In Luke Rittner's words, this was "a periodic in- 
depth appraisal of each client's operation". He added; apart from "artistic appraisal of 
the client's work ... the team will be looking to the financial implications of both 
current activity and of future plans. Each appraisal team is asked to review marketing It) ý 
education and outreach'. ). 52 Based on the assessment conducted by "the appraisal team", 
the Council defined broadly three groups. The "best" of the groups, which fulfilled the 
criteria the Council had set, would be promoted to three-year secure funding status. 
Those which the Council could not rate confidently, but which were worthy of a 
second chance, would be put on annual funding list. Those which failed would be 
made to apply for project (short-term) status. 
The list of criteria was so long and complex that without a proper help from 
trained consultants, it was difficult to receive three-year secure funding. For examPle, 
in The Glory of the Garden there were 14 individual criteria, listed from 'a' to 'n', 
demanding not only highly abstract quality standards but also education policy and 
financial ability. It said that "For the foreseeable future the criteria remain as follows": 
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a. quality of artistic product, including, as appropriate, standards of 
presentation, performance, design and direction, and their relationship to 
the conception of the company's overall programme. 
e. education policy in relation to the artistic programme; 
9. overall value for money, including any success in extending audiences 
through other media; 
Ii. box office and attendance return; 
i. the company's success in raising local authority support and other 
income; 
j. the efficiency shown in using available resources 
control of budgeting; ...... 
53 0 
and the accuracy and 
The Council's message was simple; follow the Council's business plan 
faithfully, otherwise, you will suffer. If the clients wanted to be awarded three-year 
fundine, status they had no choice, first of all, but to meet the required criteria with 
three-year business plans setting financial goals and a realistic strategy for achieving 
them, and a schedule of specific tasks - marketing, accounting, cost-saving and so on. ltý 0 4-: ) 
According to John McGrath the business plan was "the most dangerous thing ... and a Ito 7 C) 
monstrous form of interference". 54 
As the 1980s was progressed, the shift of the arts funding pattern from annual 
stable revenue grants to short-term project grants became a general trend. Under the 
situation, such a theatre company as 7: 84 found it increasingly difficult to carry on 
long-term communitY-based cultural experiments. In addition, as a way of alleviating 
financial problems in the small-scale companies, the Council, in The Glory of the 
Gai-den, set another strategy which made national or regional "centres of excellence" 
take responsibility for co-ordinating the small-scale companies. Since then, this has 
been a common practice between the mainstream and the alternative theatres as a way 
of extending arts subsidy by stretching resources under the constraint of arts ftinding. 
3 
However, this strategy could cause a serious problem for the alternative company -a 
loss of its raison d'etre. In 1991, Gillian Hanna, a leading member of the Monstrous 
Regiment theatre company, recalled this time; 
As we continued to struggle for our financial existence during the 1980s, co- 
productions with larger institutions became a lifeline in the maintenance of 
our artistic standards. ... However, small entities taken under the wing of large institutions are in danger of being swallowed whole, and we felt we 
were constantly juggling our economic needs against our desire to work on C, 4") 
our own terms. 55 
In this sense, it is understandable that John McGrath wondered "if Mrs 
Thatcher or her advisers have not studied Gramsci better than the left". D. Keith 
Peacock verifies this by claiming that the effect of what they had done was "political"; 
For companies that had shunned the traditionally hierarchical management 
structure of theatre and had anarchistically constituted themselves as 'co- 
operatives' during, the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the effect was 
political. 56 
The political effect is clearly demonstrated by the two cases of 7: 84 (Scotland 
or England) and Red Ladder. John McGrath was told that funding from the Arts Z) 
Council would cease from the end of 19S8 unless administrative changes were made. 
These included, in McGrath's words, "replacing most of the company's board with 
people with ... business skills, public relations expertise, and accountancy and 
legal 
57 
skills; people who would be politically objective about the work of the company". 
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McGrath, a liberal socialist as he himself admitted, could not accept the imposition by 
the Council. He resigned in 1989. 
As for Red Ladder, in the first half of the 1980s, for various reasons such as the 
very conservative political climate, Red Ladder was deeply in trouble. In 1985, the Arts 
Council, together with Leeds City Council and Equity put forward a rescue package on 
the condition that the company should, first of all, abandon its collective working 
principle. To survive, Red Ladder had to accept that, and has since been running on the 
basis of a hierarchical management with the post of Artistic Director. As with the 
Greater London Council, these two cases also demonstrate the consistent imposition of 
the rig: 'ht-wincr 
ideology on the arts. Later, this study will undertake a more detailed 0 
examination of Red Ladder as a case study of how political theatre companies, on 
losing their ideological base and significance, have had to modify themselves in the 
conservative cultural and political climate since Thatcher's government. According to 
Baz Kershaw's analysis of alternative theatre in the 1980s, althouggh there was a 
significant increase in the number of alternative companies from 143 in 1980 to 272 in 
1990 and the alternative theatre was more diversified in kind, these increased and 
diversified companies could not be seen as alternative in an ideological sense. Rather, 
these companies were ... alternative' only in the theatrical sense". 58 Kershaw divides the 
companies into eight categories from the least ideologically radical to the most 
ideologically radical. According to his analysis, there is little ideological significance Z 
up to the sixth category. He labels even the most radical as a "soft ideology" group, 
owing to its "general tendency to soft-pedal socially critical issues", investigating 4t) I 
, 59 "issues of gender, sexuality, race and, increasinggly, the environment' He gives the 
main reason for this and sums up; 
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... the variety was, more apparent than real as the survival of new groups 
often depended on the marketing of 'safe' products, particularly for the arts 
centre circuit ... The reduction in revenue grants ensured that any companies 
would add to a growing 'underclass' struggling to make a unique mark in 
the alternative theatre market-place. The general effect of such 
commercialisation was to push alternative theatre further into the de- 
radicalised fragmentation ... It is depressingly clear that, as a result of these trends, overt political 
theatre became increasingly hard to sustain in the 1980s. A number of 
leading companies had their grants cut and were forced to close down, 
including 7: 84 (England) 
... Hence, the key focus of explicit ideologically 
oppositional practice shifted to the women's, gay, black, and special needs 
groups 
60 (such as Scarlet Harlets, the Theatre of Black Women, and Graeae 
Theatre Company), and to some of the community theatre companies. 61 
By the end of the 1980s, just as Britain saw a tendency towards ideological 
monopolisation in which socialism as an alternative ideology to capitalism was almost 
"dead", so it also witnessed a tendency towards theatrical monopolisation in which 
left-wing political theatre had also almost collapsed. Many overtly political touring 
companies actively working during the 1970s such as Belt and Braces, 7: 84 (England), 
and North West Spanner no long existed. Some of them such as Red Ladder, CAST 
and 7: 84 (Scotland) changed and modified themselves as less-overtly ideological 
companies. 
No matter how politically effective the British political theatre has been judged, 
what it had attempted to do in the 1970s is significant, at least, in the area of 
accessibility. It had attempted to establish new working-class cultural values against 
dominant middle-class values by taking theatre to working-class communities. It had 
demonstrated that theatre could become a medium in which culturally alienated 
audiences enjoyed shared cultural experience. In this sense, the political theatre had, 
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consciously or unconsciously, earnestly followed one of the criteria outlined the Arts 
Council - increasing the accessibility of theatre to the general population. In this sense, 
it is ironic to see its destruction by the Arts Council. It is also regrettable that the left- 
wing political theatre movement did not develop any further as a popular oppositional 
theatre that would give voice to the concerns of ordinary people. 
Thatcher's efforts to make the enterprise spirit prevail in Britain seemed to 
gradually bear fruit in the arts world. By the mid-1980s, the arts had become 
recognised as a major sector of the economy. John Myerscough, who published a book 
entitled The Economic Importance ofArts in Britain, wrote in 1988; "... argument [has] 
moved on to a higher ground, by relating the role of the arts to the fact that we live in Z: ) 
an era of industrial restructuring characterised by the growing importance of the service 4D 
industries". 62 
In retrospect, the early 1980s' stress on the economic value of the arts reads 
like special pleading by those defending the arts against threatened Zý 0 
reductions in public spending. ... 
Most fields of the arts, after a lull in the 1980s, were trading at higher levels C, 0 
in the mid-1980s, than prevailed some 10 years previously. Consumer 
spending on admissions to arts events and attractions was estimated at E433 
million in 1985/86 of which E256 million was paid for entrance for theatres 
and concerts ... . 
Outside London's West End the Arts-Council-funded producing theatres in 
the rest of the country saw attendances rise by 12 per cent between 1981/82 
and 1985/86. Previously, attendances had been falling Thus, the mid 0 
1980s saw ... the subsidised producing theatres attracting record audiences. 00 
The issue is now not so much whether the arts have an economic dimension. 
Rather, what is the specific and distinctive economic contribution the arts 
can make? How can this be most appropriately encouraged and exploited? 
And what is the relevant policy frame in which to relate the interests of the 
arts to wider economic aims? 
63 
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Accordingly, he claimed that "The [future] process must start from a 
recognition of the economic value of the arts" by emphasising their importance as; a I 
major economic sector in their own right; a high value added sector; a major export 
earner; a major direct employer; a significant generator of indirect employment. By the 
end of the 1980s, the British arts world was, as Myerscough argued, in their 
importance to the national economy equal to such giants as cars or fuel and power. 
According to his findings up to 1988, the arts had a turnover of f 10 billion and a value 
added of F-4b. Their overseas earning was estimated at f4b making the sector the fourth 
largest invisible export earner. In addition, the arts were responsible for a quarter 
(0.1 b) of total earnings from tourism in the UK. Furthermore, almost 500,000 people 
in the UK were employed in this sector with a 26% total employment increase over the 
period 1981-86. At the same time, the sector's economic linkages with other industries 
and the spending of arts customers generated an "arts multiplier" effect that supported It) 
a further 175,000 jobs in the wider national economy. 
For those who saw arts from an economic viewpoint like Myerscough, a change 
in arts made by Thatcher's government in the 1980s could be seen as being positive. 
Some economists, such as David Sawers, demanded in 1993 extreme measures for 
radical change. David Sawers, a writer and consultant who specialised in industrial 
economics and who spent 18 years as an economist in govenu-nent service, argued in 
his article - Should the Taxpayer Support the Arts? - that even the government 
investment with subsidy to attracting tourists is an "unjustifiable spending 
programme II . His point 
is that "The Arts Flourish Without Aid" as "They survived in 
this country for centuries before the Arts Councils was established", and that only the 
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market and commerce can be an index of what kind of arts should be available to the 
British public. Thus, the government should "disengage" itself from the arts, and 
subsidy should be dismantled by abolishing the Arts Council. He suggested "a ten-year 
process" of dismantling arts subsidy, during which the subsidised companies would 
transform themselves into more competitive commercial ones by reducing their costs 
and increasing their prices, and by increasing their income from donations. To this end, 
finally, he urged "firm government action" to be taken immediately; 
A government that wished to adopt the proposed policy [Disengaging 00 
Government from the Arts and Dismantling subsidies: a Ten-Year Process] 
would have to be strong willed. It is therefore unlikely that the present 
Government will be attracted to it. If it is not prepared to take such strong 
steps, it should at least proceed to reduce the level of aid given to the 
performing ar-ts and to the museums and galleries. ... The government should 
also seek to reduce the scale of the present administrative superstructure for 
the arts. If it does not abolish both the Department of National Heritage and 
the Arts Council, it should, at least, abolish the Department. 64 
Considering the arts from the purely economic point of view, David Sawers has 
reason to argue and recommend such changes. On the other hand, he should, however, 
also understand that cuts in arts spending would not be cost-effective to the economy 
as a whole. A specific case indicates this; 
A study by BECTU showed that a E500,000 cut in subsidy to a major 
regional theatre would eventually lose the Treasury E2.15 million when 
account was taken of VAT on tickets; the theatre's expenditure on wages 
and services; the theatre employees' expenditure on taxes and in the 
community; and redundancy payments, lost taxes and unemployment benefit 
among both employees and the comniunity. 
65 
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In this sense, not David Sawers but Luke Rittner was right when he asked the 
government for a real financial increase for the Council in 1987, because he was 
concerned that the arts, which, in his view,, was "the unique and precious 
, 66 commodity" would be damaged if the increase rate was below inflation. 
In addition, David Sawers does not even mention the potential problems 
resulting from his argument for seeing the arts in economic terms. He may be either 
negligent or ignorant in understanding the arts in artistic tenns, or in pursuit of his 
argument, he may have consciously avoided mentioning the negative aspects which 
arise when the arts are driven by the market. Scholars and theatre workers did not 
hesitate to show their concern about the impact of economic Thatcherism on the theatre 
of the 1980s. In a conference devoted to the theme of 'British Theatre in Crisis', held 
on 4 December 1988,95 theatre people, from Steve Abrams to Arnold Wesker, signed 
a declaration. Here, they confirmed that "a free market economy and private 
sponsorship cannot guarantee the necessary conditions for theatre to fulfil its many 
ftinctions". 67 In Cambridge another theatre conference, entitled 'Theatre under Threaff 
on 20-21 October 1990, critical voices were directed at the detrimental effects of 
"limited amolints ofArts Cotincil slibsidy" and "blisiness sponsors" under the Thatcher 
goverranent on "the national companies as well as mostfringe companies". 
68 Sir Peter 
Hall offered the reason; 
Art and market forces never mix. Art is necessarily innovative, unexpected 
and frequently (particularly at its inception) unpopular. ... To make safe and 
consistent money out of art, it must be dumped down to the common 
denominator. Money can then be made by providing the expected stuff for 
the expected public. It is the principle of McDonald taken away 
froni 
, and applied 
to creativity. catering 
69 
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Artistic Directors, who were thought to have devoted most of their time to 
enhancing the spiritual and aesthetic quality of life, could not any longer spend the 
same time. For instance, owing to the three-year business plan demanded by the Arts 
Council, they were now busy with business and managerial work - having to have 
efficient marketing and administrative organisations and to seek diversified funding 
under the pressure of having their arts subsidy reduced. Now, they were no longer 0 
encouraged to think of the arts chieflY as a public good, but to think of them as a 
commodity driven by consumerism. Simon Trussler wrote that in the 1980s, "arts 
administrators ffittered away disproportionate time upon the tactful, usually 
unrewarded, composition of applications for business sponsorship, they thus found it 
politic to speak in tenns of investments and returns, of markets and invisible 
expo s 1. ) . 
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These business practices, in turn, affected theatre programming and 
playwriting. Theatre companies consciously avoided productions which required many 
actors. Jenny Topper, director of the Hampstead Theatre, agonised over the means of 
financing a new play by Jennifer Philips that demanded a cast of 10. She said; "the 
optimum cast-size is now 'no more than six and preferably four' 37 1 Even the National 
Theatre, "which had been the venue chosen by Brenton, Hare and Bond", found it 
increasingly difficult to stage their ... public plays' that represented social conflict in an 
ý, 72 
epic manner requiring a cast of twenty or more Under the circumstances it is very C) I 
difficult to expect playwrights to put many characters in their plays. If they dared to do 
101 
so, their plays had little chance of being staged. As D. Keith Peacock points out, this 
led to another ideological weakening; 
the necessity of producing plays containing between two and four characters 
had an ideological outcome in that it militated against left-wing political 
plays whose dramatic discourse demanded the representation of society in 
action and, therefore, often required large casts. In contrast, plays with small 
casts generally focus on individual experience and personal psychology 
rather than the interaction of social groups and therefore reflect bourgeois 
individualism ... 
73 
There are other detrimental aspects. The most significant one related to the 
problem of new writing in the 1990s as a direct effect of economic Thatcherism. This 0 
will be dealt with in the next chapter which will examine the state of the arts and 
theatre world in the 1990s. 
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Chapter III: Thatcherism's Impact on the Theatre in the 1990S 
Introduction 
People have been encouraged to view the notion of public funding as old hat ZY Cý 
and contemptible; reductions in Arts Council grants ... confirm this impression 
... . Now more than ever, we who work in publicly funded 
theatre inhabit a uniquely impossible financial ecology. Our whole 
philosophy is based on breaking even; indeed we could hardly be entitled to 
public money were we to make huge profits. But what this means is that we 
have no cushion against failure. One show that doesn't work can push us 
over the brink, and working within these restrictions inevitably means 
reducing the number of plays (particularly new plays), reducing the size of 
companies, and a general lowering of standards to a point where it not only 
becomes visible, but destructive. ' 
Just as Thatcherism has made a significant impact on British politics and 
economics in the 1990s, so it has also made a big impact on the arts and theatre. This 
chapter will examine the impact on the theatre world of Major's and Blair's 
governments. The two governments have held almost the same view on the arts as 
Thatcher's govemment. They have regarded the arts as an industry. They have 
continuously restrained spending on the arts in the 1990s, which, in turn, has further 
forced theatre companies into the competitive market economy. 
This chapter will examine the impact of political and economic Thatcherism on 
the theatre world; on musicals; on new writing; on regional theatres; on the political 0 
theatre movement. A boom of musicals since 1980s has been a direct reflection of the 
dominance of Thatcherite materialistic cultural values. This chapter will investigate the týý 
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materialistic aspects of the musical both in the manner of its production and as a means 
of moneymaking. In the early 1990s, it was said that new writing was in a deep crisis. I 
shall also explore its critical state in terms of the political, financial. and cultural impact 
of Thatcherism. From the mid-1990s, a group of young new playwrights began to 
emerge. These young writers in outlook and experience might be described as 
Thatcher's children. I shall examine in what sense Thatcherite values have affected the 
contents and forms of their plays. As a direct result of Thatcherite theatre economics, 
most regional theatre companies began to suffer severely in the 1990s. I shall examine 
the gloomy state of the regional theatre which was a direct result of a squeeze on arts 
funding throughout the 1990s, and also briefly look at the moribund state of the 
political theatre as a consequence of the continuous process of ideological 
monopolisation of capitalism. 
Theatrical Conservatism and Populism 
It seems that any leader who came to power in November 1990 could not 
escape considerable economic problems. Under Margaret Thatcher, while the arts had 
responded to market economy by relying more on the box office and business 
sponsorship, she had not actually created suitable economic conditions for its survival 
or good health. What she left, instead, was an economic recession with sharply rising 
unemployment and declinincgr growth, and an adverse balance of trade. 4 
107 
Surprisingly, despite the recession, a couple of years into Major's regime, 
subsidy for the Arts Council of the Great Britain (ACGB) was increased from 
f 175.79m in 1990/91 to f221.2m 1992/93. Some said that "Majorism has a kindlier 
face towards the arts". 2 However, the quality of the increase needs examining. 
During that period, a large proportion of the increase was dedicated to short- 
term unstable project funding. As has been illustrated, a shift away from annual 
revenue grants towards project grants has been a trend, after the Council's strategic 
document, The Glory of the Garden. In 1991-92, the total funding for drama projects 
was fl. 79m. In 1992-93, it reached E2.45m - an increase of E660,000. According to 
Ian Brown and Rob Brannen who evaluated the Cork Report, ten years after its 
publication, there was a significant increase in funding for single projects from 
1986/87 to 1993/94. The problem was, as the report confirmed, that this increase was 
"effectively gained" by the Drama Projects sector as it "lost the responsibility of 
funding for some twenty of its most long-standing clients". Another problem was that 
project funding "was always a highly competitive area. Only 25 per cent of 
applications actually made at present succeed in gaining the projects funding 
required 11 . 
More importantly, however, Major's "generous" period did not last long. The 
table below shows changes in arts subsidy for the Arts Council of England (ACE, now 
devolved from the ACGB) from 1992/93 to 1996/97; 
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Changes in Parliamentary grant-in-aid 
4 for the arts in England from 1992/93 to 1996/97 
Grant in real 
Grant in terms (at 
Cash ten-ns 1993/94 values)[1] 
fm fm 
1992/93 185.8 191.6 
1993/94 189.6 189.6 
1994/95 186.0 182.4 
1995/96 191.1 181.5 
1996-97 185.1 177 
[I] Using the GDP deflator (I 993/94= 100), Financial Times, 
30 November 1994 
During the period listed above, the ACE received almost standstill subsidy in 
cash terms. However, in real terms with consideration of inflation figures, there was a 
15% cut. Particularly, in the last year of its existence, in 1994, the Arts Council of 
Great Britain (ACGB) experienced a huge cut, E3.2m, which in turn resulted in a cash 
cut of E3.6m for 1994/5 of the Arts Council of England. This was the Council's biggest 
cash cut since its inception in 1946. What was worse was that the cut came at a time 
when "box office returns were decreasing as a result of the recession and local 
authority funding and sponsorship were also under pressure". 5 The former chairman 
Lord Gowrie (1994-98) despairingly commented in 1994 that "at present the Arts 
Council is engaged not in nurturing the arts ... 
but in staffing an increasingly crowded 
casualty ward". 6 It was not surprising to see a squeeze on arts subsidy under Major's 
government because there was little difference in such policies as monetarism between 
Major's government and the Thatcher's goverment. 
The immediate effects of the cut in 1994 was significant in the theatre world. 
Firstly, even the total projects grant decreased from E2,299,488 in 1993-94 to 
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fl, 675137 in 1994-95. This led to an abandonment of many projects; "New writing 
and drama projects bore the brunt of the funding reductions ... Compared with the 
previous year, cuts in project grants cost 177 weeks' touring and 1,738 weeks' 
employment". 7 In addition, as Ian Brown and Rob Brannen indicated, the Council tried 
to "protect established companies ... at the expense of projects and other new 
development". 
Indeed, theatre companies with little umbrella protection of the Arts Council 
suffered. Besides hardship from cuts in arts subsidy, there were two other reasons for 
this. One was the rate-capping, introduced by Thatcher's goverranent in the mid- I 980s, 
which was a government-imposed measure intended to restrict local authorities' 
spending. Because of the rate-capping, those items on the Council's budget which were 
not mandatory, like the arts, were among the most likely to be cut. It was not surprising 
that they were reluctant to spend much money on the arts which, in their view, had a 
dubious value. The rate-capping pushed most of regional theatres further into financial 
hardship. 
Moreover, the Arts Council supported the Wilding Report which contained the 
controversial proposal of devolution of arts funding. Richard Wilding, a former head of 
the Office of Arts and Libraries, in his report, Supporting the Arts (1989), argued 
strongly for the devolution of funding responsibility for the Council's clients to the 4-: ) 
RABs. including most of the regional companies and all of the alternative theatre 
groups. The then Arts Minister Richard Luce announced the devolution strategy 
proposed by the Wilding report on 13 March 1990. By 1992 "twelve Regional Arts 
9 
Associations have given way to ten RABs". Since then, the ACGB's (the Arts Council 
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of England after 1994) main funding responsibility has been gradually shifted to 
concentrate on the leading national theatres such as the Royal Opera House and the 
Royal National Theatre and some "centres of excellence" in the regions. The RABS 
have been responsible for most of regional and community companies. By early 1995, 
the Council devolved responsibility for the nation's network of 41 regional theatres to 
the RABs. 10 Most of regional theatre companies resisted the proposal because they saw 
it as demotion from national to regional status, but only a few won. Their protest was 
understandable because while the devolution plan promised the Arts Council's support 
for the leading companies and a few regional "centres of excellence", as Lizbeth 
Goodman pointed out, "the effects [of the policy] on touring and small scale 
community theatres had not been adequately addressed')'. " It was not difficult to 
assume the effects in the light of local authorities' rate-capping. 
This study has already closely examined how from its formation to the end of 
end of 1980s the Council had tended to give funding priority to the "centres of 
excellence". It has also examined the two national theatres' high level of funding was 
justified by their role as market leaders, whereas in the 1970s the high level was 
customarily justified by the fact that they set the artistic standards by which other 
theatre companies could be judged. In the 1990s under Major's government, this trend 
was still going on. In 1990-91 the Royal National Theatre's (RNT) box-office income 
was increasing despite the onset of recession. In 1991-92, it received a 10%-increased 
grant. Its financial turnover peaked at over f 29m in 1992-93, with box-office receipts 
up 49 % on the previous year. In 1993-94, an operating surplus of over 
fO. 5m was 
recorded. In contrast to the RNT, in 1990-91 the Royal Shakespeare 
Company (RSC) 
had a severe financial problem with an accumulated 
deficit of over f 3m. However, the 
Arts Council generously remedied this as it had customarily done. The Council's 
appraisal team, concluding that the prevailing levels of subsidy were inadequate to 
sustain the RSC's operation, offered an 8% increase in the company's basic grant plus 
enhancement funding matched by the Corporation of the City of London. Over the 
subsequent years, with the Council's generosity, the RSC managed gradually to reduce 
its accumulated deficit, and in 1994-95 an accumulated surplus of E0.5m was recorded. 
The two national companies between them received almost half [between 46% and 
50%] of all ACE and RABs drama funding in the early 1990s. Particularly, in 1994-95, 
these two accounted for 73% of ACE drama spending. ' 2 
My study has also examined the fact that the Arts Council, in the mid-1980s 
after the publication of its strategic document, The Glory of the Garden, set up regional 
"national theatres" in such cities as Leeds and Manchester where large theatre 
buildings already existed. The Council's action was mainly due to its realisation that 
the capacity of ticket-yield became more and more important under the constraint of 
arts subsidy. However, this meant the beginning of the Council's discrimination in arts 
funding within the regional theatre. While evaluating the Cork Report, Theatre Is For 
All (1987), Ian Brown and Rob Brannen, in 1997, ten years after its publication, 
recalled the list of regional theatres which had been likely to have to close in the two 
years following 1986, including the Victoria Theatre, Newcastle-under-Lyme, the 
Theatre Royal, York, Salisbury Playhouse, the Nuffield Theatre, Southampton and 
Hampstead Theatre. Although none of these closed, Brown and Bannnen asked again 
44a question as to how this survival was assured". 
13 One of the recommendations by the 
Cork Report, which was actually adopted by the Arts Council Drama Department 
(ACDD), was "parity negotiations" - negotiations with local authorities in an attempt 
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to draw more money in from the local authorities in order to balance out discrepancies 
in funding levels between most regional theatre companies and regional "national 
theatres" whose funding was targeted by the Council. Despite "parity negotiations", 
Brown and Brannen revealed the consequence; 
During the period [1986-1996], then, there was much shifting of resources 
from one theatre to another as a result of the process of parity negotiation ... And there were significant losers as well as gainers 14 by this process ... . 
15 
Regional theatre companies which were not included in the "gainers", in other 
words, which could not receive umbrella protection from the Arts Council, suffered 
seriously in the adverse situation in the early 1990s - economic recession, local 
authorities' rate capping and the Council's devolution programme, and the government 
squeeze on arts subsidy. This is illustrated below by statistics of about 200 mainly 
regional theatres which were members of the Theatrical Management Association 
(TMA); 
TMA member theatres, 1990/91-93/94 16 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 
Performances 31,856 29,979 29,145 25,404 
Attendances (m) 13.4 12.1 11.9 10.6 
Gross ticket revenue (fm) 105.4 105.7 110.9 108.9 
Revenue after VAT (Em) 91.6 89.9 94.3 92.6 
AveraRe ticket price 7.84 8.72 9.32 10.24 
(including VAT) W 
Increase in ticket vrice on - 11.2 6.8 9.8 
previous year 
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Over the four years during which the figures were collected, performances fell 
by more than 20% (6,400), and audience attendance dropped sharply by almost the 
same 20% (2-8 million). Revenue before VAT was reported to increase by only 3%, 
but the increase in the rate of VAT in 1991 meant that the increase after VAT was only 
0.6% from E91.6m in 1990/91 to E92.6m 1993/94. The Council's 1993-94 report 
warned that "one of the nation's greatest cultural assets, its provincial theatres, remains 
on the brink of an irreversible spiral of decline". The Liverpool Everyman Theatre 
Company, the North West Playwrights' Workshops and the Tyne Theatre trust 
(Northern Stage Company) were in the list for cuts in grant. Its 1994-95 report noted 
that those three regional theatres had been forced to stop producing their own work due 
to continuing financial pressure. Many regional theatres had to find measures to keep 
them running - actively involving themselves in community projects, 17 planning co- 
productions that enabled them to pool resources and share costs, 18 taking over some of 
the theatre-in-education (TIE) role, 19 and trying to avoid the new. This study will 
examine these measures in the case study of The West Yorkshire Playhouse under its 
Artistic Director Jude Kelly. 
Under the constant pressure of the shortage of money, a business spirit and 
expertise has been an undeniable necessity in theatre. Year on year, theatre companies 
needed more and more sponsorship money in order to stand still. Money from business 
sponsors, after a fall from the 1991/92 total of f 74.6m to the total of 69.5m for 1993/4 
mainly due to the recession, was steadily rising. In 1994-95 it reached E83m, 
accounting for more than 10% of the total funding for theatre. In the year 1997-98 the 
government grant for arts was almost standstill with f 185 million, but money invested 
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by business sponsors into the arts reached a record level of EI 15m, an increase of more 
than 20% on the previous year, accounting for f 17 million for theatre. 
Apart from seemingly old style cash support, business sponsors became more 
actively involved in the arts in the 1990s. It was a common practice that business 
sponsors sent their representatives to arts companies to impart business know-how in a 
scheme called "cross-fertilisation". For instance, Board Bank, which was sponsored by 
the National Westminster Bank, put almost 200 young ambitious business people on 
the boards of arts companies around the UK during 1996-97. The Everyman Theatre in 
Liverpool, desperately in need of better business management at this time, was one of 
the leading regional theatres willing to accept the scheme. 20 
Increasingly, business sponsors unreservedly intervened in the business affairs 
of the arts companies they supported. In October 1997, the Creative Forum for Culture 
and the Arts was launched at a party in the Buckingham Palace, hosted by the ABSA's 
patron, the Prince of Wales. Here, f-20,000 a year for three years was put aside for the 
purpose of "investigating ways in which culture and the arts" could "penneate and 
improve the performance of business". A team was set up to make "recommendations 
on how artists can contribute to PR and marketing, to design, to human resources, to 
personnel, and to overall management performance". The former ABSA's director 
general Colin Tweedy said that this was a "holistic approach"' . 
21 
The detrimental result, however, might be an increase of bureaucracy in theatre 
companies, with huge amount of money, which could be used 
for productions, being 
spent on sponsorship departments. In addition, sponsorship money 
is generally 
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regarded as part of a company's promotional expenditure, so business sponsors 
normally expect certain benefits in return. Apart from allowance for tax purposes, 22 
they expect their companies' promotion by advertising and association with prestigious 
arts events. Sir Roy Shaw revealed his experience; "David Maroni of Olivetti, one of 
this country's most imaginative sponsors, once appealed to his colleagues at a 
conference to admit that they were in sponsorship for reasons of enlightened self- 
interest. This brought a correction from another sponsor who said emphatically, 'Brutal 
55 23 self-interest' . 
In the previous chapter, this study has examined one of the detrimental effects 
resulting from the Council's imposition of business methods on the theatre world -a 
kind of self-censorship in programming and playwriting which avoid plays requiring 
many actors. Here, this self-censorshiP will be examined in detail. 
As long as the arts are viewed as commodities in a free-market, they are thrown 
into high competition just as other economic sectors are. Here, success is not optional 
but obligatory. To succeed means creating a favourable situation to attract sponsorship 
by private donors as well as secure funding by the Arts Council. To be successful, 
content has to be closely scrutinised by theatre companies themselves. Plays, for 
example, whose values and ideals are alien to sponsors whose artistic taste tends to 
be 
conservative, 24 are unlikely to obtain sponsorship. As Michael Billington argued, 
it is 
true that "in a society where commerce is the prime criterion of artistic value", market 
populism "amounts to censorship". 
25 The consequence of the "censorship" must be a 
push towards theatrical conservatism, forcing theatre companies to seek safe products 
such as adaptations of well-known novels and musicals. 
26 
116 
Amongst others, a boom of "mega-musicals" symbolises the changes in 
programming in the British socio-cultural climate in existence after Thatcher's 
government. Before the 1980s, as Sheridan Morley admitted, "the British stage musical 
had never achieved on its home ground the dominance that its American counterpart 
had on Broadway". 27 However, after the influx of American musicals such as 
Oklahoma! for decades since 1980s the British musical has become as spectacular and 
materialistic as a Broadway show, attracting broad popular appeal. Cats (1981), Song 
and Dance (198 1), The Phantom of the Opera (198 8), Aspects of Love (1989), Sunset 
Boulevard (1993) all transferred to Broadway and could be seen in many large theatres 
around the world. 
The dominance of musicals in the metroPolitan British theatre of the 1990s can 
be demonstrated in figures. According to the Society of London Theatre (SOLT), from 
1990 to 1994, "modem musicals", for example, those by Lloyd Webber and Sondheim, 
took a share of total Performances ranging between 27% (1990,1994) and 37% (1992). 
"Traditional musicals" have increased their share steadily since 1990, from 7% (1990) 
to 12% (1994). In total, musicals accounted for 39% of all performances in 1994. By 
comparison, "modem drama" has slightly decreased in its share; 22% (1990), 17% 
(1991), 16% (1992,1993), 20% (1994). Musicals have been even more dominant in 
terms of actual audience attendance. Musicals have accounted for more than 50% of 
theatre tickets sold by the members of the SOLT; from 51% (1990) to 59% (1992, 
1993). By contrast, the audience of regular adult playgoers, conscious of the repertoire 
and developments in new work, has been in decline, as modem drama has ranged from 
12% (1990) to 8% (1993). 
28 
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These musical productions were bluntly Thatcherite, encouraging private 
entrepreneurs to adopt materialism both in the manner of production and as a means of 
making money. In this sense, Lord Andrew Lloyd Webber, a producer and a musical 
composer, was and still is the perfect symbol of the triumph of Thatcherite theatrical 
materialism. He has invested vast amounts of money in epic scale productions, with 
spectacular sets such as the gothic staircase in Sunset Boulevard and the dazzling 
chandelier in The Phantom of Opera, and with lavish costumes. He rewrote the history 
of the musical by making incredible profits. In 1991 he was running six musicals at the 
same time in the West End. In July 1993, Sunset Boulevard opened with E4 million in 
advance bookings. At the end of January 1996 Cats marked the longest-ever-running 
musical with more than 42,000 performances in 21 countries. By then it had been seen 
by 7 million people in London alone. By 1998 it had taken f2bn at the box office 
world-wide. Antony Thorncroft said; "The fattest cats, with most of the cream, are 
naturally Sir Lloyd Webber ... who has described Cats, with some irony, as 'my 
pension fund "'. 29After the success of Cats, in 1986, his production company, the 
Really Useful Theatre Company, was to be floated on the London Stock Exchange, 
immediately valued at over f 35m. By the end of November 1994, more than 40% of 
theatre income in the US came from Lloyd Webber musicals and this led to his Really 
Useful Group twice receiving Queen's Awards for export achievement. In 1991 when 
The Phantom of Opera, Song & Dance and Aspects of Love were added to his 
catalogue, the PolyGram Corporation offered around f 100m for a mere 30% share of 
his company. By 1996, he was among the list of the top ten richest men in Britain, 
eamino, most of his fortune from mega-musicals. 
30 Sheridan Morley wrote; "If you 
Z) 
added up all the lifetime earnings of all other British stage composers in this century, 
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the total would be unlikely to reach even a half of what Andrew Lloyd Webber is now 
worth" . 
31 
At the 1995 Birmingham theatre conference titled 'All Passion SpentT, there 
was a strong argument between straight theatre and the musical. Writer-director Neil 
Bartlett "defended the musical as a form uniquely possessed by its audience". 
According to David Edgar, "for him, the ideal show is one to which a member of the 
audience could happily escort his boyfriend and his mother". John Bull, however, 
"condemned the musical as ideologically conservative and creatively reactionary, both 
paradigm and cause of a theatre of escapism and nostalgia". 32 Whether theatrically 
benign or malign, practical effects of the rise of musicals have been clear. David Edorar 4: ) 
wrote; 
The big musicals have converted the playgoing experience from regular 4D C) 
theatre attendance to the occasional slam-bang treat; by exposing major 
classical directors, designers and actors to the market, musicals have 
transformed the culture of the subsidized rehearsal rooms to which these 
artists returned. Whether for good or ill, the musical was the Trojan horse by 
which the consumer-orientated principles of the market were infiltrated into 
the subsidized theatre. 33 
Indeed, when the idea of extravagance rooted in materialism gained popular 
appeal, it seems true in the 1990s that "it is unwise to believe in too rigid a division 
, 34 between the commercial and the subsidized'. Not only have leading national theatres 
often put on highly successful musicals themselves, but also they 
have become 
branches of the entertainment industry. For instance, in David Edgar's view, 
"the 
National Theatre no longer operates as an acting ensemble, and is increasingly 
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, 35 collaborating with outside companies on its own productions'. In the 1990s the Royal 
Shakespeare Company made huge profits from Les Miserables. For primarily 
commercial rather than artistic reasons, The Royal National Theatre decided to stage a 
revival of the musical Guys and Dolls at the Olivier Theatre, giving up the original 
plan for classical, renaissance, and Shakespearean plays. 36 It seems that what the Arts 
Council aimed at with the national theatres were - setting a new market-driven model 
for the subsidised theatre - was finally accomplished. 
Many established leading directors, moving freely between the subsidised 
sector and the commercial sector, seemed to be another token of the breakdown of any 
rigid division between the two sectors. Trevor Nunn, who had been running the RSC 
for 18 years from 1968 to 1986, became the director of the RNT in Autumn 1996, with 
a five-year exclusive contract which allowed him to work in the commercial sector. 
This enabled him to take care of his own musicals like Cats, Starlight Express and 
Sunset Boulevard which have made him a multi-millionaire. Many of the leading 
theatrical figures like Trevor Nunn have been responsible for theatrical conservatism 
and materialism, despite accusations that they curried favour with the public or the 
defence that they were unavoidably following the fashion of the times. Trevor Nunn 
did not conceal his preference for musicals, simply because they had popular appeal 
attracting more first-time audiences to the RNT. Nunn also strongly hinted that under 
his directorship in the RNT commissioning new writing would not be his major 
concern, by saying that before joining the RNT, "It is entirely possible that I have not 
kept in touch with new writing". 
37 
-. 
20 
As seen in the case of Trevor Nunn, when theatrical conservatism and populism 
became a dominant idea, new writing was in a serious crisis in the British theatre in the 
first half of the 1990s. The crisis of new writing during this period seemed to typify the 
theatrical problems caused by the prevalence of the Thatcherite market economy. Due 
to the significance of this, this study will separately examine what created this crisis 
and what the consequences. However, a literary analysis of new writing that emerged 
from the mid- I 990s is not the concern of this study. 
The State of New Writinp- in the 1990s 
Artistic directors are shouldering impossible burdens of under-resourced 
buildings, lack of opportunity for artistic refreshment, lack of recognition 
and boards who keep the artistic policy in check - thank goodness mine is 
one of the exceptions. As a result of a plethora of legislation, they are now 
personally liable for fine or prosecution if there is evidence of financial 
mismanagement. As a result, they are less likely to sanction any risk-taking 
because of the need to protect themselves. In the current climate, areas such 
as new writing become an easy target for cuts. 38 4: 5 
In the early 1990s many theatre people and critics were seriously concerned 
about the state of new writing for theatre. David Edgar in retrospect defined the period 
of 1988-92 as "death of the new" - the period of "what seemed to be an exponential 
decline in the amount, quality and performance of new work in the British theatre". 
39 
Critics such as Michael Billington also pointed out a deep crisis 
in new writing; 
121 
New writing for theatre is in a state of crisis. Of course, new plays are still 
written: around 100 a year in the grant-aided theatre. Some are good. But for 
a variety of reasons - fmancial, political and cultural - new drama no longer 
occupies the central position it has in British theatre over the past 35 years. 40 
Indeed, the state of new writing in the early 1990s has been directly and 
interrelatedly affected by political, financial and cultural changes starting from 
Thatcher's government. Politically speaking, since 1979, Britain has witnessed the 
emergence of the New Right, and witnessed Labour's desocialising process towards 
Thatcherite values. The British society was becoming more and more conservatively 
depoliticised. This was particularly true of the youth. As a MORI poll indicated, the 
aspirations of "Thatcher's Children" were materialistic and individualistic. As Martin 
Thomas witnessed in the Chapter 1, they showed little interest, if any, in politics and 
even did not understand the meaning of socialism. Under the situation, it was difficult 
to expect the emergence of a new generation of young writers to ensure theatre's role 
as a place of lively debate of which it had once boasted. 
Financially speaking, as arts subsidy was continuously squeezed after 
Thatcher's second election victory in 1983, the subsidised theatre sector was 
increasingly pushed into a free market competition in which decision-making was 
taken rather in terms of business than of artistic and spiritual consideration. In this 
situation, new plays looked simply too expensive. 
Thus, culturally speaking, in the theatre, a tendency towards theatrical 
conservatism and populist materialism was a logical outcome. The tendency was 
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illustrated by the Arts Council's analysis of the "Overall Repertoire for Arts Council 
Building-Based Theatre Companies" from 1981 to 1995 - the rise in musical and 
adaptation and the decline of post-war serious work. 
These interrelated political, financial and cultural changes have brought about a 
vulnerable climate in new writing. More specifically speaking, several factors, which 
arose from political, economic and cultural Thatcherism, have contributed to this 
vulnerable climate. 
First of all, _there was 
the difficulty of finding a subject. David Edgar, who once 
said that he "was brought up to deem two truths to be self-evident; that live theatre is a 
unique art fonn and new work is essential to its strength", 41 looking back on the state 
of new writing in the early 1990s, claimed that "by 1990 British theatre has ceased to 
have a subject". 42 It was true that unlike the 1980s, in the early 1990s playwrights such 
as David Hare and Caryl Churchill found it difficult to find a subject of their time. In 
the 1980s, they had brought Thatcherite Britain into debate as one of the subjects. For 
example, Caryl Churchill's Top Girls directly attacked top girls like Mrs Thatcher as 
typical bourgeois feminists. Pravda (1985) co-written by Brenton and Hare denounced 
the embracing of free-market cultural economy by Thatcher's government, comparing 
Sir William Rees-Mogg, the ex-editor of The Times and the then chairman of the Arts 
Council to the main character, Lambert Le Roux, as a representative of the power of 
naked capitalism. However, although Margaret Thatcher was gone in 1990, Thatcherite 
Britain still continued. There may have been a cynicism which claimed that we had 
tried hard against Thatcher's Britain, but what happened? Vera Gottlieb spoke in 1988, 
"I find in myself a lot of ideas that are a residue of twenty years ago and not necessarily 
12 3 
engaging with the realities of today - which is not to say that many of these values are 
wrong, but how does one readdress thern?, 543 In addition, after the Berlin Wall was 
breached, there arose amongst left-wing writers a certain defeatism. Brenton declared 
that "The 'British epic' theatre with its 'issue plays' ... has died". 
44 Trevor Griffiths 
observed; "It's very difficult ... to make art Out of politics, at a time when people aren't 
making politics out of politics". 45 It was not until the mid-1990s when a group of 
young wnters began to deal with issues of violence, sex, drugs and homosexuality that 
new writing with new subjects began to emerge. Later in this chapter, those issues will 
be examined. 
The vulnerability of new writing was also related to theatre companies' 
financial hardship. As their income of which government arts subsidy represented a 
considerable proportion was becoming insecure, theatre companies could not afford to 
stage risky new plays to the same extent as they did. Even the Royal Court whose 
Theatre Upstairs was renowned as "a major venue for new playwrights" had gone 
through a difficult time. During the 1970s, the Court received steadily increasing 
subsidy from E105,000 (1971-72) to 051,000 (1979-80). Despite the inflation rate 
which caused the reduction in value of its income in the 1970s, it could afford to 
produce eight or nine new plays on the main stage and almost the same number in the 
Theatre Upstairs. However, the subsidy the Royal Court received from 1984 to 1989 
was almost standstill; E532,780 (1983/84), E505,508 (1985/86), and E566,500 
(1988/89). The Court, by 1986, could only afford to produce four plays each on the 
stages. In 1989, the Court was unable to maintain even the minimum level of four 
shows in each theatre. The Court's status as the centre of new writing was recognised 
by the Arts Council in this year, but the Theatre Upstairs which had been "a major 
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venue for new playwrights" was temporarily closed, simply because it did not receive 
the necessary funding to develop further. In the early 1990s, there was little increase in 
its arts subsidy. 
In regional theatres, where financial hardship was most severely felt, staging 
new plays had already become a rare event. Despite sporadic successful events such as 
the Stephen Joseph Theatre's staging of Tim Firth's Neville's Island which made the 
journey from Scarborough to London, and despite an audacious challenge of such a 
company as the West Yorkshire Playhouse which produced 5 or 6 new plays annually - 
a third of its own in-house productions - most regional theatres, which became 
increasingly concerned about box office returns, were either unable or unwilling to risk 
new plays. Binningham's Artistic Director, John Stalker said in 199 1; "A few years 
ago we would have commissioned 12 new plays a year. Now it's only six and we can't 
afford a literary manager. That means there are 50 per cent fewer opportunities for 
writers". 46 Without being nurtured, it is difficult to expect the new talent to be 
forthcoming. 
The critical state of new writing was also related to the financial condition of 
new writers. New writers who wanted to start their career in theatre had to be prepared 
for a precarious income. Particularly after a drastic cut in the Council's special 
schemes for new writing in the late 1980s, their general financial condition in theatre 
has not been adequate. Unlike actors and directors whose income was relatively stable 
irrespective of success or failure of a production, writers, particularly new writers, still 
remained the workers in the subsidised theatre whose income was primarily rewarded 
by initial success which was xrery rare. Even after the success, their income looked, at 
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most, only sufficient enough to carry on their work. Theodore Shank, after 
interviewing Charles Hart, officer in charge of Writer Schemes in the Arts Council in 
1991 , wrote; 
So if in a year a playwright were lucky enough to receive a bursary 
[maximum E5,000], a commission [maximum around F. 3,800], and a 
residency [f4,000 for six months] which was renewed for a second six- 
months period the total income for the year would come to E16,800. 
However, one would have to be very optimistic indeed to count on all of 
these awards - especially since the success rate for bursary applicants is low 
and most often go to experienced writers. 47 
In 1991-92, the Council's E34,000 bursaries were offered to only 9 writers, 
including Kay Adshead (0,000) and David Halliwell (f 5,000). The precarious income, 
therefore, often drove writers from the theatre into other media such as television. In 
terms of economics, the temptation to write for television was irresistible. Billington, 
quoting from a playwright friend, wrote; "A new play at a theatre like Hampstead will 
earn a writer a maximum of f-5,000: a dramatist who knocked off seven segments of 
EastEnders, in less time than it takes to write a stage-play, earned E2 1,000,,. 
48 In 
addition, with a few exceptions such as works of well-establi shed writers as Hare, 
Brenton and Edgar, young writers found it difficult to interest theatre directors in their 
work. It was small wonder that they were attracted to other media. Some promising 
playwrights like Hanif Kureishi and Tony Marchant have already abandoned the stage 
for success in other media. Many others have increasingly pursued other media as a 
side business. For instance, Peter Cox wrote for Brookside in 1991. He was previously 
the author of The Garden of England for 7: 84 which described the effects of miner's 
strike of 1984-S5 on women in the Kent coalfield. Louise Page, Sarah Daniels and 
126 
Kevin Hood, whose works were produced at the Royal Court during Max Stafford- 
Clark regime, have been earning their living in the 1990s by writing popular serials on 
radio and television. 
TV was often criticised by theatre workers and critics as one of the main 
culprits for the fragile state of new writing in the theatre. Billington wrote; "television 
uses theatre as a cheap recruitment facility without putting anything like enough 
bac . 
49... te economic blandishments of TV are so strong that writers are being 
snatched out of the nursery before they have had a chance to grow". 50 In Max Stafford- 
Clark's view, "television is kidnapping, young theatre writing talents and draining their 4: ý 
, 51 vital juices' . 
Indeed, in the 1990s, television companies exploited new talent without 
offering suitable conditions for writers to develop their craft. In the 1970s, the BBC 
was noted as a great patron of new writers. According to Peter Ansorge who joined the 
BBC in 1976 as a script editor in the television drama department, "there were dozens 
of outlets for single plays, with a variety of producers commissioning them" in the 
primetime, such as "Playfor Today on BBC" which "could win audiences of well over 
10 million". 52 However, after the emergence of Thatcher's government, it was faced 
with the decline in real-terms license fee income as well as heavy competition with 
ITV. BBC restructured itself into a business-like organisation, so that its in-house 
producers competed with independent programme makers who wanted to sell their 
programmes to the BBC. Its restructuring certainly had an impact on programming 
with broadcasters' preference for marketable items. David Edgar said that "The new 
BBC is the clearest possible demonstration of how restructuring for the market creates 
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, 53 conservative programming'. In the 1990s, the primetime programmes of either the 
BBC or ITV nonnally included police series, soap operas and hospital shows such as 
The Bill, Inspector Morse, Brookside and EastEnders, and Casualty and ER. Thus, 
once recruited by television companies, it was obvious that new writers were expected 
to develop their craft by writing these series and soap operas. 
The writing technique demanded by television and stage is clearly different. 
There is no doubt that the stage remains the most demanding writing medium. Writers 
of soap operas and long-running series are nonnally given stories and characters. This 
can, dangerously, lead to the writers becoming reduced to the status of dialogue- -t) 
writers, with little assimilation of the symphonic skills needed to write a stage-play. In 
this, television, which has huge capacity to attract new writers, has made an aesthetic 
impact on theatre in the 1990s. Later, this study will examine the aesthetic impact of 
television on theatrical and dramatic discourses of new writers emerging from the mid- 
1990S. 
The vulnerable climate of new writing was also to do with the state of small- 
scale touring companies. It is said that in the 1970s these played a major role in 
inspiring unknown talented writers to join the theatre and thereby offered them a 
training ground. Theodore Shank said about the capacity of touring companies to 
inspire "an incipient young playwright"; 
The first experience of an incipient young playwright living outside of 
London might be to see a performance by a touring company. When 
Welfare State arrives in a community is much like a circus coming to town. 
They construct props, large puppets, masks, lanterns and 
banners 
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culminating in parades and performances. It is easy to see how such 
excitement, contrasting with the drabness of an industrial town, could 
inspire a teenager to devote his or her life to the theatre. 54 
Once they were recruited, new writers learnt their writing craft before they 
made their name in the larger subsidised companies. In the 1970s, companies such as 
Portable Theatre, Joint Stock or Monstrous Regiment had writers at the core of their 
work. Such writers include David Hare and David Edgar of the post-Osbome fringe 
generation. For instance, Hare, with Tony Bicat, founded Portable Theatre in 1968 
where he undertook a playwriting apprenticeship until 1972. In the ffinge theatre in the 
1970s, audiences were presented with new plays dealing with issues of the time. 
However, by 1990 many of significant companies such as 7: 84(England) and North 
West Spanner were driven out of business. 55 
In the early 1990s, new plays were, nevertheless, still being written and staged. 
According to the Arts Council, new plays accounted for roughly 15% of the repertory 
of subsidised companies. This figure was not very different from the figure of the early 
1980s. However, the problem was, as Theodore Shank indicated, that many of 
premiere productions "drew upon the familiar - the work of earlier writers or history or 
movies which would spark recognition in the minds of potential spectators 1, . 
56 
Moreover, a higher proportion was confined to a few metropolitan theatres - the Royal 
Court, Hampstead, the Bush, the Tricycle and other venues. Most of the London fringe 
theatres were, to a greater or lesser extent, in a state of a boom from the rediscovery of 
either domestic or European classics. A great deal of playwriting talent was devoted to 
adaptation and translation. The Gate, for instance, did its European seasons for two 
consecutive years. One was a Spanish Golden Age season under Stephen Daldry in 
Q9 
1991 with such productions as Tirso de Molina's 1620 Spanish tragedy, Damned For 
Despair. The other was a 'Plays For Europe' season under Laurence Boswell, who 
succeeded Daldry, in 1992, with pieces from a recent French dramatist Michel Vinaver, 
Euripides, Lorca, and Lope de Vega. As Dominic Dromgoole said, "The Gate was a 
very late 80s phenomenon when new writing was suffering". 57 
The phenomenon was, first of all, due to artistic directors' increasing concern 
with marketing. For the directors, new plays from new young writers were not paying 
business; few of them could attract the critics' attention; few of them could attract 
substantial audiences; few of them could attract business or private sponsorship. 
Generally speaking, new plays were viewed by theatre directors as being risky and 
expensive, requiring more investment in rehearsal time and money for commissioning. 
For instance, Adrian Noble, the RSC's artistic director of the Barbican, decided in 
1992 to drop the last seven performances of Richard Nelson's new play, Columbus 
And The Discovery Of Japan at the Barbican. The decision was made because of 
44simply no movement at the box office for the last seven performances - only 830 
advance bookings". Against criticism from Richard Nelson who argued that "the show 
is being turned into a scapegoat for the decline in business this summer", and from 
Michael Billington who saw the decision as "foolishly myopic". Adrian Noble justified 
his decision by arguing that it saved E80,000,58 and "protected the company's other 
work by improving its overall financial condition". This was one simple example of 
the general trend of Artistic Directors' primary concern in the 1990s with finance. In 
Adrian Noble's words, the decision came from "a lesson from bitter experience over 
the last 15 years, by both artist and funding bodies alike". 
59 
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In the early 1990s there was a dearth of young directors who were eager to 
direct new plays. David Edgar critically wrote; "For the first time since 1956 there is a 
whole generation of talented young British directors who affect little or no attachment 
to the production of new work". 60 If established directors shrank away from new plays 
chiefly from financial considerations, a new generation of young directors refrained 
from them chiefly out of consideration for a promising future career. 
Generally speaking, many young directors were reluctant to take risks. They 
were reluctant to spend time and energy in the dubious field of new writing. They 
preferred rather classics which they saw as a safer bet because at least the validity of 
their texts was hardly questioned. Indeed, for them, mounting productions of classics 
was related more to the matter of getting noticed than of aesthetics. Unlike the classics, 
where directors are usually spot-lighted after a successful opening night because most 
of the authors are no longer alive after the opening night of a new play, it is not the 
director but the writer who receives reviews and gets noticed. Carl Miller, a former 
Royal Court trainee director who turned freelance after a stint at the Royal Court 
Young Director's Theatre described his experience in the early 1990s in the fringe 
which had been a testing ground for new plays, but was now an open audition for 
young directors who played safe and opted for the classics; 
Once people directed on the Fringe because that's where they wanted to 
work. Now an awful lot do it because they hope that Richard Eyre will turn 
up on a wet night and say 'Great, come and do Trewlaney of the Wells at the 
National. ... 
The fiinge has become an open audition. It's like constantly 
being backstage at a Broadway musical where everyone is hoping to get the 
break into the big time. 61 It's not that I don't want to be as famous as the 
next person but the lack of idealism is really depressing. Trying to maintain 
any political or artistic integrity is incredibly diffCUlt. 
62 
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Generally speaking, in the 1990s, with a few exceptions, the only time young 
directors showed their interest in new writing seemed to be when they were appointed 
as director in a venue such as the Royal Court or the Bush. Stephen Daldry was a case 
in point. Daldry was considered to be one of the young directors who led a new writing 
boom in the middle of 1990s. He made his name, however, not with new British works 
but with classics. In 1988, his Liverpool Playhouse production of The Ragged 
Trousered Philanthropists won him instant critical acclaim. He staged Odon Von 
Horvath's Judgement Day at a London ffinge and the Old Red Lion in 1989 praised by 
Billington as "a remarkable event". He became director of the Gate Theatre in 1990. 
Critics such as Michael Billington and Claire Annistead praised highly his directorial 
vision in the classics when he offered two productions in a Spanish Golden Age 
season, Marieluise Fleisser's Pioneers in Ingolstadt and Purgatory in Ingolstadt (199 1, 
with co-director Annie Castledine) and Tirso de Molina's Damnedfor Despair (199 1). 
The season was award-winning, and his fame, after successfully staging these classics 
and European plays, led to him being designated as co-director to Max Stafford-Clark 
at the Royal Court in 1991 with a view to succeeding him in October 1993. After the 
designation, he said; "One of the things I don't like, and don't adhere to in today's 
theatre is the sectarian attitude to the classics that has emerged in new British writing 
over the past few years". He added; "We need now to go back to text-based works, 
marrying new writing to the more extraordinary theatre which has been abandoned in 
the eighties". 63 However a remark like this seemed to be highly predetermined by his 
designation as artistic director of the Royal Court, a theatre noted for its support for 
new writing. 
I 
Jane Edwardes, in her article entitled 'Directors: The New Generation', 
illustrated a general tendency followed by young directors in the 1980s and the early 
1990s. Apart from Jenny Killick, 64 all the "Oxbridge" young directors she interviewed 
- Declan Donnellan, Sam Mendes, and Deborah Warner" - turned their backs on new 
writing early in their careers in favour of the classics and were then quickly embraced 
by the leading subsidised companies. Donnellan, director of Cheek by Jowl which has 
been known for specialising in revivals since its foundation in 1981, said; "We like 
plays that have an epic, poetic dimension. Plays about great issues that are not tied to 
any particular period. The great literary texts are so emotional". 66 He and his company 
produced Racine's Andromache (1984), Tweýfth Night (1986), Macbeth (1987), 
Ostrovsky's A Family Affair (1988), and the like. Sam Mendes, who made his name 
before reaching his thirties by winning the Hamburg Shakespeare Scholarship, 
produced The Cherry Orchard (1989) at the Aldwych, Troilus and Cressida (1990) 
and The Alchemist (1991) at the RSC, and The Plough and The Stars (1991) at the 
Young Vic, and Richard III (1992) at The Other Place. Deborah Warner set up a fiinge 
company called Kick which explored the classics. Her fringe classics included King 
Lear and The Good Person of Sichuan. Her subsequent productions at the National 
consisted of King John (1987), Electra (1988), Good Person of Sichuan (1989), and 
King Lear (1990). 
The post-war British theatre has witnessed some productive director-writer 
partnerships in new writing. The fifties and sixties saw the partnerships of Tony 
Richardson and John Osbome, John Dexter and Arnold Wesker, William Gaskill and 
Edward Bond, and Peter Hall and Harold Pinter. In the seventies, apart from the 
133 
partnerships in the mainstream theatre such as David Hare first with Peter Hall and 
then with Richard Eyre, there were partnerships in the fringe which had resulted in a 
huge explosion of new writing. in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it still happened 
occasionally, between Max Stafford-Clark and Caryl Churchill, but "It became de 
rigueur", wrote David Edgar in retrospect; 
for directors under (and even on occasions a little over) thirty to announce 
that they couldn't be bothered with the triviality of the contemporary, and 
they certainly couldn't cope with the trauma of having a living writer in the 
rehearsal room. Instead, they were either doing increasingly operatic and 
continental versions of not always unjustly neglected European classics on 
dangerously raked stages, or endless productions of the twenty or so sure- 
fire classical POPS. 67 
For them, works by today's playwrights seemed untrustworthy, inadequate or 
even "sanctimonious". Deborah Warner once exchanged words with Arnold Wesker. 
She said that living writers were always "neurotic", and that her production of Electra 
was "a modem play". She added that "I would love to direct a new play when there are 
new plays of the size that is offered to me in classics ... one you could give a year of 
your life to". 68 Amold Wesker characterised Wamer and her fellow classical directors 
as opportunistic "necrophiliacs", blind to the allure of living playwrights. 
As the vulnerable state of new writing continued, playwrights themselves were 
increasingly concerned about the theatrical climate. In November 1994,87 playwrights 
such as Harold Pinter and Caryl Churchill asked theatre directors in Britain to put on a 
quota of three new plays a year on their main stages. They expressed a fear that the 
nation's theatre was slipping into "irrelevance and decline" because of the lack of 
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opportunity for new work. This was the year that the Arts Council grant was cut by 
0.2m, and that both local authority funding and business sponsorship were in decline. 
However, as Jude Kelly argued, the demands of the playwrights were "impossible 
burdens" to artistic directors while they were asked to run "under-resourced buildings" 
successfully. 
Despite the hostile climate for new writing examined so far, by the mid- I 990s a 
group of young writers did begin to attract attention from critics and scholars. Benedict 
Nightingale, after a few years' watching, and comparing the stir created by this new 
writing to that created by Look Back in Anger, felt in 1996 that "there is a similar buzz 
in the air now". 69 In contrast to his lamentation on the crisis of new writing in 1991, 
Michael Billington, reviewing theatre in 1995, said; "Indeed the most heartening 
feature was the abundance of new plays that both found an audience and addressed big 
issues". 70 David Edgar, who had been asked by the Arts Council in 1992 to write a list 
of post-war British playwrights and their writing, wrote in 1997; "One could now add 
at least 20 potentially or actually major writers to the list". 71 With the emergence of 
new writers, he saw one particular subject of their writing - 44masculinity and its 
discontents". 72 His thematic list included "gay plays like Jonathan Harvey's Beautiful 
Thing and Kevin Elyot's My Night with Reg, boys' bonding plays like Tim Firth's 
Neville's island (and the boys' betting plays of Patrick Marber and William Gaminara), 
lads' plays like Jez Butterworth's Mojo and Simon Bent's Goldhawk Rd, girl-in-a- 
boys' gang plays like Irving Welsh's Trainspotting and Mark Ravenhill's Shopping 
and Fucking, (and indeed the subgenre of girl-in-and-out-of-a-boys'-bonding-plays, of 
which genre Terry Johnson's Dead Funny remains the market leader)". 
" 
13-5 
A few factors were behind the emergence of these new playwrights. One was 
the establishment of practical courses in playwriting in higher education. For instance) 
Binningham University established Britain's first postgraduate playwriting course 
guided by David Edgar in 1989. Its three underlining principles were - "that it is taught 
by practising playwrights, that it combines theoretical exploration with work on student 
texts, and that it involves live perf 9 74 ormance of students' work'. A writing course like 
this has given students a sense of confidence about their playwriting craft by seeing 
their own work produced. Of the 1990s graduates of the course, about one third 
75 became professional playwrights by the end of 1998, including Sarah Kane, Clare 
Bayley, Ben Brown and Rod Dungate. 
Another factor was the availability of playwrights' self-help workshops and 
festivals, such as North West Playwrights, Northern Playwrights, and Yorkshire 
Playwrights. These emerged from the necessity felt by writers to develop their new 
works in rehearsal as theatres were increasingly unwilling to respond to unsolicited 
scripts. For instance, Northern Playwrights organised 'Stage First' - the first festival of 
new writing on Tyneside in May 1993. It was a weekend of workshops and discussions 
about new plays with names like John McGrath, Alan Plater, Michael Wilcox and 
Philip Hedley. Here, new local writers were given a chance to try their new works, 
such as Peter Mortimer's Ghosting. Even against the financial odds, these courses, 
workshops and festivals gave an energy to the emergence of new writers in the mid- 
1990S. 
Such directors as Dominic Dromgoole and Stephen Daldry have taken the lead 
with regard to the new writing boom in venues traditionally famous for new writing 
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such as the Bush Theatre and the Royal Court. Dominic Dromgoole became artistic 
director of the Bush in 1990 and soon staged The Evil Doers (1990) by Chris Hannan, 
The Pitchfork Disney (1991) by Philip Ridley and Our Own Kind (1991) by Roy 
MacGregor. His six-year period as artistic director introduced many new writers to the 
Bush audiences; Lucinda Coxon, Sevastian Barry, Lesley Bruce, Naomi Wallace, 
Richard Zajdlic, Tamsin Oglesby, and Conor McPherson, Simon Bent, David Eldridge 
and Samuel Adamson. Stephen Daldry, after his designation as artistic director in the 
Royal Court in 199 1, soon showed his detennination to produce new works. A boom 
of new writing in the Court largely came from Daldry's expansion policy after 
succeeding Max Stafford-Clark in 1993. In the early 1990s after its desperate financial 
year of 1989, a Court autumn season usually consisted of two plays on the main stage 
and two Upstairs. However, in 1993 Daldry announced his first full season (1993- 
1994) in the Court which contained four productions both in Upstairs and Downstairs. 
Extra funding from the Jerwood Foundation and the Audrey Skirball-Kenis Foundation 
was financially helpful to his policy. He said in July 1994; "It's important to expand 
when you feel threatened. ... There is a 
huge exuberance of new writing around, and I 
don't mean the old Royal Court plays with a bit about the state of England in the 
middle of Act 11". 76 Just before the season began in early September 1994, Daldry said; 
"Between now and April next year, we are planning to produce over a dozen writers. ... 
The importance of this is simple - it allows opportunity". 
77 
In his heyday at the Court from 1994 to 1996,78 the Court produced by 1995 
many new plays from young writers, with ages ranging from the youngest at 15 to the 
oldest at 27. In 1994, it produced Jonathan Harvey's Babies, Joe Penhall's Some 
Voices, Nick Grosso's Peaches and Judy Upton's Ashes and Sand. In the following 
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year, 1995, Stephen Daldry demonstrated a "can do" attitude despite financial 
hardship. This year saw 8 new plays in the Theatre Downstairs, and 9 in the Theatre 
Upstairs, plus the Barclays New Stages Festival. Sarah Kane's Blasted, Judith 
Johnson's Uganda, Phyllis Nagy's The Strip, Jez Butterworth's Mojo were staged in 
the Court during this year. In 1996, the Court left Sloane Square and moved into its 
temporary homes, the Duke of York and the Ambassadors in the West End, because of 
its refurbishment with lottery money. Despite the London Boroughs Grants 
Committee's withdrawal of its grant of E37,000 to the Theatre Upstairs, Daldry did not 
stop commissioning new works. The work of the Theatre Upstairs was continued at the 
Ambassadors Theatre (renamed the Royal Court Theatre Upstairs). He converted the 
Ambassadors into two spaces, which allowed him to run three theatres rather than two, 
so that he was able to continue the expansion of the programme. He stated that "while 
we're out of the building in Sloane Square it won't feel like our work is on hold. In 
fact, quite the reverse - we will be continuing to expand and do the work and allow 
5 79 writers to flourish'. This year saw new works including Nick Grosso's Sweetheart, 
Martin McDonagh's The Beauty Queen of Leenane, Nigel Williams's Harry and Me, 
Clare McIntyre's The Thickness of Skin, Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking, 
Marina Carr's Portia Coughlan and so forth. 
What is most significant, however, it that new plays in the 1990s have generally 
reflected political Thatcherism in their contents and economic Thatcherism in their 
fon-n. The contents of the plays shows a strong apolitical tendency which is a theatrical 
legacy of the 1980s. While analysing the plays of Jim Cartwright, Timberlake 
Wertenbaker and Terry Johnson as representatives of new playwrights of the 1980s, D. 
Keith Peacock pointed out feature of this tendency: that none of them was "employing 
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the oppositional left-wing dramatic and theatrical discourse common in the 1970S,,. 
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In the early 1990s before the emergence of a group of new writers, Max Stafford-Clark 
also verified this tendency'after his experience of changes in the political climate 
during Thatcher's 1980s; 
History had indeed been happening outside the window and in such a 
theatrical fashion that it has tended to upstage events on stage. ... The dedicated or fellow-travelling socialism which provided the moral and 
intellectual framework for a previous generation of playwrights is itself in 
question. It is not that the goal posts have moved - it's more that we are now 
playing on a different pitch. 81 
He anticipated the different way new writers in the 1990s would deal with the 
contents of their writing - in a personalised manner; 
New writers, no less disillusioned with the promises of their parents than the 
angry young men and women of the past, have to find their own analysis. 
They may be profoundly concerned with social, environmental and political 
themes but they use personal experience to make sense of the world. 82 
His anticipation was more or less vindicated by Stephen Daldry. After 
announcing the Court's expansion policy, Daldry received thousands of unsolicited 
scripts in 1994. After examining all of these, whether or not his personal taste 
functioned as a major factor in selecting scripts for staging, he must have become 
aware of the apolitical and personalised tendency from the scripts; 
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The politically-driven writing of the seventies and eighties has 
unsurprisingly fallen into abeyance. In its place has grown an interest in the 
politics of the individual - the politics of sexuality and gender, a concern 
with violence and nationalism, mental illness and taboo, innocence and evil, 
coincidence and the supernatural. ... And this new generation of writers is 
addressing these subjects with an energy and a generosity not felt in the 
theatre for some while. 83 
Although no longer concerned with party politics, it is possible to deduce a 
kind of politics from these plays such as the politics of sex or violence. Elizabeth 
Sakellaridou, in her article entitled New Faces For British Political Theatre, attempts 
to relate the work of Sarah Kane, Mark Ravenhill and Patrick Marber with "the politics 
of violence and class politics". 84 However, these may be better described as issue 
plays. The reason is that after the retreat of political plays such as those of John 
McGrath and Howard Brenton, the concept of 'political' or 'politics' has not been 
defined as clearly as it was in the 1970s. Thus, I consider that 'political' plays should 
still be regarded as those which contain socialist oppositional ideology. Plays of new 
writers of the 1990s do not contain such a strong ideological stance, and are, instead, 
issue plays written on the basis of personal experience; gay issues in Jonathan Harvey's 
Beautiful Thing and Kevin Elyot's My Night with Reg; sex, drugs and violence issues 
in Sarah Kane's Blasted and Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking; lads issues in 
Jez Butterworth's Mojo and Patrick Marber's Dealer's Choice and Closer. 
In portraying such small-scale personal issues, new plays do not need a large 
number of characters. This is also directly inherited from Thatcherite theatre 
economics in which theatre companies instinctively avoided staging plays with a 
large 
number of casts. In the new plays of the 1990s small numbers of characters are 
remarkably evident. Jonathan Harvey's Beautiful 
Thing has 5 characters and Kevin 
140 
Elyot's My Night with Reg has 6. There are only 3 characters in Sarah Kane's Blasted, 
7 in her Cleansed, 6 characters in Patrick Marber's Dealer's Choice, 5 in Gangster 
No. ], 6 in Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking, 6 in Jez Butterworth's Mojo, 5 in 
Judy Upton's Bruises, and 6 in Rebecca Prichard's Essex Girls. 
It is also a logical outcome that these plays employ naturalistic "domestic 
settings" to project personal small-scale issues with a small number of characters just 
as new plays of the 1980s were "employing domestic rather than public settings to 
, 85 focus on individual or even personal crises rather than public confrontations'. For 
instance, Jonathan Harvey's Beautiful Thing tells a story of the sexual awakening of 
two teenage gay characters against the minutiae of a parochial south-east London 
landscape, and Sarah Kane's Blasted describes the violent nature of human beings in a 
domestic set of a small hotel room in Leeds. Mojo tells a story of men's desire against 
a domestic environment of a rock'n'roll club in gangland Soho in 1958. Dealer's 
Choice tells a story about the risk-taking life of six addictive gamblers set in a 
restaurant somewhere in London. Shopping and Fucking includes only a few pieces of 
furniture. There are other many plays which can be categorised within a drawing-room 
tradition, such as Kevin Elyot's My Night with Reg with it stage-centre sofa. 
In these features, young playwrights of the 1990s are rather like Thatcher's 
children. There is a reason for this. When Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 
1979, most of them were around 10 years old; Jez Butterworth was 10, Sarah Kane 9, 
and Patrick Marber 15. It is obvious that their sense of values has been largely formed 
under a Thatcherite society in the 1980s, through mass media, or the government's 
enterprise education. Indeed, their sense of values in a real world strongly reflected the 
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nature of Thatcherism - individualism and materialism. Most of them, after making 
their names in the theatre, preferred to be individualistic freelance writers. They also 
showed strong preference for television and film which can offer more materialistic 
benefits than the theatre, and which have a capacity to attract huge audiences, and, 
thus, provide them with fame in a very short time. As Peter Ansorge argues, "For the 
young writers of the 1990s, fame in television and particularly film seems a more 
attractive option than the theatre". 86 For them, theatre looks old-fashioned particularly 
in terms of business and fame. It seemed that theatre was a mere springboard for their 
way into bigger business organisations such as the BBC and film industry. 
Sarah Kane began writing a screen play for the BFI in 1996. Martin McDonagh, 
after he left school at 16, drifted through a few office jobs with an ambition to become 
screenwriter. He wrote his first stage play, The Beauty Queen of Leenane, at the age of 
23. Jez Butterworth's Mojo was originally conceived as a film script rather than a stage 
play. Mojo is exactly like a Tarantino thriller, dealing with a group of tragicomic young 
gangsters committing a brutal crime. It was filmed in 1997. Jez Butterworth has 
already completed a few film scripts. Patrick Marber, before writing his first play for 
theatre - Dealer'S Choice, had served his apprenticeship on TV as a writer and 
performer for comedy shows like The Day Today and The Paul Caýf Diary. He also 
wrote and directed After Miss Julie for the BBC. When he was asked "what about film 
and TV", he said; "I've come from TV. I'm aware of how much you have to 
compromise. ... The thing that appeals about 
film and TV is fixing the thing and saying 
'this is it' and it just being there. I quite like that. I would like to make films one day 
)587 Perhaps, Jonathan Harvey is a representative of this fashion. After making his 4: ) 
name in theatre with Beautiful Thing which was screened by 
himself for a Channel 4 
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film, he has been vigorous in writing TV sitcoms, a drama series, and screen plays. He 
also wrote musical-like lyrics for the Pet Shop Boys. As a gay writer, by the end of the 
1990s, he was making reference to homosexuality in his sitcom series, Gimme Gimme 
Gimme, in which gay characters talked and joked about sexual issues. When he was 
asked whether he wanted to stay with theatre or to do more on television, he said; 
I want to do a mixture of everything really. ... I'm doing this sitcom at the 
moment and the schedule's very tight - you do four days rehearsal and the 
fifth day in the studio and the sixth day you fihn it and the seventh day you 
edit it. ... I'd like to be a good writer to be able to write different things 
well, ... But I don't know if that's possible. On the sitcom the techies and the 
crew are quite surprised I've got a play on at the National. They just think I 
write ridiculous half hour television. 88 
However, for Peter Ansorge, who pointed out that writers' freely moving 
between the three would have been unthinkable at the end of the 1970s, this fashion is 
just "a loss in terms of the relationship between roots and writing". 89 With regard to 
this, Jenny Topper, the director of the Hampstead Theatre, significantly remarked in 
1991; of 1,200 scripts a year the Theatre received, "there are fewer writers who know 
how to write for the stage. Plot development and structure have now become less 
formal and more casual because of TV. You feel a lot of dramatists simply haven't 
seen enough plays". 90 As has been noted, once recruited by television companies, most 
writers are normally invited to write marketable items like a slice of a soap opera or a 
thriller rather than invited to write a drama which needs symphonic skills. In Patrick 
Marber's words, this is exactly "fixing the thing". 
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TV and film have significantly influenced the dramatic and theatrical 
discourses of the new writers. Just as most TV dramas and screen scripts are projected 
naturalistically, so are their plays. Besides their naturalistic setting as has been noted, 
most of their plays also depend on naturalistic conversation. In addition, their dialogue 
is conversation, consisting mostly of a few words or a short sentence. For instance, in 
Blasted and Shopping and Fucking, characters rarely converse each other with for more 
than two sentences. That conversation is mostly made up of a single word or a short 
sentence. For this reason, some theatre people have been concerned that the 
playwright's status will be reduced to that of dialogue-writers for television and film. 
In David Edgar's eyes, "Jonathan Harvey's gay romance, Beautiful Thing, is a highrise 
equivalent of Brookside Close". 91 
Moreover, many of the plays are composed of small episodic scenes, similar to 
cinematic composition. For instance, Shopping and Fucking consists of fourteen 
scenes, Cleansed twenty scenes, and Beautiful Thing ten scenes. However, this 
composition has nothing to do with the so-called "collision of episodes" - one of the 
main theatrical discourses of Brecht's epic theatre - which functions to enable 
audiences to maintain a certain distance from the stage by colliding and defamiliarising 
each episode, and, thereby, to form a critical view on what is given to them. The new 
writers' episodic composition in the 1990s has merely been a fashion influenced by the 
writing method of television and film. 
In fact, unlike playwrights working on TV in the 1970s, such as Jim Allen and 
Trevor Griffiths, whose plays, such as Allen's Spongers and Days of Hope and 
Griffiths's series of Bill Braiidt, offered the audience political discussions, new writers 
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in the 1990s did not seem to be interested in narrative discussion. Rather, they 
employed third-person narrative which simply revealed the world they have privately 
mediated or experienced. Blasted shows us how brutal and abnormal the world around 
us is. Although some people talk about its metaphoric message about a Bosnian war, it 
simply reveals brutal images and scenes such as male-raping, eye-gouging, defecation 
and cannibalism. The play ends with a terribly shocking visual image, in which Cate, 
whose blood is running down her legs, shares her food with Ian, whose eyeless head, 
showered by rain, is poking out of the floorboards. 
It can be said that some plays deal with the world wrought by Thatcherism. 
However, unlike previous plays which explicitly dealt with the practical consequences 
of Thatcherism and contained strong moral messages against it, 92 their plays deliver C") 
moral messages implicitly. This is mainly because they make little effort to explore the 
whys and wherefores of dramatic background and characters' behaviour. Trainspotting 
does not preach. It does not even question why Tommy, who injects heroin into his 
penis, has succumbed to drugs in the first place. He may be assumed to be a victim of 
Thatcherite social divisiveness, but the play simply presents heroin addiction and the 
use of opium suppositories without asking why. Mark Ravenhill has argued that his 
play Shopping and Fucking is an implicit critique of Thatcher's dictum that 'there is no 
such thing as society'. His characters are desolate, disposable and disconnected in the 
world in which "money is civilisation". Occasionally, the characters make efforts to 
escape from the trapped circumstances. One character, Mark, trying to come off his 
dependency on drugs, leaves his boyfriend Robbie to go into rehabilitation. However, 
because the play does not investigate such efforts in a larger social and political 
context, such as investiggating how Mark has become a drug addict and why 13-year old 
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Gary has become a gay prostitute, individual struggle is shown as likely to fail. For this 
reason, it is difficult to assimilate a critical message of what Ravenhill intended -a 
callous society caused by Thatcherism. Michael Billington was right when he wrote; "it 
[Shopping and Fucking] never persuades me that its characters are social metaphor 
rather than a group of hapless special cases". 93 
With a few exceptions 94 the world described by those new plays is gloomy with 
little hope of positive change. In 1995 a spokeswoman for the Royal Court said about 
their general view of the world; "Blasted is part of a series of II works by new writers 
The youngest writer was 15 and the oldest was 27. Most of them have a very dark 
world view which reflects the fact that we are living in dark times. Ashes and Sand, 
one of the plays in the series, was about a gang of teenage girl muggers and it was 
running at the time Elizabeth Hurley was mugged". 95 Similarly, Simon Bent's 
Goldhawk Road is about a group of vultures hovering round a dying old man and 
trying to get their hands on his money. In this sense, their view stands at the opposite 
pole of Brechitian thought - society and individual can be changed through discussing 
the whys and wherefores. Here again, their apolitical tendency is evident. 
New writing by new young writers, which mostly emerged from the mid- I 990s, 
was then, apolitical, small-scale, and naturalistic. Michael Billington, who had pin- 
pointed in the early 1990s "the small-scale nature of so much new writing and the way 
it increasingly privatises experience"96 as the main cause for the crisis of new writing, 
was in 1997 still deeply concerned in 1997 about the inevitability of studio-writers' 
thinking small. He wrote; "Drugs, sex, violence - which have lately dominated new Z-) 
drama - are all fascinating topics ... We 
have an abundance of talent. But why is it so 
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scared of writing about the great drama of public life? , 97 He himself recognised as 
early as 1991 that the drastic changes in the political, economic and cultural climate 
had made large-scale political plays unpopular. From Thatcher's government in the 
1980s to Major's government in the 1990s, the dominant social and cultural agenda 
shifted away from collective thinking towards individualistic thinking. The Thatcherite 
political economic cultural agenda has continued in the theatre under New Labour. 
Now, this study turns its attention to the arts and theatre world under New Labour. 
Arts and Theatre under New Labour 
... New Labour is busy restructuring and 
deforming the arts, while 
congratulating itself that it encourages them. The gap between reality and 
sharp public relations is the mark offin de si&le in Britain. ... As I write 
this, there are no real [theatre] companies left in Britain. They too are 
unfashionable - principally because they cost money. 
98 
Although few people believed that the New Labour was socialist, with its 
election victory arts organisations had some expectation of a tangible increase in arts 
subsidy. Indeed, when New Labour was in opposition, it was very supportive of the 
arts. At the Mansion House on 3 February 1997,3 month before the general election, 
Tony Blair argued; "We have the potential to invest in arts and culture, not just 
for the 
economic rewards but for the whole of the quality of life". 
99 However, to the dismay of 
the ails world, the first visible gesture that the New Labour government made towards 
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the arts was to cut it by fl. 5m for 1997/98. What was the point of cutting such tiny 
meaningless sum in relation to nation's overall economy? Perhaps, the message was 
that the New Labour gove=ent, in fact, did not care for the arts. 
Indeed, just as there is little difference of economic or social policies between 
New Labour and the previous Conservatives, so there is little difference in arts policy 
between the two. New Labour has inherited the Tories' arts policy. Its inheritance was 
explicitly mentioned by Tony Blair in his Mansion House speech. Here he revealed at 
least two clear views on the arts. The first was that it was his fin-n belief that "the 
Treasury is not the only significant provider of funds to the arts". This meant that New 
Labour would maintain the same spending policy towards the arts as the conservative 
governments had done since Margaret Thatcher. This was vindicated by its first 
Chancellor, Gordon Brown's, commitment to stick to the previous government's 
restraint on public expenditure for the first two years of his Chancellorship. In 1997 its 
first arts budget was cut by E1.5m in cash tenns and was frozen in 1998 and 1999. 
Secondly, Tony Blair regarded the arts as basically "creative industries" which, 
in his view, "have been on the sidelines for too long" under Tory govermnents. He was 
not interested in the arts that cost money, but only in the ails that make money. 
Although he mentioned spiritual and creative aspects, he interpreted the arts and 
culture mainly in materialistic terms with such words as "creative economy", Les 
Miserables "earning millions for the country", "exports from the sector" amounting to 
11 100 f 10 billion, and "overseas visitors" financially contributing to "the cultural sector . 
Following the Prime Minister's view, Chris Smith, the Secretary of State for Culture, 
Z 
Media and Sport, named his department "an economic department with a series of 
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powerful economic sectors at its heart". "' One of the economic sectors was the 
Creative Industries Task Force (CITF) which was set up by Tony Blair after the 1997 
general election. The CITF was designed to "look for ways of maximising the 
economic impact of British goods and services in the creative sector". It has also been 
working "to identify market failures and to propose measures to address them". 102 
To create the arts as part of creative industry, Chris Smith, first of all, tackled 
what he saw as the Arts Council's bureaucracy and inefficiency. After the lottery 
money was distributed to the arts world in 1995, criticism of the ACE's bureaucracy 
was mounted. For instance, its annual report of 1996-97 showed that the total operating 
costs in dealing with lottery cash rose from E6.86m in 1995 to E14.71m in 1996. The 
lottery department was so large in 1997 that it could not even fit into the Council's 
Headquarters in Great Peter Street. The ACE found it difficult to escape criticism that 
much of the public money, which otherwise could have been used for the arts 
themselves, was spent to sustain its bureaucracy. There was also speculation about the 
government's direct intervention in relation to national companies, by funding them 
directly from the ministry. In the centre of this speculation lay the financial problem of 
the Royal Opera House, which had been perhaps the most prestigious cultural 
institution receiving the highest annual subsidy, and which also had a poor financial 
record. The government thought that the ACE's lack of entrepreneurship may have 
caused the Royal Opera House's problems. As Thatcher's government had done, 
instead of a direct intervention into the Council's affairs, the Blair goverranent tried to 
transform the Council into a more business-like institution. 
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Gerry Robinson became the new chairman of the ACE in March 1998. As the 
chief executive of the leisure group Granada he was a tough businessman. He was also 
a close friend of Tony Blair's and benefactor of the Labour Party. On being appointed 
as the chairman, he introduced radical reforms, applying the same management 
methods to the ACE that galvanised Granada - reducing the membership of its board, 
delegation to key officials and the devolution of arts funding. 103 
His determined reduction of its 23 board members to 10 provoked particular 
controversy. The board was the Council's ruling body, which met regularly about 10 
times a year to decide policies and approve spending, and which had been "the only fig 
leaf of democracy that the council had". 104 While depriving 13 advisory panels of 
experts of their place on the Council, Robinson placed more power in the hands of the 
Secretary-General and three new managers appointed by himself This meant that in 
deciding policy and funding, there was less of a consultative process with experts while 
more power was placed in the hands of the new Secretary-General, Peter Hewitt, an 
expert in business enterprise which he had applied to the visual arts in the North-East, 
and three departmental managers; Graham Marchant, general manager of the North 
London dance centre, The Palace, as director of policy and arts; Graham Long, long- 
term arts "apparachik", as director of finance and operations; and Phil Murphy, 
political editor of the Press Association, as director of public affairs. 
With Gerry Robinson and his subordinates the ACE became an overt business 
organisation. For instance, council meetings, which normally lasted 10 hours under 
Lord Gowrie, became 2-hour business-like ones after the removal of the 13 advisory 
panels of experts. Robinson and Hewitt claimed that meetings like these with less of a 
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consultative process would make the Council function "more effectively" and would 
cut down on internal "bureaucracy". 
However, board members did not agree. From the beginning of Robinson's 
reforms, many of them resigned in protest. For instance, the entire drama panel, led by 
West End theatre producer Thelma Holt, resigned on 20 May 1998. A week after the 
resignations, a letter, signed by 60 theatre directors and producers led by Sir Peter Hall 
and Sir Cameron Mackintosh, arrived as the Arts Council's office. It said; "We totally 
support the reasons for the drama panel's resignations. We would not wish to serve on 
any Arts Council of England panel whose chair is not a full member of the council". 105 
What the signatories could not tolerate was that the arts were being handed over to 
businessmen while experienced experts were frozen out of the decision-making 
process. Thelma Holt argued; 
With nobody from the art form panels on the council, these changes mean 
that people who have supported their local theatre may wake up one 
morning and find it is gone because nobody from the profession was there to 
speak up for it. 106 
Being less consultative, it is conceivable that there was contradiction and lack 
of consistency in the Council's policy. This was clearly seen with its dealing with the 
Royal Opera House (ROH). In addition, the case of the ROH also demonstrated the 
contradiction of New Labour's arts policy. 
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Since the 1980s, the ROH has been dogged by two factors. The first was its 
elitist attitude. Most ticket prices were beyond the reach of many people. The average 
ticket price in 1994 was E57.45. By September 1998, normally, mid-range seats cost 
E80 and the most expensive price was over E150. It was not surprising, then, that most 
of its audiences consisted of the ABCI social group from London and the home 
counties. This meant, in Gerry Robinson's words, that the ROH had "continued to ply 
their trade to the same, middle-class audiences", 107 unable to give access and appeal to 
a wider public. The second factor was that the company had had perennial management 
problems. Its board members had "spent what they thought they needed rather than 
what they knew they had", the policy of, in Sir Richard Eyre's words, "knowing 
recklessness". 108 Even after it received a total subsidy of approximately f98 million 
from 1992/93 to 1996/97, its deficit reached nearly f5m by the end of 1997. This 
raised questions about the validity of the principle on which all arts organisations 
receive taxpayers' money. The board members were severely criticised by Gerald 
Kauffi-nan and the culture, media and sport committee on December 1997. The 
conunittee report conclusively ordered; "The current board should dissolve itself, and 
the chief executive should resign, with immediate effect". 109 As criticism of the ROH 
mounted, Sir Richard Eyre launched an inquiry into opera and dance provision in 
London at the request of Chris Smith on November 1997. He told MPs on 16 July 
1998 that there had been "little sign of improvement" so far in the operations of the 
ROH. He also recommended refonns"O that the ROH must rapidly adopt if it was to 
continue to receive arts subsidy. 
Mentioning the case of the ROH implicitly, Gerry Robinson, as a tough Z: D 
businessman warned; "when you are an Arts Council client you will not always be an 
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Arts Council client". "' In his first Arts Council/Royal Society of Arts lecture after 
becoming chairman, he also stressed that there would be no more "blank cheques", and 
added that "in the new era, no one should kid themselves that the Arts Council will be 
a soft touch". ' 12 His remark meant that any company, even the ROH or the RNT, could 
lose its grant unless it had a good business record. 
However, in December 1997, Lord Gibson, Chairman of the Council from 1972 
to 1977, argued that the ROH's elitist attitude and its huge deficit was mainly due to 
standstill arts funding for several years, while production costs had risen with inflation. 
Particularly, he pointed out that the ROH's recent deficit had resulted from the "close- 
down period" starting in July 1997 for its rebuilding with lottery funding. He argued 
that during that period, "it couldn't attract the same box-office income from a smaller, 
less suitable temporary venue". 113 He added; 
... the 
Royal Opera House has become the face of the arts in the LJK, and 
New Labour has chosen it as the easiest target. Brought to its knees by 
mismanagement of the close-down period, the ROH is being used as a 
smokescreen for the government's failure to address the overall decline in 
subsidy. 114 
Conclusively, he accused Blair's government of being "no more willing to help 
the arts than its Conservative predecessors", labelling its arts policy as a "chimera". 
His accusation was not wrong in view of the goverranent's contradictory arts policy. 
Tony Blair argued in his speech at the Mansion House in 1997; "Art is not 
elitist. What is elitist is a society in which art is hoarded 
for the few and never 
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experienced by the many". Accessibility was one of the bases of the government arts 
policy. Also, this accessibility was closely related to its grave concern with "creative 
arts industries". New Labour believed that if arts companies did not improve 
accessibility to either the public or tourists, no prosperity of arts as "creative 
industries" would be attained. However, with high seat prices, it is impossible to attain 
the accessibility. For instance, with the ticket prices in 1998 - E80 for mid-range seats 
and over f 15 0 for the most expensive one - the ROH found it impossible to widen its 
accessibility to the public. Thus, for accessibility, arts organisations need, first of all, 
proper arts funding. Thus, refusing to increase arts subsidy, the New Labour 
governrnent's demand for an increase in accessibility was simply contradictory. 
Perhaps, realising the validity of the accusation, Cultural and Arts Minister 
Chris Smith responded; "the country's key arts companies would be able to establish 
themselves on a sound financial basis ...... 
115 Accordingly, Gerry Robinson, claiming 
that "There is no doubt we under-fund the opera and ballet in London", 116 endorsed 
I I% subsidy increase for the ROH - E8.83m for the Royal Opera and the same level of 
increase for the Royal Ballet to E7.17m for 1999-2000. In 2000-0 1, the first full season 
in which the two companies will be performing in their refurbished building which will 
be completed with the support of lottery money, subsidy will rise appreciably from 
f 16m to f 20m, with more promised for 2001-02. 
There are two points which can be made from the case of the ROH. Firstly, one 
of the bases of the Labour govenunent's arts policy - "Art is not elitist" - is higghly 
questionable. Faced with the accusation that the goverrunent was actually fostering 
elitism in the arts, it increased the subsidy for the ROH. Perhaps, the ROH may be 
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trying hard to escape the criticism of its tendency towards cultural elitism. The new 
chairman since January 1998, Sir Colin Southgate, the boss of EMI, brought in a board 
packed with businessmen such as Sir David Lees of GKN. The new executive director 
since November 1998, Michael Kaiser, who was a noted arts businessman as a money- 
raiser in American Ballet Theatre, pledged several things such as improving 
accessibility by reducing its ticket prices by 25% for all but the most expensive seats, 
and by developing better financial systems. Perhaps, the government and the ACE will 
take serious action if they do not think that the ROH is carrying out its pledges 
faithfully. However, the ROH, even after its increase in subsidy, could not escape the 
criticism of its elitism. The reason is that however hard its business team works, there 
is always limitation on how far it can cut its ticket price without the aid of a substantial 
increase in its arts subsidy. Lord Gibson took the case of the Bastille Opera House in 
Paris. According to him, after recovering from crisis, it has achieved high artistic 
standards and has been able to offer a good seat for Ffr240 (E24) and an upper balcony 
seat for Ffr64, with the support of the French goverment's annual subsidy of Ffr550m 
(E55m). Without such a proper level of arts subsidy as the Bastille, the ROH may have 
been and will remain elitist. Sir Peter Hall argued in 1999; 
... 
in the case of the Royal Opera House, government pressures created an 
indefensible 'toffs' opera which regularly charged f-200 a ticket, while 
drawing a subsidy of E15,000,000 a year from taxpayer. No wonder it was 
unpopular. 117 
In the case of the ROH, the Council's contradictory attitude was also seen 
in 
Gerry Robinson's abandonment of his policy of "no more blank cheques", had little 
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justification for the increase of the art subsidy for the ROH. In order to follow the 
decision of the Cultural Minister, Chris Smith, he increased arts subsidy for the ROH. 
This is one clear example of how closely the Arts Council was subordinated to its 
superior authorities, just as the cabinet members such as Chris Smith were faithfully 
subordinated to the Prime Minister. 
From the case of the ROH's subsidy increase, it is not difficult to see the Arts 
Council's traditional practice of preferably funding big prestigious companies. This 
practice was also related to economic potentiality which those prestigious companies 
could produce - visible and invisible economic returns which correspond to New 
Labour's "creative arts industries". There has been no systematic research on how 
much each national company has generated those returns. However, it is not difficult to 
infer something of their significant economic contribution from a range of figures and 
facts. As has been noted, in 1986 the arts already generated E140m which exceeded the 
Council's grant of E135.6m. Stephen Daldry's RNT production of J. B. Priestley's An 
Inspector Calls, which was running in both the West End and on Broadway and also 
opened in Japan, Australia and Canada, had been seen by half a million people by 
September 1994. According to the National Campaign for the Arts, by the mid-1990s, 
'T2 billion per year is generated through arts-related tourism". ' 18 With tourist Z-) 
spending, arts companies pay their employees, purchase supplies, contract for services, 
and these activities, in turn, create local jobs, and generate revenue for local and central 
govemment. 
For this reason, the policy of "centres of excellence" was still in effect under 
the New Labour govenu-nent. This led to the further deepening of the disproportionate 
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distribution of arts funding. In December 1998, Chris Smith announced a E125m 
increase in arts subsidy for a three-year period from 1999 to 2002.119 Besides the sharp 
increase for the ROH, the RNT received 9% more - E12.17m, and the RSC 5% more - 
E8.9m. Moreover, the ACE also used earmarked funds for strategic development to the 
benefit of large companies. The Orn strategic fund for 1999-2000 was possible owing 
to the extra cash from the Treasury. It was designed for one-off cases of special need. 
Among fl. 46m distributed by the end of January 1999, the RSC and the Royal Court 
took E600.000 and E200.000 respectively. Sir Peter Hall, after his application for 
E500,000 of the fund to enable his own company to perform at the Old Vic met with "a 
polite rebuff', he said; "Even if I had been allowed to stage productions at the Old Vic, 
I would still be saying they are doing a terTible job". 120 
By contrast, even after Chris Smith's announcement of a subsidy increase, 
small regional or fringe companies, which could not play the same economically 
important role as large companies could, continued to receive standstill funding. The 
goverment and the Council were revealing unreservedly what they considered to be 
culturally most worthy. Theatre workers such as Nicola Thorold - director of the 
Independent Theatre Council - criticised this as a "two-tier system"; 
I am very concerned that there is a two-tier system appearing. Fifty-five per 
cent of small and mid-scale companies are on standstill funding. For many 
of them it is for the fifth or sixth year in a row. The Arts Council says this 
is 
a radical budget but it's a nonsense. They've shifted the money to a 
few by 
keeping the small companies on standstill... . 
121 
15-1 
A gloomy state of the British regional theatre continued. Sir Peter Hall 
observed; 
I don't think they've got the regional theatre remotely right. We're going to 
end up with almost no regional theatre except for one or two centres, say 
Leeds and Birmingham. The small houses where audiences learn how to be 
audiences are disappearing. We're talking about a lot of money to put things 
right. 122 
On 13 July 1998, confinning that "This is the year in which the crisis point for 
regional theatres has unquestionably been reached", The National Campaign for the 
Arts (NCA) published "Theatre in Crisis: the Plight of Regional Theatre" which 
revealed the increasingly conservative and materialistic measures regional theatres 
were being forced to take in order to survive; 
-A cut in in-house productions (e. g. Scarborough's are down 50% over two 
years). 
-A cut in cast sizes (e. g. the average cast size at Derby Playhouse has fallen 
by 42% over the last two decades). 
-A fall in the employment of actors (e. g. the number of actor weeks at the 
Crucible, Sheffield has fallen by half over the last five years). 
-A rise in the share of productions that are musicals from 8% to 17% since 
1990. 
-Steep rises in ticket prices. The average ticket price paid 
in England 
increased by 90.3% between 1986/87 and 1994/95 and in Scotland by 
105%. 123 
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The suffering regional theatres might have still operated for months and years 
by paying their staff pitiful wages, but somehow, at the last minute, extra cash was 
found. Survival for all, however, is by no means certain. Peter Ansorge offered his 
vivid experience of the gloomy reality of one of the leading regional theatres, the 
Everyman Theatre in Liverpool; 
In February 1996 1 attended a performance of a new play at Liverpool's 
Everyman Theatre. The play, an accessible two-hander, had been well 
received locally and my companions assumed that the auditorium would be 
packed. In fact there were eight people in attendance. ... Part of the reason 
had to do with economics. At eight pounds a head, even ticket prices at the 
Everyman were on the steep side. ... As a result, even in Liverpool people 
are more likely to choose Lloyd Webber than the new Bill Morrison. 124 
However, if regional theatres have been fortunate in the sense that they, at least, 
have been able to survive, the left wing political theatre movement was unable to 
revive itself Political, economic and cultural conservatism since Thatcher's 
government caused its demise. Particularly, after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and 
Soviet Union, capitalism seems to have won the race against socialism. Capitalist 
values swept the world, generating a cultural globalisation in every comer. 
125 in 
Britain, arts and culture is already judged in materialist terms. New Labour's view of 
"creative arts industries" meant that it was interested in particular arts companies and 
forms which could generate financial returns. Besides its preference for national 
companies, New Labour has showed its strong interest in pop music, 
design, video, 
film and architecture. For them, small companies and theatre were not efficient 
cc creative industries". New Labour sharply divided the arts 
into two - reward worthy 
and unworthy. Peter Hall strongly criticised this in 1999; 
"One of the frightening things 
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about New Labour is its instinctive urge to make the arts conform". 126 He also 
compared New Labour's arts policy with Stalin's state arts. Whether his criticism was 
exaggerated or not, one thing is clear. Under the New Labour goverment, theatre 
companies found it more and more difficult to gain arts subsidy. After coming to 
power, New Labour has moved towards authoritarianism in dealing with arts subsidy. 
It has already outlined guidelines which urged theatre companies to conform - 
ideological non-opposition, economic viability, utilitarian social work for such things 
as Tony Blair's "Education, Education and Education! ". In this cultural climate, it is 
impossible to expect an oppositional movement. For instance, unlike most political 
theatre companies which ceased activity or changed their socialist agenda, the Banner 
theatre company still retains its oppositional ideology. Currently at the end of the 
1990s, the company's main concern was the problem of global capitalism. However, 
such work was isolated and of much smaller scale than in the 1970s. In addition, 
mainly due to its ideological opposition, the company has received little subsidy. 
There is one particular similar phenomenon in the arts world between the end 
of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s. The two periods witnessed organised opposition 
and protest from the performing arts. In December 1988, many theatre people gathered 
together in an open conference, called "British Theatre in Crisis" at Goldsmiths' 
College. Here, a "Conference Declaration" of recommendation and protest were signed 
by many leading figures in theatre, such as Harold Pinter, John McGrath, Caryl 
Churchill, Timberlake Wertenbaker and Amold Wesker. 
On 12 February 1999 Sir Peter Hall announced the fonnation of a 'Shadow 
Arts Council' (SAC) as an infon-nal counterpart to the ACE. Realising that previous 
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organised protest had been unsuccessful, he said that, this time, the tactic would be 
"different"; "We want our body to have a guerrilla-like quality". 121 In 24 March 1999 
the SAC was launched with huge support from people such as Dame Judi Dench, 
Harold Pinter, Caryl Churchill, Sir Richard Eyre, Sir Alan Ayckbourn, Sir Tom 
Stoppard, David Edgar, Howard Brenton, John Tusa, and from hundreds of others 
including music luminaries, Evelyn Glennie and Harrison Birtwistle. Each had 
different anxieties about the current situation of the arts directly within their own 
experience. John Tusa, deputy chainnan of the Shadow Arts Council, talked about his 
anxiety and the role of the Shadow Council; 
With a Culture Ministry still inclined to preferring the 'creative 
industries' rather than the arts, with the ACE increasingly 
managerialised in its methods, the debate about the arts in society is 
disastrously lopsided. The Shadow Arts Council is there to restore 
the balance to talk about why the arts matter, why they are not elitist; 
why they need to cost money rather than earn it, and why a society 
that turns its back on them risks losing the capacity to understand 
itself, why media that diminish a serious debate by writing it off as 
'luvvies whinoeing' is about to short-change itself into terminal 0 
frivolity. For my part, the arrival of the Shadow Arts Council is the 
signal for this debate to start. ' 28 
Some artists and scholars were doubtful about its impact as they had witnessed 
the "indiscernible" effect of similar movements at the end of the 1980s. For instance, 
John Kieffer5 director of perfonning arts at the British Council, politely declined to 
sign up, saying; "it ends up defending the status quo against all-comers". 
129 By the end 
of 1999, the goverriment showed no sign of changing its arts policies. Gerry Robinson 
still argued for the impossibility of swimming against the current. He was critical of 
the emergence of the Council's infon-nal "Shadow"; "Positive dialogue must include a 
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readiness to accept change in the arts, not just a harking back to a so-called Golden- 
Era". 130 Although there has been no tangible effect by the end of 1999, the "Shadow 
Arts Council" was still shouting at the top Of its voice about the government and the 
ACE. In a society where alternative cultural values are getting more and more 
marginalised, such an oppositional voice has merit in itself In a contribution to The 
Guardian in September 1999, indicating that "The budget for the arts in Berlin is four 
times what we spend annually on the whole of England", Sir Peter Hall again spoke 
out; 
Our arts are currently in a terrible mess; yet nobody will admit it. It is, of 
course, largely the result of 20 years of Tory attempts to squeeze subsidy out 
of the system. But now we have a new danger: new Labour's ability to paint 
a rosy picture and manipulate us all into believing it. They confuse 
excellence and originality with elitism and are terrified of anything that is 
not populist ... . Last month, many of London's West End and most of our 
regional touring theatres were sold to an American conglomerate. There was 
little comment, and market forces have triumphed again What will 
Blair's Britain be remembered for? The Drama? The films? The television? 
I'm afraid not. Most of them have been sold off to America already. They 
will be the Dome of course. And it is a beautiful object. But there is 
apparently no drama there either: is it not thought populist enough? 131 
As illustrated above, Sir Peter Hall's sad observation that the British theatre in 
the 1990s was "paying for the excess of the Eighties" 
132 was far from wrong. In the 
meantime, against the financial hardship felt by most theatre companies, the National 
Lottery, which could be described as a casino economy, was held up as a sign of hope. 
This study will now turn its attention to the examination of whether indeed the Lottery 
has offered real hope for the adequate funding of the British arts in general and the 
theatre in particular. 
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Chapter IV: Lottery, A Crusader? 
Lottery money can only supplement, not replace, our core subsidy ... we do not imagine that the Lottery alone will be the salvation of the arts. It can never be a 
justification for the withdrawal or erosion of central or local government 
funding: if anything, it increases government's responsibility to maintain a 
stable financial environment for innovation and excellence. ' 
Britain had a long lottery tradition. It is recorded that the first was launched in 
1569. Since then, Lotteries in the UK have been frequently held mainly for public 
purposes. For example, the first 1569 one was held principally to raise money for the 
repair of the Cinque Ports, and the 1739 lottery was held for the building of Westminster 
Bridge in 1739. By then, lotteries had become respectable government undertakings. 
However, there was strong opposition to state lotteries at the end of the 18th century 
because of illegal practices and the social evils to which these practices apparently gave 
rise. A Select Committee of MPs concluded in 1808 that as a result of the lottery and 
illegal gambling on its outcome, "idleness, dissipation and poverty are increased, domestic 
comfort is destroyed, madness often created". 2 The state Lottery disapp-ared in Britain in 
1826. Its abolition indicated that a lottery was not a desirable method for raising 
government funds. From the 1920s opinion changed again and small lotteries were 
legalised in the UK. 
The establishment of the current National Lottery began with a recommendation 
by the Royal Commission on Gambling of 1978 which concluded that a lottery "would not 
be socially harmful' .3 
Its introduction seemed imperative in terms of "restoring the fabric 
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of the nation". This was particularly true of the arts and theatre world. After Jennie Lee 
had been established as the first Arts Minister under the Harold Wilson government, there 
was a significant increase in revenue grants for the arts, and the government appeared 
willing to spend money on capital projects. Lee's Policyfor the Arts (1965) established 
the Housing the Arts Fund which funded "Centres where light entertaimnent and cultural 
projects can be enjoyed" with "additional amenities (restaurants, lecture rooms) at existing 
centres". 4 However, since 1984/85, the Arts Council of Great Britain has almost ceased to 
fund capital projeCtS5 as the Thatcher government restricted its public spending. Lack of 
capital spending has caused the run-down of many arts buildings. As far as performing 
arts and the theatre are concerned, new resources have been urgently needed for repairs 
and maintenance. Despite doubt and criticism 6 of its introduction, a redeeming feature of 
the lottery has been the millions of pounds that have been made available for worthwhile 
purposes which would otherwise be impossible to fund from the government's limited 
resource. 
The worthwhile causes were illustrated in A Home Office White Paper: A 
National Lottery: Raising Moneyfor Good Causes, published in March 1992. According 
to this paper, the lottery money should be spent on four "good causes" - arts, sports, 
heritage and charities. A fifth good cause for projects to mark the new millennium was 
added in 1993. The 1998 National Lottery bill also included a sixth good cause - the New 
Opportunities Fund for education, health and enviromnent. 
In the meantime, the Department of National Heritage (DNH - now Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport, DCMS) was fonned in 1992 in order to introduce 
legislation for the establishment of the Lottery, and to set up the lottery distribution 
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mechanisms and the National Lottery Distribution Fund (NLDF). The current National 
Lottery, which John Major described as "a people's lottery", was finally launched in 
November 1994. 
The seven-year operating licence went to Camelot plc which would take 
responsibility for fulfilling all the commitments including the Distribution Fund for the 
good causes. Over the seven-year period, a proportion of about 28 % of total sales was 
expected to be distributed to the good causes. 7 For each of the five good causes, II 
corresponding distributing bodies have been established: the Millennium Commission, the 
National Lottery Charities Board, the Heritage Lottery Fund, the four regional Sports 
Councils and the four regional Arts Councils. They share equally the expected 28 % of the 
lottery money which is provided from the NLDF (20 % each). 8 
Camelot, the lottery licensee, estimated that EI. 54bn a year would be generated for 
the five good causes once the Lottery was running at full scale and with the introduction 
of a scratch card version in 1995. It has, however, been more successful than originally 
expected. In the first year of its operation, 1994-95, annual turnover reached nearly f5bn. 
By 1997 it would raise f4bn for the good causes. The original target, f9bn for good causes 
by 2001, was amended in 1997 by Camelot to flObn. 9 The ACE received more money 
from the lottery (E220m) than from the government (f I 85m) in 1998. Of course, this was 
due to the fact that people's lottery enthusiasm was undiminished. For instance, in 1997 
they spent E5.4bn, with f 1.5bn contribution to the good causes. 
The current Lottery has been developed at least in part for the "public good" in the 
sense that lottery money, which comes from the public's pocket, has been used to do what 
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the goven-iment, otherwise, may have to do with taxation. Thus, decisions about the 
distribution of funds can affect every member of society. Precisely for this reason, many 
questions can be raised. This study will deal with two matters in connection with the 
performing arts and theatre. Firstly, has the distribution been fair? If not, who/which has 
benefited most? Secondly, what is the implication of several years' frozen arts subsidy 
with regard to lottery spending for capital purposes? 
In distributing lottery grants, the ACE has not been allowed full authority in 
deciding who/which to fund. This is because its decision is based upon government 
guidelines on Lottery grants. There are four such guidelines. Two of them significantly 
related to the performing arts and theatre are; that "funds should be spent predominantly 
on capital projects; 'O that grants should be made to organisations which have already 
raised significant partner funding". " Under the guidelines, the Council's Lottery Advisory 
Board embarked on "consultative roadshows across the country". After this, Jeremy 
Newton, the first director of the Lottery Department set up in 1994, "added four additional 
criteria; the quality of artistic activities; their relevance to national, local and regional arts 
development; the role of artists in developing projects; and provision for education and 
., 12 marketing' . 
The govenunent guidelines and the subsequent cnteria by the Council mentioned 
above are the starting point of a consolidation of cultural elitism. This is demonstrated by 
the government's demand of "partner funding" - an obligatory requirement for all Lottery 
applicants to raise a significant level of support from non-lottery money. The Council, in 
response to the government's demand, set up minimum partnership funding requirements; 
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organisations applying for more than f, 100,000 needed at least 25% partnership funding; 
applicants for f 10,000 or less needed at least 10%. 
In theory, the partnership funding scheme seems excellent. Only serious, well- 
supported arts organisations would receive lottery money. In practice, however, it seems 
not as excellent as all that. Particularly for smaller companies, this seems nothing more 
than discrimination. Partnership funding comes from a variety of sources from small fand- 
raising to private donations. The biggest comes from business sponsors and private 
foundations. If we accept the claim that business or private sponsors have displayed their 
preference for middle-brow prestigious companies, it is not difficult to assume that small 
regional or experimental arts groups have struggled to find corporate ffiends. London- 
based big companies seemed able to raise partnership funding easily. For instance, the 
Royal Opera House received more than fl0m from Lord Sainsbury, and from Vivien 
Duffield who has been a fund-raising ffiend of the ROH, and by July 1997, when it was 
temporarily closed for two and half years for redevelopment, it had already raised E70m 
out of the fI 00m target. The Royal Court was also able to obtain f3m from the Jerwood 
Foundation in return for putting a new theatre name above its main entrance - 'The 
Jerwood Theatres at the Royal Court'. Moreover, when the ACE was doubtful about 
"whether sufficient [partnership] funding" would be "forthcoming from the corporate 
sector-, 13 because of its realisation that business sponsors were less keen on capital 
projects of "bricks and mortar" than event-by-event projects, such as live arts for the 
14 
young, which can offer much clearer advantages for their marketing, it helped the 
prestigious companies by even bending its own rule of matching cash. 
15 On the other 
hand, many small regional theatre groups, typically those who are not as attractive to 
sponsors as the prestigious companies, have become marginalised from lottery benefit. 
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Until 1998 when New Labour with its People'S Lottery Bill announced its abolition, the 
partnership funding had acted as a huge discouragement to them. 
An abstract criterion maintained by the ACE, "the quality of artistic activities" in 
deciding who/which to support with Lottery money, was another clear path towards 
cultural elitism. In view of its traditional role - preferentially supporting "centres of 
excellence". the distribution of Lottery funds is also highly susceptible to this rule. Wendy 
Harris, Artistic Director of Red Ladder from 1998, questioned "who decides where the 
lottery money should goes to". 16 Graeme Evans, the then Director of Centre for Leisure 
and Tourism Studies at the University of North London, offered a critical analysis of this. 
He predicted in 1995 just before the first announcement of the Lottery awards, that the 
Lottery money would be given to agency clients by the established providers. He foresaw, 
thus, that non-traditional art-forms or the hitherto unrecognised cultural expression of 
minority groups would offer "limited scope to bid for Lottery grants". 17 As a simple 
reason, pointing out what he considered to be "overtly political appointments to national 
and regional arts councils", he argued that "the appointment of professional grant 
assessors by Lottery boards has effectively completed" the "hegemony rules". " 
His claim was quite convincing. In 1998, many, perhaps most, of the ACE 
members of the Advisory Panel on Drama, which represents the interests of the English 
theatre, and discusses lottery distributions within the English theatre, consisted of 
members of the establishment theatre. Thelma Holt, the chain-nan of the Panel, was artistic 
director of Roundhouse in the 1970s, and is a theatre producer in the West End. Alan 
Ayckbourn is the most famous playwright in the commercial sector. Jude Kelly is director 
of the West Yorkshire Playhouse. Sam Mendes was the director of the Donmar 
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Warehouse. Michael Attenborough is a Royal Shakespeare Company director and son of 
Lord Attenborough. There were also senior figures from the RSC, the RNT and the 
Barbican Centre. It would be odd to. expect that their interest lay not in 'centres of 
excellence' than on small ffinge ones. 
The hegemony rule seems to have clearly been demonstrated in the case of the 
relationship between the former chain-nan of the National Lottery Advisory Panel, Peter 
Gummer, and the fonner ACE's Secretary-General, Mary Allen. Gummer was the 
chairman of Shandwick PR organisation at that time. He was also said to be a passionate 
lover of opera and dance. In 1995, he chaired the Panel which at that time promised the 
London Opera House E78.5 million for its redevelopment. He resigned as Panel chairman 
on 20 March 1996. The reason for this was his appointment as the chain-nan of the ROH. 
His appointment was very "odd", as Financial Times indicated, because he was the man 
who had been "chairing the lottery advisory panel", which "promised" the House 
"loadsamoney" for its redevelopment. 19 Mary Allen was confidentially appointed to the 
post of chief executive of the ROH in May 1997, without the ROH advertising the post. It 
was her former close colleague in the ACE, Peter Gummer, who requested her 
appointment. Her contract with the ACE was to end in September 1997, so she still had 
four more months to work in the ACE when the appointment was made in May. 
Concerning her appointment, Gerald Kauffinan said; "Here was an Arts Council 
employee, laying down terms on which she would leave her post behind the back of her 
chairman, to take on another job funded by the Arts Council". 20 In the eyes of Graeme 
Evans, these two cases were surely operated by the "hegemony rules" - the dominant 
class's tactics for making social organisations and institutions which work in their favour 
appear "legitimate and natural". 
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Just as arts subsidy has traditionally been concentrated on big prestigious 
companies, so the lottery money has been disproportionately allocated to those companies. 
The government's prerequisite for lottery money, partnership funding, and the Council's 
abstract criterion as a means of measuring support, "the quality of artistic activities", have 
functioned to produce disproportionate allocation. By June 1996, Lord Gowrie announced 
that; "the arts councils ... have made 1,200 awards to the tune of f471m. Over 75% by 
number of those awards have been less than E100,000 in value, demanding 10% in 
matching funds only". He added that "Surely this gives the lie to perceptions that all we 
do is to provide finances for large and prestigious organisations". 21 It must be said that 
from the viewpoint of the figures, the Council indeed seems to have fairly distributed the 
money. 
However, in view of the proportion of money, it cannot be claimed to have been 
fair. On 13 May 1999, in a report to the House of Commons public accounts committee, 
the National Audit Office (NAO) criticised the way the Council was dealing with large 
capital projects which resulted in over-budgeting and serious delays. For instance, the 
NAO criticised the Council for paying lottery money to the Royal Opera House whose 
"management and financial information system had broken down catastrophically". 22 The 
NAO revealed another fact. Since the Lottery operation, approximately flbn has been 
allocated to thousands of arts organisations. However, 28 of the largest multi-million 
developments have taken more than E500m out of that F-Ibn, including tens of millions of 
pounds refurbishment projects for the Royal Opera House Covent Garden (08.5m) and 
the Royal National Theatre (f42m) and a several-millions pound project for the Malvern 
Festival Theatre (f5m). 
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Although it is understandable that large prestigious companies, which can be 
regarded as representatives of British arts and which can make a significant contribution 
to the tourist industry, should receive capital injections from the Lottery, the 
disproportionate percentage of money distributed was critical. The fact that only 28 
companies received the lion's share of lottery money has critically damaged the ACE's 
credibility, provoking charges of elitism. The single project of the ROH (08.5m) has 
taken more than three times as much money as the total spending of the "one-off' project 
of the ME (Arts for Everyone) Express Small Grants Scheme (about E22m), through 
which in 1996/97 the ACE distributed grants of up to E5,000 to over 5,000 small groups 
and individuals. This fact directly supports Graeme Evans' claim that -given the 
reassertion of the hegemonies through the Lottery agency system, popular requests are not 
being sought - 'pay up and play the game and leave the rest to us' is the party line". 23 In 
this way, what John McGrath described in his book, The Bone Won't Break, as "the 
standardisation of culture" can be consolidated through lottery funding. In these 
circumstances, it is worth noting the comment below; 
... the huge 
distributions to 'good causes' were divisive, sometimes contributing 
to the growing process of social exclusion in the country. Huge grants continued 
to be made to institutions, be they football grounds, Domes or theatres, whose 
admission charges barred poorer lottery players from access to the very places 
they themselves had paid for. 24 
0 
From the first year of lottery operation, 1994-95, the Arts Council of England 
received more money from the Lottery's Arts Board (f250 million) than from the 
government (E186 million). This was a delight for the prestigious companies. Stephen 
176 
Daldry, artistic director of the Royal Court, was fulsome about the benefits of the lottery 
scheme at a time when the Royal Court, for its rebuilding, moved from Sloane Square into 
the Duke of York's and the Ambassadors in the West End. He said; "the lottery 
potentially gives us a Marshall plan for the cultural infrastructure of the nation. ... this 
period will be the largest and greatest theatre building period since the late Victorian 
age "- 25 Numerous extravagant new buildings have begun to emerge in the late 1990s. The 
Royal Court had an opening night with Conor McPherson's play Dublin Carol on 22 
February 2000 after completing E28m refurbishment. The building boasts a multi- 
functional proscenium. arch and a comfortable auditorium with leather-covered seats with 
individual ann-rests, larger foyer spaces, a glass lift and a new restaurant. It is not difficult 
to see that a lot of money was needed to construct such extravagant theatre building as the 
new Royal Court. 
In contrast to increasing money from the lottery, the government grant has 
remained at a standstill. In the Secretary-General's words, "the grants to most regularly 
funded organisations have not increased for four years -a real tenns reduction since 
1993/94 of 9%, which will reach over I I% by 1997-98". 26 New Labour also cut the grant 
by fl. 5m for 1998-99. In 1996 Lord Gowrie already pointed out a contradiction between 
the huge capital influx from the Lottery and the continuous cuts in grant from Treasury; 
... there is confusion 
in the public mind - expertly exploited by the Treasury - 
between the rules that govern the Lottery awards and the rules that govern the 
grants that we make for the support of the arts with the money Parliament votes 
to that end. It is felt that the arts are doing all right, and perhaps are even rather 
spoiled, so what on earth is the Council doing moaning about cuts and 
demanding more money? The short answer is that we are not allowed to use the 
Lottery to look after the arts themselves. We can build shining new palaces of 
culture ... But we cannot 
ftind what goes on inside them. 27 
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Basically, as has been briefly noted, the ACE had to be adamant about the use of 
lottery money on the basis of capital purpose only. The Council stated that it could "only 
distribute [lottery] money as endowments or revenue grants where such costs are 
associated with a capital project which has received or expects to receive money", and 
where "the project would otherwise not be completed because there is no other source of 
finance". Despite the gradual compromise particularly by the New Labour government, a 
few years after the lottery commenced, its money had been mostly used for capital 
projects. A couple of problems arise from a scheme of capital projects. One of these is that 
extravagant buildings and elaborate facilities built with millions of pounds of lottery 
money can turn into, at the worst, useless "palaces", failing to attract audiences while 
consuming huge extra running costs. 28 This is particularly true if the company's income, 
of which government subsidy makes up a substantial proportion, is not sufficient to run its 
operation. There was already a case in point. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, many 
extravagant regional theatres were newly built. The economic recession caused by the 
abrupt rise in the world oil price led to the escalation of the cost of running those theatres. 
Despite a significant rise in arts subsidy, the extravagantly built regional theatres had to 
economise in every way owing in consequence of soaring inflation. 
The situation in the late 1990s was similar or even worse. Many newly built 
regional theatre companies faced funding cuts particularly as a result of govenunent rate 
capping of county councils. As Lord Gowrie pointed out, there were "too many companies 
struggling for survival rather than achieving the superlative". " For instance, in March 
1997, Oxfordshire and North Yorkshire decided to virtually eliminate funding of local 
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theatres in an effort to reduce their deficit. As a result, the Oxford Playhouse, which 
received E2.5m from the lottery, lost its E45,000 grant. In 1997 the Stephen Joseph 
Theatre in Scarborough, which received fI . 48m from the lottery, faced the same thing, 
losing much of the E78.000 it received from North Yorkshire. The first big lottery project, 
a refurbishment of the Cambridge Arts Theatre in 1996, brought it to the brink of closure 
at the end of the 1998. The refurbished smart new restaurant, which was expected to 
finance some of its extra running costs, failed to hit its target. Just like the extravagantly 
built regional theatre companies in the 1970s, the refurbished regional theatre companies 
in the 1990s, with no increase in their arts subsidy, have also had to economise by relying 
on conservative and materialistic programmes - with fewer actors, fewer staff, few new 
plays, rises in ticket prices, and populist repertories - in order to keep their extravagant 
buildings running. 
With the governments' subsidy continuously restrained, there has been a growing 
controversy over whether it is best to use lottery money only for capital purposes. The 
controversy emanated from the arts organisations, particularly touring companies and 
financially suffering regional companies, and was conveyed through the Chairman of the 
ACE to the Culture Minister, Chris Smith. 
Touring companies like Red Ladder, for which theatre buildings are not urgent 
concerns, do not need to apply for new theatre buildings. Although most of them, even 
politically committed theatre companies like Banner Theatre, have received lottery money 
in one way or another, they could not take the same advantage of lottery money as the big 
prestigious companies because of the restriction of lottery money for capital purpose only. 
Red Ladder, which received f 68,318 for its equipment of a van, a copy machine and 
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computers, has never actually applied for funding for a theatre building. Wendy Harris, 
Artistic Director of Red Ladder at the end of the 1990s, argued; 
So far a lot of lottery money has been given for buildings and equipment. But 
not every Organisation needs them. What is more important is the creation Of 
artistic work with arts subsidy. I do not think that we can just have a building 
without people. The two have to balance very carefully. 30 
Although financially suffering regional theatres must have welcomed the 
allocation of lottery money to alleviate their immediate financial hardship, after the 
Contact Theatre in Manchester managed to receive E4.5 million in 1995, Patrick Martin, 
its Administrative Director said; 
A real cut next year would be very hard. 31 If we could take 5 per cent of our 
lottery award and apply it to our revenue budget ... it would transform our 
organisation ... we were heartened by reassurances 
from John Major that lottery 
money would not be used to restore mainstream funding. But many suspected 
those assurances would only last so long, and the temptation for the Treasury to 
start raiding the kitty would be too great ... 
32 
As has been briefly mentioned, there has since been a change in the allocation of 
lottery money from capital purposes only to its use for revenue grants. The House of 
Commons endorsed the change in April 1996; 
New rules will allow revenue funding to support initiatives which could not 
have occurred without the availability of Lottery funds. We shall invest more in 
our young people to enable them to develop their potentiaI33 
180 
Accordingly, in 1996 the ACE announced, on a Pilot basis, its first Arts for 
Everyone (A4E) Express Small Grants programme. It offered "one-off revenue grants" to 
any existing arts company, either a small group or an established organisation, as long as 
they had "an established record" which accorded with the five aims outlined by the ACE 
such as "supporting new work, and developing its audience". Another was a 
"stabilisation" programme introduced in September 1996, which, basically, was a 
consultancy programme which aimed to help financially suffering companies to keep 
working. Its most attractive aspect was, however, its capacity to wipe out financial 
deficits. If they qualified, after an examination by the consultants Coopers & Lybrand, 
companies were able to use "the additional funds to implement their stabilisation 
strategies and reduce existing liabilities". " The ACE launched its pilot scheme in January 
1997 with f7m. 15 companies were chosen from 129 applicants, including the 
Binningham Repertory Theatre (f5.77m), the West Yorkshire Playhouse (f2.64m), and 
the Tara Arts company (E606,000). 
Since 1997, the ACE has been allowed to spend lottery money on limited revenue 
projects for such things as new and experimental work. Lord Gowrie was still not satisfied 
and demanded "fast changes"; "We should also move as fast as possible towards agreeing 
with the Government a better balance between capital and revenue needs for the arts 
funding system as a whole. This would require changes to the existing Lottery 
legislation". 35 If lottery money is allowed to be used for revenue grants, there may be the 
so-called "substitution" - lottery money as an alternative to arts subsidy. This 
is highly 
likely. Precedents from other countries have shown a shift from additionality to 
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substitution. 36 There has already been a growing suspicion of substitution among MPs; 
"Further arts funding cuts could fuel suspicion that lottery funding was being used as a 
substitute for government grant-in-aid ... It indicates that MPs are beginning to take 
seriously the fears of substitution ... and view with mounting 
disquiet the reductions in 
arts spending ... The committee called for 'continual vigilance' ... 907 
However, Major's government tried to, and more or less, managed to maintain the 
additionality principle. Perhaps, Major's govenunent appears to have listened to such 
people as Lord Gowrie who consistently insisted that "Lottery money can only 
supplement, not replace, our core subsidy, and the Lottery alone will not be the salvation 
of the arts". 38 Just before the commencement of the National Lottery, the Major 
government confirmed the additionality principle in its White Paper in 1993; 
The Government is firmly of the view that the proceeds should not be directed 
towards the main area of public spending, and that it would be inappropriate for 
the lottery to be seen as a way of funding the National Health Service, education 
or similar programmes. ... The Government 
does not intend that money 
provided from the lottery should substitute for that provided in other ways. 39 
John Major reaffirmed that Lottery funds would only be additional to existing state 
funding; 
On the Government's side - Treasury, please note - we will make no case-by- 
case reductions on conventional public spending programmes to take account of 
awards from the lottery. The money raised by the Lottery will not replace 
existing Government spending. 
40 
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The then opposition Labour Party also affinned the principle. Thus, the principle 
was endorsed as a consensus among the political parties. However, with Blair's New 
Labour government, things changed. In order to win the 1997 general election, New 
Labour had promised not to raise taxes, and promised to maintain Tory's spending plans 
for two years. This, in turn, meant no increase in arts subsidy for at least two years. A 
drastic change in the use of lottery money for revenue purpose looked, therefore, attractive 
to New Labour in order to offer a lifeline to arts organisations most of which had suffered 
from standstill arts subsidy. Lord Gowrie's demand for a fast change to the use of lottery 
money for revenue grants was echoed by New Labour's Cultural Minister Chris Smith; 
"With the advent of the National Lottery we have that quantum leap in the availability of 
funding, but it is being wholly focused on building and institutions. I arn not sure that 
that's necessarily the best way to proceed". " 
The 1998 Lottery Bill suggested that grants could be much more "flexibly" used 
42 for "investing in people", particularly in "young people" . In Chris Smith's words, 
"We've turned the emphasis away from bricks and mortar to support for people and 
activities". 43 Chainnan of the Arts Council, Gerry Robinson, thus, talked "in terrns of a 
I L405m-a-year arts budget, merging fI 85m. annual grant with the f220m from the lottery' . 
He anticipated, in May 1998, that by the next year the Council's spending for new 
buildings "will have dropped to nearer E150m", whereas its revenue spending for arts 
, 44 activities "will be about E250m' . Lottery money now came to arts organisations 
in the 
form of revenue grants. In 1999 Tony Blair still maintained that "We don't believe it 
would be right to use Lottery money to pay for things which are the Government's 
45 
responsibilities", but it is hard to accept his claim for what it was. 
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New Labour's inclination towards substitution was further demonstrated beyond 
the area of the arts. John Major severely criticised New Labour's VvUte Paper, The 
People'S Lottery which led to National Lottery etc. Bill (1998), and which subsequently 
amended the distributional formula in order to create a New Opportunities Fund. He 
argued that the New Labour government was taking money from good causes to fund 
areas nonnally funded by general taxation. In his view, the New Opportunities Fund, 
which aimed to promote health and the training of teachers, was equal to a "smash and 
grab raid" on the lottery. 46 He had good reason to be angry, because in the UK health and 
schooling have been traditionally key government responsibilities. The former heritage 
secretary said; "The additionality principle has been breached, the jackpot winners are the 
Treasury, and the successful lottery will be seriously damaged', . 
47 
By the end of the 1990s, only five years after the Lottery began, it seems difficult 
to trust the promises of "additionality", and thus, also difficult to give credence to what 
the ACE's lottery director, Jeremy Newton claimed in 1994; "We're keen not to blur the 
distinction between the grant and the lottery money, so that the Government isn't tempted 
to break its promise not to allow lottery money to become a substitute for the gTant". 48 
Outside the battles between the political parties, as far as the performing arts and 
theatre is concerned, whether lottery grants are made on the basis of additionality or of 
substitution seems not so important, because it appears that any lottery money spent on the 
arts, sport, heritage and culture is somehow, by definition, additional. What is more 
important to them is whether there is a friendly policy to alleviate their financial hardship. 
If a switch from additionality to substitution takes place, on the one hand, most suffering 
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arts organisations may see some recovery after years of financial hardship. On the other 
hand, however, there will be a strong possibility that the government's own arts subsidy 
may be reduced in the future, handing over much of its own financial resPonsibility to the 
Lottery. The subsidy was sharply cut by f6m. in cash terms in 1996-97, the year the lottery 
funds for the arts began to be distributed full-scale. New Labour announced its first arts 
budget cut by El. 5m in cash terms in 1997. The Council's Chairman Lord Gowrie said in 
1997; "Huge capital inflows led the Treasury to cut our small revenue. As a result, we are 
suffering the worst arts revenue crisis in my adult lifetime. ... Additionality went out of the 
, 49 window with the first cash cut that we received'. Maggie Saxon, Managing Director of 
the West Yorkshire Playhouse, after witnessing these cuts, showed her concern about the 
future of arts subsidy; "If the lottery money goes into revenue funding, then we may see in 
the future that a huge reduction in revenue funding from the central government is highly 
likely". 50 
The Lottery cannot become a major source of arts funding. As Lord Gowrie 
argued, it can "not be the salvation of the arts". Its income is unpredictable. In addition, no 
one can predict how long the current lottery will last, and how long the lottery 
phenomenon will continue. When the current lottery is proved to be a poor method of 
raising govenu-nent money, it will probably be doomed. Arts provision, which is essential 
for the quality of people's life, should not be dependent on an unreliable source of 
funding. David Edgar argued that "however admirable Labour's planned Lottery-funded 
National Endowment for Science and the Arts might be, there is no point in giving one-off 
grants to young artists if there is no national policy to sustain institutions dedicated to their 
work". 5 1 This is why the government needs to maintain a proper arts provision against the 
worst, even if a consensus emerges for substitution. In this regard, it is worth listening to 
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the reason why the 1978 Royal Commission on Gambling ominously wrote about the 
"assumption" of the Lottery's success at the end of their chapter of the National Lottery; 
Finally, the whole of this chapter is predicated on the assumption that the 
Government will not penalise those organisation which benefit from the national 
lottery by withholding funds which they would otherwise have got, or reducing 
them if they are already being supported by the general exchequer. 52 
However, as has been noted, in December 1998, the government surprised the arts 
world by announcing an increase in arts subsidy for 1999-2000. The increase was, 
however, not beneficial to all companies, with the leading national companies taking 
most. Indeed, the subsidy increase for them was inevitable because more money was 
needed to run their extravagant buildings which consume huge running costs. After 
conducting an inquiry into the Royal Opera House, Sir Richard Eyre, in a letter to 
Robinson, already said that the ROH needed its subsidy "to double to around f30m a 
year" to make its building work. In addition, in order to conform to one of the 
government's guidelines of what the arts should do - improving accessibility, the ROH 
and others had to cut their ticket prices. If the ROH cut its ticket prices as its Chairman, 
Sir Colin Southgate, intended -a cut of 25%, this would cost about ElOrn a year. It is 
assumed that the government and the ACE found it difficult to resist its demand for more 
money, simply because they did not want to their shining buildings' becoming unused 
"palaces" through lack of financial support. While lottery money was disproportionately 
distributed to the leading national companies, another subsidy increase was awaiting after 
refurbishment. The Royal Court, after moving back into its redeveloped Sloane Square, 
was given a sharp 45% rise in arts funding. i 
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The Lottery grant, distributed from 1995, could have had an important financial 
role in establishing a healthier soil for the arts and theatre than previously. Although it has 
made a significant contribution to changing the external appearance of British arts and 
theatre, it seems to have failed to do so to the infrastructure. In ten-ns of amount, funds 
have been disproportionately distributed in favour of 'centres of excellence'. In addition, 
the government's continuous squeeze on arts subsidy has made many theatre companies 
harder to run in their refurbished buildings. Under the circumstances, a shift from 
additionality to subsititution seems to have become inevitable, which in turn may lead to 
the decrease of arts subsidy in the future. Even after Labour goverranent announced the 
funding increase of 1999/2000, it was the leading national companies that mostly 
benefited. In this sense, the distribution of lottery money, just as the distribution of arts 
subsidy, has been a further demonstration of the move towards cultural elitism. 
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Chapter V: The Playhouse in Leeds 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine, as a case study, the history of the Playhouse in 
Leeds from the mid- I 960s to the end of the 1990s. The reason why the Playhouse has 
been chosen is that its existence falls into two distinct periods - the Leeds Playhouse 
(1970-90) and the West Yorkshire Playhouse (VvTYP, 1990- ). The distinction is ideal 
for charting the changing theatrical climate from the progressive age of the 1970s 
through the enterprise age of the 1980s to the post-Thatcherite age of the 1990s. 
Particularly, the VVYP, which has been considered to be one of the most successful 
regional theatre companies in the 1990s, most clearly illustrates the post-Thatcherite 
theatrical characteristics. The main subject of this chapter is, therefore, to explore how 
the Playhouse has adjusted itself to the changing political, economic and cultural 
climate. This will illustrate in concrete terms the findings of previous chapters. 
However, as the main concern of this study lies the post-Thatcher period of the 1990s, 
more attention will be given to the West Yorkshire Playhouse rather than to the Leeds 
Playhouse. 
For this case study, books and newspapers, pamphlets, programmes and annual 
reports made by the Playhouse, such as the souvenir brochure of the opening of the 
Leeds Playhouse in September 1970 and the annual reports of the VvIYP in the 1990s, 
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will be comprehensively consulted. Interviews with important people such as John 
Harrison - the Leeds Playhouse's longest serving artistic director (1972-90) and 
WYP's Managing Director Maggie Saxon will be also quoted to support those 
findings. 
The Leeds Playhouse and The West Yorkshire Playhouse 
The most individual characteristic of the West Yorkshire Playhouse is that 
there is no hierarchy in our policy. This means that each work we are 
pursuing, either for community or education, for the young or the old, for 
the classic or new work, and for musical entertainment or serious play, is 
equally important, and equally treated. This has been what made the 
Playhouse unique. ' 
The Playhouse in the city of Leeds has two stories; the story of the Leeds 
Playhouse and of the West Yorkshire Playhouse. These two stories cannot be 
considered separately, because the WYP is the successor to and the replacement for the 
Leeds Playhouse. For those who have worked in the two Playhouses, such as Kathy 
Webster who has been with the company since the formation of the Leeds Playhouse in 
1970 and is currently taking charge of its archive, the two stories are viewed as 'Stage 
F and 'Stage 11' of a quest for a permanent theatre building which culminated with the 
completion of the WYP. 
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'Stage F is the story of the Leeds Playhouse. In the 1960s, Leeds was the 
largest city in the Britain without a regional theatre. According to Doreen Newlyn who 
wrote Theatre Connections, a detailed story of the campaign for the Leeds Playhouse, 
the campaign began in early 1964 with 13 enthusiastic local people who were involved 
in various local amateur dramatic societies such as the Student Theatre Group of the 
University and the University Staff Dramatic Society. Doreen Newlyn herself was a 
history teacher and a director for that Society. 2 
The campaign could be seen as a response to the inspiration of the times. The 
1960s was a decade of economic stability with feelings of growth and progress in many 
spheres of British social life. In the progressive 1960s, the arts world was certainly 
moving into an optimistic period of expansion. The year the campaign began, 1964, 
saw a Labour victory after thirteen years of Conservative goverranent. Jennie Lee 
became the first Minister for the Arts, and introduced a progressive arts policy with a 
substantial increase in arts subsidy. Many local authorities demolished the few 
remaining theatres and built new arts centres and theatre buildings in the confident 
belief that more state subsidies would become available from the Arts Council to run 
them. From 1965 to 1973, there was a rapid growth in new regional theatre building in 
Nottingham, Sheffield, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Cardiff and Exeter. The 
progressive spirit of the time was clearly felt by the campaigners who hoped the future 
Leeds Playhouse would; 
be non-conunercial, to be subsidised as art needs to be subsidised: so that 
experiments can be tried and failures assimilated; ... so that the success at 
the box office might not have to be the sole criterion for selection; and so 
that everyone could afford to go, because prices would be kept down. 
3 
192 
In the early days of campaigning, the Leeds Theatre Committee was formed as 
a widely representative body under the Chairmanship of Sir Roger Stevens, Vice- 
Chancellor of Leeds University. It included Walter Newlyn, an economist from Leeds 
University and Doreen Newlyn's husband. The Committee drew up an analysis of the 
economic prospects of a repertory theatre, collecting and collating facts and figures 
from the successful playhouses at Nottingham, Coventry and other parts of the country 
and so formed an estimate of cost and probable income on the basis of experience 
elsewhere. 
The public was generally sceptical about the need for the Playhouse. Many 
people in Leeds thought at that time that a new theatre which needed to be financially 
supported was unnecessary while the big Victorian Leeds Grand Theatre, run by a 
commercial management, functioned well with shows such as annual pantomimes, 
touring ballets, operas, musicals, and plays from London. Despite this, permission for 
building construction was obtained for a site near the Town Hall. However, spending 
cuts caused by unexpected economic and oil crises in the late 1960s led to the 
postponem ent of the original plan. In 1969, the Leeds Theatre Trust Limited, 
incorporated in 1968, decided to search for existing premises which could be converted 
into a temporary theatre. After many disappointments, the University of Leeds agreed 
to lend the Trust, rent-free, the site of a proposed sports hall which cutbacks had also 
forced them to postpone building. The conditions were that the Trust would build the 
shell and put the theatre in it in such a way that it could be removed at the end of a ten- 
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year period. The construction began on 25 September 1969. A total of E150,000 had 
been raised from many sources, such as the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the 
Leeds City Council, and private donors and the efforts of thousands of schoolchildren 
selling pencils and bookmarks. 4 
After six years of persistent campaigning with support from famous actors 
including Peter O'Toole, Diana Rigg, Judi Dench and James Mason, the Leeds 
Playhouse as a temporary home opened on Thursday 16th September 1970 with the 
world premier of Yorkshire dramatist, Alan Plater's, Simon Says. 
The Playhouse was intended by the campaigners and others to act as both a 
repertory theatre and a community-based 'civic' theatre. In Doreen Newlyn's 
recollection, the Playhouse was conceived as; 
a home for a permanent resident company with a close relationship with the 
life of the city, and a programme containing the whole range of good drama; 
in a building that would also be a home for peripheral activities - music, discussions, films, community activities and children's theatre -a building 
that belonged to the people of Leeds, where they could feel at home, all the 
time ... 
5 
However, running a theatre on the basis of a repertory concept has always 
proved expensive. In its ideal fonn as envisaged in 1970, a subsidised repertory theatre 
should aim to offer the public a wide variety of quality drama on a three or four week 
rotational basis. A permanent company of actors would be cast play by play to offer 
ensemble playing and freshness in performance. Commercial considerations should not 
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govem the repertoire, so ticket prices would be kept to an affordable level. To this end, 
the theatre company needed to be well-funded either by private benefactors or by 
central and local govenunent. 
It is true that the government subsidy for the arts rose substantially in the late 
1960s and 1970s from E3,205,000 in 1964/65 to E63,630,000 in 1979/80, but this was 
not enough to satisfy the financial needs of regional theatres. There were two particular 
reasons for this. Firstly, the number of theatre companies had increased significantly 
since the late 1960s - 40 more regional theatres and over 100 more alternative theatres 
by 1980. According to the Cork Report in 1986 - Theatre isfor All, during the 1970s, 
the percentage of the total Arts Council funding allocated to regional theatres fell from 
62% in 1970/71 to 41% in 1980/81 in order to feed the ever-rising alternative theatre 
companies whose percentage rose from a mere 2% in 1970/71 to 13% in 1980/81 and 
the two national theatres whose percentage rose from 30% to 43% at the same period. 6 
In addition, the economic recession during the 1970s caused a soaring inflation rate 
that severely impacted on the economy of regional theatres. Below is a summary of the 
general state of the theatre economics of the regional theatres; 
Despite the growth in state aid to the theatre therefore, the theatre industry 
as a whole really did not grow as anticipated but even decline. The key year 
was 1973, when the abrupt rise in the world price of oil caused severe 
inflationary problems for all western economics and had a particular impact 
on the new repertory theatres. ... the new reps were 
lavish, non-cost- 
effective, built to demonstrate civic pride. They had fulsome foyers and 
7 glass windows ... . Within weeks of the price rises, 
the costs of running 
these theatres had escalated. Although funds to the Arts Council rose as well 
- by 1977-88 more than flO million was being given to the subsidised 
theatres - these did not compensate for the rising overheads 
due to inflation. 
The reps economized in every way they could, among them restricting the 
amounts spent on productions. 8 
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The Leeds Playhouse began to receive arts funding in 1973 from the then 
Metropolitan County of West Yorkshire. During the 1970s, its arts funding was 
gradually increased in cash terms from E71,308 in 1973/74 to E147,120 in 1979/80, but 
the increase was not enough to run the company as a repertory concept. It is true that 
throughout its history, the Leeds Playhouse had offered a variety of drama including; 
modem European - The Caucasian Chalk Circle (1972/73), MaratlSade (1985/86); 
modem British - Oh, What a Lovely War! (1972/73), Saved (1972/73), The Wedding 
Feast (1976/77), Every Good Boy Deserves Favour (1978/79), The Genius (1985/86), 
Pravda (1986/87); Shakespeare - The Tempest (1974/75), Macbeth (1976/77), A 
Midsummer Night's Dream (1981/82); musicals - Guys and Dolls (1975/76), The 
Marvellous Land of Oz (1985/86). 9 However, this did not mean that the Playhouse 
worked on the basis of the repertory concept. 
The general financial state of regional theatres went from bad to worse during 
the 1980s which saw a cut in arts funding in real tenns under Thatcher's government. 
In the latter half of the 1980s, regional theatres were increasingly anxious about their 
financial situation. The Leeds Playhouse's minutes of the annual general meeting of 
1987 record that; "The abolition of the County Council, which had been so generous to 
the Playhouse, and the freezing of the grants from the Arts Council and the West 
Yorkshire Joint Committee had made a severe cut in finances" in the Leeds 
Playhouse. 10 
One of the recommendations by the Cork Report, which was actually adopted 
by the Arts Council Drama Department (ACDD), was "parity negotiations" - the Arts 
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Council Drama Department's negotiations with local authorities in an attempt to draw 
more money from them into regional theatres. As Ian Brown and Rob Brannen pointed 
out in Theatre Is For All, there were "gainers and losers" as a result of "the process of 
parity negotiation". Fortunately, the Playhouse was a "gainer". This can be clearly seen 
by comparing its subsidy in the first half of the 1980s with that in the second half. 
While its subsidy increase by the Arts Council was E80,000 from E167,000 in 1980/81 
to E247,000 in 1985/86, the increase in the latter half of the 1980s was E232,650 from 
f247,000 in 1985/86 through E374,000 in 1988/89 to f479,650 in 1989/90. Its 
combined income from Leeds City Council and the West Yorkshire Joint Committee 
also significantly increased; E93,250 in 1986, E161,000 in 1987, E176,000 in 1988, 
E222,000 in 1989 and E375,000 in 1990. However, even this significant increase could 
not make it possible for the Playhouse to run on the basis of a repertory concept. John 
Harrison, who served as a playwright and Artistic Director both at the Leeds Playhouse 
and the VVYP for 18 years" reveals that, from the beginning, it was difficult to run the 
Leeds Playhouse on the basis of the repertory concept; 
After I took over the Leeds Playhouse, we, about 20, worked on the basis of 
a repertory concept. We opened with a series of 3 plays by Brecht, 
Shakespeare and Joan Littlewood. We alternated those three. But after 2 
years, that was too expensive. We couldn't afford to do it any more. 12 
The Leeds Playhouse also did not have a good record in its intended role as 
community-based civic theatre. With the exception of the work of its Theatre-in- 
Education unit formed in 1970, the Playhouse did little within the community. Besides 
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the handicap of lack of space in the Playhouse's temporary home adjacent to the 
University Sports Centre, John Harrison explains; 
The Leeds Playhouse was not suitable for community work. It was situated 
within the University. The public felt that it was separate. There was no bus 
stop near. It was not easy to get to the building. It was a public theatre, but 
we couldn't do that sort of community work there. We thought that the 
future theatre should include all that sort of community works. 13 
For the Playhouse, searching for a permanent theatre building which would 
enable it to undertake community work became one of the prime targets of the 1980s. 
As John Harrison says; "a whole pressure of all that time (the 1980s) was to find a 
pennanent building". With the search for a permanent building in the 1980s, the story 
of its 'Stage 11' began. 
Momentum came in 1984 when the Leeds City Council earmarked a site on 
Quarry Hill, which is next to the bus station and within walking distance of the 
commercial centre of Leeds, for a permanent theatre. This prompted the Leeds Theatre 
Trust to seek financial backing for the new building. It was the generosity of the West 
Yorkshire Metropolitan Council that secured the future of the new Playhouse by 
funding an initial architectural competition and investing f4m. John Harrison says; 
When Mrs Thatcher disbanded the Metropolitan district councils in the mid- 
1980s, the Labour-governed West Yorkshire Council was one of them. With 
its dying gasp, the VyIYC gave us a large sum of money on the condition that 
we changed our name from the Leeds Playhouse to the West Yorkshire 
Playhouse. They always supported us to the best of their ability, giving us 
more money than the traditional-Conservative-dominated Leeds City 
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Council which preferred to give their money to the Opera North and the 
Grand. 14 
The national competition to design the new Playhouse was won by a husband 
and wife team, 'The Appleton Partnership' from Edinburgh. The first sod was turned 
by Sir Donald Sinden in November 1987. The foundation stone was laid by Judi Dench 
in March 1989 and the building topped by Albert Finney in September 1989. The 
building cost fI3.5m. Funding came from the Leeds City Council (E5.4m), the defunct 
West Yorkshire Metropolitan Council (f4m), the Arts Council (f I m) and other small 
grants and donations. The Playhouse also raised Elm in capital sponsorship. The long 
campaign for a permanent theatre building was accomplished with the official opening 
of the West Yorkshire Playhouse by Diana Rigg on March 8th 1990. Kathy Webster, 
whose memory of the Leeds Playhouse was that "Everyday just flashes by", said in a 
souvenir programme for the farewell Production of Tweýfth Night at the Leeds 
Playhouse on 21st December 1989; "We've reached our goal, we've got the theatre 
we9ve always wanted". 
15 
As has been noted briefly, the process of building the new Playhouse was in 
line with the latter half of the 1980s when the arts subsidy was continuously 
constrained by Thatcher's government, and thus, the market-driven theatre economy 
became increasingly dominant. In 1986, the year when the funders finally combined to 
create the WYP, Luke Rittner wrote in his Council's Report; "More and more arts 
organisations were stavingg, off financial disaster ... not because they were 
badly run, but 
because the essential core funding was no longer enabling them to fulfil the demand". 
This was two years after the publication of The Glog of the Garden which was 
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followed by the Council's two business-like documents; A Great British Success Story 
and Partnerships; Making Arts Money Work Harder. This was also the year when the 
Council launched "a periodic in-depth appraisal of each client's operation" reviewing 
their "marketing, education and outreach" in the name of making them consolidate 
business methods for "financial self-sufficiency". 16 Despite its subsidy increase as a 
gainer from the parity negotiations in the latter half of the 1980s, the Leeds Playhouse 
still felt short of the necessary financial resources. Indeed, according to John Harrison 
during his career in theatre, especially in the Playhouse, "there has never been a proper 
subsidy in Britain except for a very brief period of the 60s with the first Arts Minister 
Jenny Lee". 17 
Under these circumstances, the person who would be in charge of the new 
Playhouse would have to achieve, at least, two things; undertaking community work 
and running an efficient management in the age of business. It was therefore a surprise 
to many when Jude Kelly was appointed Artistic Director in 1990. Before the 
appointment, she had had no experience of running such a big theatre as the WYP with 
the exception of short period in 1980s. Her theatrical experience was mostly to do with 
the fiinge. After gaining a B. A at Birmingham University in Drama and Theatre Arts, 
she briefly worked as an actress at the Leicester Phoenix, and then began a career as an 
artistic director with a small touring company, the Solent People's Theatre, until 1980. 
From 1980 to 1985, she became artistic director of the Battersea Arts Centre in south 
London. In 1986 Jude Kelly joined the RSC as an assistant director both in London and 
in Stratford. From 1987 she worked at Bristol Old Vic and The Lyric Hammersmith. 
However, John Harrison offers a clue to her appointment; 
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Two years before we left the old theatre [1988], 1 engaged Jude Kelly as an 
associate at the old theatre. There were a lot of applications and we 
interviewed many people. We felt that she was right person. The new theatre 
needed to move in new directions and those were the directions in which she 
had a lot of experience. Her previous experience had all been in the area 
which we needed and which we had not had - outreach; community and 
education works. 18 She was ready to inherit the new theatre. Three of us, 
Jude Kelly, William Weston (as Executive Director for administration) 19 
and 1, worked together for the first season of the WYP. Then, I decided to 
leave and the two worked together for another year. After this, Jude Kelly 
took over the whole business of the Playhouse, administrative and 
theatrical. 20 
Only a few years after the appointment, what she had achieved with the largest 
regional theatre company except Stratford, was viewed by many as a considerable 
success. Lyn Gardner wrote in 1997; 
Kelly is one of the most powerful people in the British arts. Her relaxed, 
articulate appearances on television and radio have given her a national 
profile and made many realise that theatre directors' views are no less valid 
than company directors. ... she 
has turned the West Yorkshire Playhouse 
into a genuine community resource without compromising artistic 
standards. 21 
One of the Playhouse's major claims to success is in its community work which 
was one of the two main demands made upon Jude Kelly. Unlike the old Playhouse's 
remote situation within the University, the new Playhouse is geographically well- 
situated at the edge of the city centre. This allows the public easy access, and thus, 
makes it possible to put community work at the head of its agenda. In addition to 
exploiting this geographical advantage, Maureen Rooksby, who has been in charge of 
community and education works since the early 1990s, says; 
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Since the Playhouse opened in 1990, we've been very keen to push the 
barriers of our arts and our relationship with local people. So we've been 
looking for different ways of engaging with them, in workshops, going to 
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visit people and working in various areas . 
Indeed, the Playhouse has attempted to penetrate a broad cross-section of the 
community of Leeds and West Yorkshire. It set up an Arts Development Unit with the 
motto, "arts for everyone", which plans, organises programmes for community and 
education. Its most significant programmes have been its community productions such 
as Magnetic North and Pilgermann, Heydays for the elderly, SPARK and Theatre-in- 
Education for the youth, its dedication to Black Arts, and Community Network for the 
inner regeneration. 
Magnetic North (MN) directed by Maureen Rooksby in June 1993 was part of 
Leeds Centenary Celebrations. It was a collective theatrical celebration with the 280 
schoolchildren and 120 adult amateurs aged between 8 and 70, working for five weeks 
with a team of professionals from all over the world. The professional team consisted 
of a large number of full-time staff including 6 directors, 2 choreographers, 2 musical 
directors, one designer and one assistant, 14 group leaders, 8 student placements, and 
more than one hundred staff from every department within the Playhouse. Nine schools 
were involved in MN as part of their timetable. Many young people and adults also 
took part in the evenings and at weekends. MN is based on a story by Mike Kenny 
about a city where people work harmoniously together making beautiful cloth until 
someone steals more than their share and disintegration threatens. In performance, 
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while the participants were singing and dancing and acting, their relatives and parents, 
laughing, shouting and applauding, made up of audiences. Thus, besides an emphasis 
on human solidarity within the framework of the play itself, the production formed a 
parallel to reality in the way it created a sense of community for all the people 
involved. One participant, Joanne Telfer, said; "Ws good because we're all getting to 
know each other and getting over our embarrassment". One of the young participant's 
parents said; "I hope there will be more plays where Shelley [a Yorkshire School] is 
invited to perform. I have enjoyed every minute". Most of the local people, either 
participant or audiences, were proud of the VVYP's community role in this production, 
as one anonymous person said; "I think Magnetic North was a wonderful idea to 
introduce people to the theatre. I think other theatres should take the West Yorkshire 
Playhouse's lead and do other similar things". 23 
Pilgermann (1995) was claimed to have been another well-received community 
participatory perfon-nance, this time, however, with only one professional actor among 
the cast of 80.50 trainees also volunteered their time and skills to many of departments 
including stage management, wardrobe, lighting, design and marketing, working 
alongside the Playhouse staff. It was a world premiere of an adaptation of Russell 
Hoban's novel about an II th-century German Jew who joined a Crusade. Jude KellY, 
comparing community plays like Pilgermann to Greek plays of civil pride, wrote; 
"Pilgermann recaptures some of those ancient democratic principles -a production 
created by and for the people of Leeds". 
24 
Heydays, a weekly arts programme which takes place on every Wednesday for 
people aged 55 and over, was founded at the same time as the Playhouse's opening in 
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1990. Heydays is intended to contribute to lifelong individual development. in 
1999/2000, its membership has reached 1,000, with 300-400 participating every 
Wednesday over three terins. In 1999 the fee for one tenn was E8. Over 20 different 
workshops and classes are run in each ten-n. The regular ones are singing - the most 
popular, drama, line dancing, early birds, play reading, creative writing, and discussion. 
The changeable ones from term to term are rug making, pencil drawing, water colour, 
calligraphy, lino printing, skill share, lace making, and oil painting. In some classes 
members link their projects to other areas of the Playhouse's work, for example, by 
creating the 'storysacks' for the schools tour of Nose Shoes? or creating items for the 
Storymakers project. According to a member of staff receiving applications for the first 
term of 2000/01 in July 2000, the popularity of the Heydays has been so immense that 
many workshops, such as singing and drama, have been always difficult to enter. Thus, 
people usually apply for several workshops in case of intense competition. 25 On the last 
day of each term Heydays holds its end of tenn event, giving everyone the opportunity 
to see what everyone else has been doing throughout the term. On this day, perfonning 
arts groups offer short perfonnances. On 24 March 1999, as part of the end of term 
festivities, Heydays held the first International Year of Older Persons in the Quarry 
Theatre. 26 
In the area of education, the Playhouse also introduced an organised after- 
school programme for children. Body & Soul, for example, a two-week workshop for 
under 12's, encourages those involved in Magnetic North to extend themselves with 
new skills such as physical theatre, dance, fantasy face painting and body decoration. 
The Weekend Wyppets (the WYP pets) are its after-school club in theatre, reading, 
mime and other aspects of the arts. The company launched SPARK (Sport and Arts 
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towards Knowledge) in 1997. This was designed to support children's learning by 
encouraging self-confidence, creativity, and achievement. Children work with artists 
and sports coaches to develop new skills. The main focus is on making children 
discover that learning can happen in different ways and often requires huge dedication 
and a commitment to succeed. SPARK was confirmed by Educational Secretary David 
Blunkett, as 64a national model of excellence" at the first national SPARK conference in 
May 1999.27 
While many Theatre-in-Education companies had closed down nationally 
owing to lack of financial support from the government and local authorities' rate- 
capping, the Playhouse has maintained a permanent touring Theatre-in-Education 
company, which provides a free full time service to schools in Leeds and West 
Yorkshire. Indeed, its Courtyard Theatre with 350 seats raised its first curtain with 
International Young People's Theatre Festival in 1990 to celebrate 20 years of its 
Theatre-in-Education. Nine companies produced works from all over the world and 
over 26,000 young people participated in the event. Its Theatre-in-Education company 
normally creates three new productions a year for and with primary and secondary 
schools across the West Yorkshire. 
In the context of a large non-white population living in Leeds and West 
Yorkshire, the promotion of Black Arts has become one of the company's priorities. 
For instance, its Black Arts Week from 5 to 8 April in 1994 co-ordinated programmes 
including performances and readings of plays and writings of Black writers such as 4-: ) 
Trish Cooke's Back Street Mammy, and discussions about the future of regional black 
arts at the Playhouse accompanied by Afro-Caribbean 
foyer entertainment and 
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Caribbean cuisine at the Wild Oats restaurant. 28 Since 1996, the Playhouse has 
celebrated Black History Month each year with a range of workshops, an exhibition in 
the foyer, and several one night events such as a Black literature event and an 
interactive arts conference featuring work from young Black and South Asian artists. 
Its Sunday night Black Comedy Events have also become a regular feature of its 
seasonal progTarnmes. 
29 
The Playhouse's strategy for connecting itself with the broad community was the 
establishment of the Community Network scheme, designed to support the inner city 
community. Local groups organise events to which Playhouse staff contributes. Its 
annual booklet, Connect, illustrates this; 
Target audience: inner city community groups 
Frequency/date: 3 social events per year; I annual meeting; 
events in the community throughout the year; 
unlimited tickets available for at least 52 performances 
of 13 productions per year 
Funding: Arts Development Unit budget, charitable trusts and 
Corporate sponsors 
Total members: 179 groups 
Number of visits to 
Playhouse productions: 87 participating groups made a total of 336 visits 
Total number of seats taken: 3,816 
Just as the WYP has a good record in its role in the community, so it has a 
comparatively good record of theatre management. To understand the implication of 
this good record, it is necessary to examine the general state of regional theatres in the 
early 1990s. Lyn Gardner wrote in 1993; 
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All over Britain regional theatres are struggling for survival in the face of 
dramatically reduced budgets. ... this breeding ground of new talent is facing 
an uncertain future, with many regional theatres on the brink of disaster. ... Now many are being hit by a double whammy: a cut in funding from central 
government via the Arts Council and regional arts boards, and further cuts 
by rate-capped local authorities. 30 
1993 was the year when Major's government decided to cut E3.6m of arts 
subsidy for 1994/95. This year saw many struggling regional theatres having to take 
drastic measures to survive. In 1993 the Sheffield Crucible was forced to close the 
studio programme entirely and to reduce main house productions from eight to six. At 
Derby Playhouse in that year six annual studio productions were reduced to just two in 
that year. As for Peter Cheeseman's New Victoria Theatre in Newcastle Under Lyme, 
local goverment subsidy was down by E80,000 and ticket sales were also down by 
f 100,000 over the year. In November, Cheeseman was forced to cut one fifth of the 
theatre's staff, to cut its education programme and visiting companies and to limit the 
number of actors in shows. 31 In the latter half of the 1990s, as has been examined 
earlier, there was little sign of recovery. In 1995 the 104-year-old Everyman Theatre in 
Cheltenham decided to abandon mounting its own productions for two years in an 
attempt to clear its E400,000 deficit. Ten staff, including the artistic director, Martin 
Houghton, were made redundant. Chief executive, Philip Bernays, turned the 
producing house into a receiving house for touring products. Marketing manager Tim 
Martienssen said; "For a long while we've been underfunded - the subsidy doesn't 
cover the work we're being asked to do' . 
32 As the stand-still arts subsidy continued to 
the end of the 1990s, the critically unhealthy state of regional theatres was deepened, as 
illustrated by the findings of The National Campaign for the Arts in 1998 which It) 
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revealed; a cut in in-house productions and in cast sizes, a fall in the employment of 
actors, a rise in musicals, and steep rises in ticket prices. 
By contrast, however, the West Yorkshire Playhouse under Jude Kelly seems to 
have had had a relatively impressive theatrical record. In the Arts Council's Appraisal 
Document submitted by the Playhouse, it states; 
In the first six years of operations up to March 1996, the Playhouse 
numbered 93 of its own productions encompassing classic and 
contemporary British and European drama, modem theatre from around the 
world and a vigorous new writing policy - 27 of these productions have been 
world or British premiers. Home grown work has been supplemented by the 
visit of 60 touring companies producing in total 3,493 performances to 
1,15 9,000 people. 33 
Its record can be judged more specifically from its key theatrical statistics. 
Below are the statistics from 1993 to 1999; 
1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/9934 
No of productions 16 15 14 15 16 17 
No of Touring Comp anies 5 10 15 14 13 15 
No of Performances 607 615 555 552 614 657 
Attendance 181,315 223,000 179,285 184,500 163,932 179,175 
Averaee Ticket Yield f 6.34 E6.87 E7.11 E7.05 F-7.84 f9.3 1 
Arts Council Appraisal Document, 1999 
The statistics above show reasonably a stable theatrical record from 1993 to 
1999; 35 the number of in-house productions ranging between 14 (1995/96) and 17 
(1998/99), the number of performances between 552 (1996/97) and 657 (1998/99), 
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attendance between 163,932 (1997/98) and 223,000 (1994/95), and average ticket yield 
between E6.34 (1993/94) and E9.31 (1998/99). 36 
The WYP provided further evidence of its sound management by indicating 
that its key performance indicators have compared well with those of six comparative 
regional theatres; Birmingham, Nottingham, Sheffield, Leicester, Manchester and 
Plymouth. Although it is true that no two theatres are identical in either practice or 
policy, these six were selected because of their perceived similarities in both size, 
amount of public subsidy and importance to the regional theatre network. They were by 
coincidence the comparator theatres used in the 1992 appraisal document of the Arts 
Council. Below are five comparative figures for a two-year period between 1994/95 
and 1995/96 when the financial difficulty was seriously deepened by cuts in arts 
subsidy. 
Subsidy per Attendance 
1994/95 1995/96 
NWP E7.1 L9.2 
Binnin2ham f 12.7 E13.8 
Nottingham f 10.4 f 13.6 
Sheffield f 12.4 f 14.7 
Leicester f 10.0 f 12.0 
Exchange f9.6 f8.8 
Plyinouth f3.6 f5.5 
The figures above reveal the relatively low level of subsidy that the Playhouse 
has spent per seat sold, which is only exceeded by Plymouth Theatre Royal. The 
Playhouse has had several measures to maintain affordable ticket prices such as a 'pay- 
209 
what-you-can' programme which charges minimum of 50p per seat. It has also often 
attracted money for its productions from business sponsors. Halifax Plc gave E7,500 
for the second run of its successful production of Peter Pan (1996). This money was 
used to provide free tickets for homeless families and those who could not normally 
afford a theatre visit. 
37 
Number of Attendance 
1994/95 1995/96 
WYP 223 , 000 179 , 000 Bffi-ningham 135 , 000 140 , 000 Nottingham 135 , 000 125 , 000 Sheffield 103, 000 85, 000 
Leicester 153, 000 137, 00 
Exchange 170, 000 185, 000 
Plymouth 390, 000 325 , 000 
The figures above indicate the significant variation between the two years from 
223,000 to 179,000. It shows the Playhouse exceeding or matching the highest figures 
in the majority of other regional theatres, even in a relatively difficult year, with the 
exception of Plymouth. 
Subsidy per Performance 
1994/95 1995/96 
)WP E23600 0,000 
Binningham f4,600 f4,250 
Nottingham f4,900 F. 5 600 
Sheffield f4,200 f4,100 
Leicester f2,850 f2,900 
Exchange f4,000 f3,800 
Plyii2outh f2,050 f2,800 
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Here, the Playhouse was performing relatively well in this criteria providing 
reasonable return on subsidy investment. 
Number of Performances 
1994/95 1995/96 
NWP 615 555 
Bin-ningham 375 450 
Nottingham 285 270 
Sheffield 305 310 
Leicester 530 555 
Exchange 410 425 
PlyMouth 685 630 
From the early 1990s, the number of its performances was relatively high. From 
1991 to 1992, there was a 4.5% growth in this area while a national trend of regional 
theatres revealed a7% decrease on average under the recession. The figures above 
show that the Playhouse consistently provided an average of II performances per week 
reflecting the heavy use of both auditoria. 
Earned & Contributed Income as % of 38 
Total Income 
1994/95 1995/96 
VV'YP 61% 55% 
Bimiin, qham 45.5% 41% 
Nottingham 47.5% 52% 
Sheffield 45% 43% 
Leicester 50% 53% 
Exchange 55.5% 59% 
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Hereý the figures show that the Playhouse performed relatively well in this area 
with box office trading income and sponsorship achieving well over 50% of total 
income. 
These seemingly impressive performance indicators in all these areas tell us 
two things. On the one hand, the Playhouse maintained a comparatively stable 
theatrical state seemingly unaffected by theatrical recession. On the other handý they 
tell us that the Playhouse has positively followed the post-Thatcher model of the 
theatre economics in the 1990s; self-reliance, cost-effectiveness, value for money and 
the active search for business sponsorship. To better understand this, it is necessary to 
analyse its income and expenditure. 
Like other regional theatres, its income is derived largely from two sources; arts 
funding and self-funding. Less than 50% of its income has come from Yorkshire and 
Humberside Regional Arts Board (YHA) as central government funding, 39Leeds City 
Council (LCC) and West Yorkshire Grants (WYG) as resources from regional 
councils. For instance, in 1995/96 it received around fl. 58m - E790,000 from YHA, 
E690,000 from LCC, and f 100,000 from WYG. 
Its expenditure also largely covers two areas; expenditure for salaries, 
overheads and activities such as community and education, and expenditure for 
productions. In 1995/96, the total expenditure reached roughly E3.50m. Thus, by 
calculation, in order to make ends meet in that year, the Playhouse needed at least 
f 1.92m extra income from self-funding (55%), the amount remaining after deducting 
the total income of arts funding (fl. 58) from the total expenditure (0.50m). Thus, it is 
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evident that the Playhouse should do something to produce the necessary self-funding. 
What it has done in the 1990s strongly reflects the Post-Thatcher theatre economics. 
The playhouse has raised significant self-funding from commercial sponsors. 
The amount of money from the sponsors has varied from year to year and has been 
mainly dependent on general economic factors and theatre programming. Since 1993, it 
has fluctuated between E132,000 (1994/95,1996/97) and E196,000 (1995/96). in its 
opening year, there already emerged plenty of commercial sponsors such as Provident 
Financial Group and Teeman Levine Solicitors. Among its large list of sponsors, the 
Playhouse has recently consolidated its relationship particularly with two big 
companies; the Halifax Building Society, which has been supporting its Schools 
Company and many children's productions, and Marks & Spencer which sponsored 
Magnetic North, Pilgermann, and Heydays. 
Perhaps not unexceptedly, business sponsors have been particularly attracted by 
the high profile of its community work. This is largely because the events and 
productions staged for the community often induce huge interest from the local public 
at which the sponsors' marketing primarily aims. Moreen Rooksby talks about this; 
We've got a commercial sponsor called Providence Financial. It is like an 
insurance company, women selling insurance schemes in the local area. The 
company was interested in us, because they heard about the high profile in 
our community activities. They approached us, and we approached them. 
After a number of meetings, talking about various projects, they settled on 40 
and decided to fund a project of SPARK . 
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What Roy Shaw viewed in the 1970s - the nature of business sponsors as more 
or less "brutal self-interest" - was no longer valid in the theatre economics of the . 
1990s. The arts and business sponsors have become more and more mutually interested 
in each other since the 1980s when arts subsidy began to be restrained. In Jude Kelly's 
1 41 words; "When business throws the arts a lifeline, the arts throw one back' . The 
sponsors have watched public funding diminish and realised that their financial support 
was providing a means of survival to arts companies. They have also knew that such 
regional 'centres of excellence' as the VVYP had huge spin-offs for the economy and 
had to be maintained, like any other investment. By investing, they could obtain a good 
image and PR. 42 Concerning this, John McGrath argued that "the concept of national 
and regional 'centres of excellence' is conveniently fundable ... preferably by sponsors 
... 43 wishing their product to be associated with such 'excellence . Marks & Spencer's 
Regional General Manager said; "The element of community training in Pilgermann is 
particularly exciting and my managers have benefited from being involved with this 
production". 
44 
In a sense, the VVW's rigorous involvement in the community works has often 
been seen as a way of keeping the theatre running under the post-Thatcherite theatre 
economics of the 1990s. Not only has its high profile of community work, by making 
the Arts easily accessible, helped attract arts subsidy and lottery money, but, by 
creating an identifiable market constituency, it has also provoked financial generosity 
from sponsors. 
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The Playhouse has also run its business in catering which has become an 
indispensable income source of self-funding. The Playhouse is known as the second 
largest regional theatre with around 120 permanent staff in 1999. Besides its two 
theatres, The Quarry (750 seats, open thrust stage) and The Courtyard (350, a resident 
company of actors led by Jude Kelly), it has the CAMRA award winning bar and the 
'Wild Oats' restaurant which includes a frequently used cabaret space for live music 
and performance. The building also has the Newlyn Gallery, a coffee shop, a theatre 
shop, two function rooms, and two rehearsal rooms. The emphasis in the design of the 
building has been accessibility and avoidance of intimidation. It is not difficult to see 
the live music and concerts in its foyer and bar, even when visitors do not come to see 
a show. On every Wednesday lunch time during the session of Heydays, its theatre bar 
is packed with the local elderly people, queuing for food, eating, drinking and talking 
-`-out their work. The theatre's yearly income from the bar, catering, ice-creams, au 
programmes and books has during the 1990s ranged from E500,000 to E600,000. The 
fact that, as this study has discussed earlier, running a theatre company in the 1990s is 
not dissimilar to running a business company is clearly seen by the Playhouse's 
advertisement of the 'corporate entertaining events'; 
The Playhouse has much experience of organising corporate events. With 
one phone call we can ensure that you achieve your aims and that your 
guests have an evening to remember. 
The cost of corporate entertaining is from f 34 per head (including tickets, 
programmes, drinks & food) and the Playhouse service includes: 
" behind the scenes tour of the theatre complex at 6pm 
" best seats in the House 
" use of one of the corporate suites 
" opportunity to display corporate information 
services of a Playhouse Co-ordinator 
welcome desk in the theatre foyer 
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services of the in-house Catering & Commercial Manager to plan 
your food & drink requirements 
credit facility - i. e. one invoice issued after the evening includes 
all costs 
Other services the Playhouse offers can add an extra dimension to an 
evening's entertaining; 
" flowers, including corsages 
" chocolates 
" gifts (e. g. signed copies of the play / production posters) 
" music and / or light entertainment for your guests 
themed food & drink (e. g. logo incorporated into design of food; 
NB The Playhouse has a costume hire department) 
For those who wish to have a longer-term relationship with the Playhouse or 
who operate a continual prograrrune of corporate entertaining, the Playhouse 
has a corporate club, the Business Circle. Membership offers flexibility, 
profile benefits and complimentary tickets and programmes; fees start at 
fl, 800 pa for 90 tickets. 45 
The Playhouse also had to make productions cost-effective. For instance, as 
Maggie Saxon asserted - "You can't go through the year with 20 full-time actors", the 
Playhouse has tried to reduce actors' cost. 46 Its production, The Hunchback of Notre 
Dame (1994) which non-nally needs a large number of the crowd players, was staged 
with a cast of only six. Another option taken up by the WYP was co-production. Many 
productions were presented through co-operation with other regional companies, for 
example, Comedians (1993) by Trevor Griffiths with Lyric Hammersmith, Sam 
Shepard's True West (1994) with Dom-nar Warehouse, Popcorn (1996) by Ben Elton 
with Nottingham Playhouse, and Landslide (1997) with Birmingham Rep. As Jude 
Kelly has said, co-production became a growing theatrical phenomenon especially 
between big regional companies in the 1990s, as "a way of extending subsidy" through 
stretching resources and thereby allowing them "to have longer rehearsal periods, 
higher-quality casts". 
47 
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In the choice of repertoire, the Playhouse did not ignore box office receipts. 
Concerning the VVYP's programmes, John Harrison said; "In the actual choice of 
programmes of what went on the stage - classic and new work, domestic and foreign - 
there is no great difference between the Leeds Playhouse and the NV-y-p". 48 It is true 
that like the variety of productions presented by the old Leeds Playhouse, the WYP 
presented pluralistic and eclectic productions, which include; new plays - In All 
Innocence (199 1) by Kay Mellor, Trevor Griffiths's The GutfBetween Us (1992), John 
McGrath's The Wicked Old Man (1992), Postcards From Rome (1994) by Adam 
Pernak, Irvine Welsh's You'll Have Had Your Hole (1998); American and European 
revivals - Eugene O'Neill's All God's Chillum Got Wings (1993), Samuel Beckett's 
Happy Days (1993), Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman (1994), The Seagull (1998); 
contemporary British revivals - Betrayal by Harold Pinter (1994), Sam Shepard's Thie 
West (1994); classics and Shakespeares - The Hunchback of Notre Dame (1994), King 
Lear (1995), The Tempest (1999); musicals and family entertainments - Joseph Stein's 
Fiddler On the Roof (1992), Peter Pan (1995), Spend, Spend, Spend! (1998); physical 
theatre such as Foe (1996); community productions such as Magnetic North (1993) 
and Pilgermann (1995). 
However, there emerges a subtle but significant difference which reflects the 
theatre economy of the 1990s. The Leeds Playhouse presented 202 in-house 
productions from 1970 to 1990. The West Yorkshire Playhouse has presented about 
160 during the ten years of its existence. There is little difference in the percentage of 
classics produced between the two Playhouses. There is, however, a significant 
difference between them in the percentage of adaptations and musicals produced. 
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While the Leeds Playhouse produced 2 adaptations (1%) and 4 musicals (2%), the 
WYP has produced 16 adaptations (10%) and 20 musicals (13%). The increase in 
adaptations and musicals is one clear demonstration of the theatre economy in the 
1990s in which even a relatively better-funded theatre company had to resort to safe 
productions, which also reflects a national theatrical trend in the 1990s employed in 
order to increase its required self-funding. As Maggie Saxon said, by the end of the 
1990s musicals in the Playhouse entered a new phase, offering huge box office income. 
Its Spend, Spend, Spend! (1998), about the life of Viv Nicholson who won the first 
mega-jackpot on the Pools in 1962, itself transferred to the West End and received 
critical acclaim as "a piece which gave a new hope to the British musical theatre . 
49 
Spend, Spend, Spend! won the 1998 Barclays Theatre Award for Best Musical. The 
Playhouse's new version of Martin Guerre (1998), the 1996 Olivier Award for Best 
Musical and presented through a co-production with Cameron Mackintosh, achieved 
staggering results at the box office both in Britain and America. 
Also, it is necessary to scrutinise the Playhouse's claimed support of new 
writing. Throughout the 1990s, the WYP has been noted for its record of new works. 
When theatre critics such as Michael Billington lamented the dearth of new writing in 
the early 1990s, the WYP audaciously launched, in January 1991, a 12-week season of 
six contemporary plays, including two world premiers - In All Innocence by Kay 
Mellor and Getting Attention by Martin Crimp, both of which deal with child sex 
abuse. Its Courtyard season from May to July in 1997 devoted six weeks to a festival of 
new writing called 'Seven x Seven', meaning seven new plays 
by seven writers 
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including Precious by Anna Reynolds and Good Copy by Richard Hope, the then 
writer in residence. 
The VvIYP produced 16 to 17 of its own productions annually during the 1990s. 
About a third of them were British or world premieres including Trevor Griffiths's 
second stage play in 17 years, 50 The Gulf Between Us (1992), dealing with Britain's 
involvement in the Gulf War in a neo-colonialist perspective, John McGrath's The 
Wicked Old Man (1992) dealing with the wicked world of 90s resulted from the 
ditching of altruism in the 80s, Richard Cameron's With Every Beat (1995) about 5 
people who try to raise charity, Terrence McNally's emotional comedy A Perfect 
Ganesh (1996) based on Hindu god Ganesh, Irvine Welsh's You'll Have Had Your 
Hole (1998) about torture. 
However, these new plays were mostly written by established or well-known 
writers. Richard Cameron was a regular provider of such plays as Pond Life to the 
Bush Theatre during the 1990s and was three times winner of The Sunday Times 
Drama Award. Terrence McNally had won Oscar award with his Love! Valour! 
Compassion 1. 
There were, in fact, few new plays by unknown writers, which are generally 
considered as being risky to stage, such as the comedy Postcards From Rome (1994) Ib 
by Adam Pernak, co-winner of the George Devine Award for new writers with the 
acclaimed Killers and the then 23-year-old writer-in-residence at the Vv'YP, Richard 
Hope's Odysseus Thump (1997) about age concern and Good Copy (1997) written for 
Seven x Seven. In her response to the demand in 1994 from 86 playwrights that 
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regional theatre directors should commit to a quota of three new plays a year, Jude 
Kelly explained why it was difficult to put new works on stage; 
Even the Playhouse, with its record of 22 premiers in four years, has 
hobbled by on a part-time literary co-ordinator who processes over 1,000 
scripts a year. Should we send them all back unread and simply commission 
the 86 signatories of the letter, 51 or should we all suggest that literary 
departments get funded? How can we fund annual writer- in-residence posts 
in all producing theatres? ... Artistic directors, especially of regional 
theatres, are earnestly trying to invest in the future of theatre. ... They have 
no money. They want new funding levels. Will the National Lottery help? 
Not unless typed pages represent capital investment. 52 
Like most of regional theatres, the Playhouse had no literary department which 
entails a substantial financial outlay. Jude Kelly hoped to obtain lottery money to build 
a new writin laboratory alongside the Playhouse where amateurs could learn writing 9 z-: ) 
techniques. However, the theatre economy in the 1990s shattered this hope. Even when 
the Playhouse received lottery stabilisation funding as Jude Kelly wished, the theatre 
could not afford to put aside some of the money for the artistic purpose of seeking new 
writing talent. According to Maggie Saxon, the small amount money remaining after 
paying off the capital debt was used, perhaps predictably in the 1990s, to improve its 
own business - marketing and changing the box office system. 4: 1) 
The Playhouse has been looking for any source which will increase its finances. 
The National Lottery is certainly one of these. Since the inception of the Lottery, as 
Maggie Saxon said, the Playhouse has anxiously waited for a change in the use of 
lottery money from capital purposes only, to its use for revenue grants. 
The main 
reason for this was, as mentioned above, the Playhouse's accumulated 
debt in 1997 of 
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E2.05m, arising from the extra costs in building the new Playhouse. The debt had 
become a major drain on the theatre's revenue funding (about E200,000 in 1996) 
simply to service the interest payment. The debt was, Maggie Saxon said, "severely 
impacting on what the company could do". For instance, one main actress in The 
Merchant of Venice (1994) needed to have her dark brown hair dyed blonde at a cost of 
nearly E300, the Playhouse, with no budget left, was forced to fall back on a make-over 
in ITV's This Morning programme. She underlined the critical threat posed by the 
debt; "If we hadn't had a successful application for the lottery, we would probably 
have been facing some sort of liquidation. The Lottery money (f. 2-64m) undoubtedly 
saved the theatre's future, because we were unable to pay off the debt". 53 
The problem is, however, that even after the lottery funding, the theatre's 
financial difficulty has continued. Maggie Saxon said; 
Although the Leeds City Council has been generous to add E100,000 a year 
to our total revenue grant, the grant increase in the 1990s did not catch up 
with the inflation rate. We do not have capital debts now, but we do not 
have adequate revenue funding. This building was 10 years old. We need to 
refurbish the building. Bars, catering and conference rooms have generated 
a significant amount of turnover towards our theatre activities. We should 
upgrade them with modem standards to be attractive to a wider audience. 
But we lack money to do so. We haven't replaced the carpet for 10 years. 54 
Jude Kelly claimed that the theatre's financial difficulty was mainly due to the 
unequal distribution of arts subsidy by the Arts Council; "They fund the big enterprises 
in London and everything else is scaled down ... You get the 
feeling you are funded per 
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square metre rather than per fantastic idea ... there's the hope that the energy will 
circulate, but it's not possible without backing". 55 
On the one hand, her claim was understandable. As has been noted in the 
previous chapter, the two national companies took nearly half of ACE and RABs 
drama funding in the early 1990s, and in 1994/95, these two were given 73% of ACE 
drama spending. It is not surprising that in the post-Thatcher enterprise age, a bigger 
and bigger proportion of drama funding has been given to the two national companies, 
because, as illustrated by Myerscough, they have made themselves intemational tourist 
attractions which could yield impressive theatre-related benefits with the transfer of 
plays or musicals and Shakespeare productions in Stratford and London. 
It is true that the cultural industry in Leeds has "compared favourably with the 
respective cultural sectors of other major UK cities". A survey of the city's cultural 
industry done in 1996 reported that "In Leeds the performing and visual arts are 
particularly well represented with the likes of the West Yorkshire Playhouse, Opera 
North, Phoenix Dance, Henry Moore Institute and the relocated Royal Armouries 
Museum". The industry of tourism in Leeds has also gradually expanded, contributing 
an estimated f502m per year for the City's economy in 1999/2000. However, the 
cultural and tourist industry has been mostly related to finance, commerce and retail 
services. 56 Generally speaking, it is difficult to imagine that foreign tourists or people 
living in Scotland might come to Leeds simply to see a show in the Playhouse. Without 
doubt, most of its audiences have been drawn from Leeds and the Yorkshire region. 
This is one of the reasons why the Playhouse has endeavoured to do community work. 
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On the other hand, Jude Kelly's claim that the Playhouse has suffered from the 
unequal distribution of funding appears unconvincing. The Playhouse has, in fact, been 
one of the few theatre companies to receive favourable arts subsidy. As, Ian Brown and 
Rob Brannen point out, the Playhouse was in the gainer's position in the 1990s, its 
subsidy being steadily increased by central and local authorities ftom fl. 5m in 1993/94 
to fl. 9m in 1998/99, while most regional theatres received standstill arts funding from 
1993/94 to the end of the 1990s. In addition, E2.64m of lottery money was given to the 
Playhouse. Under the circumstances, it is possible for financially suffering theatre 
companies such as the Everyman Theatre in Liverpool to argue that the Playhouse has 
been adequately funded while other regional theatres are still suffering. 
Nevertheless, it is true that Jude Kelly has exhibited an ability to promote the 
profile of both herself and the theatre. In every year since its opening, the Playhouse 
has received the annual Theatrical Management Association (TMA) award. It won the 
Bacardi Award for the Most Welcoming Theatre and its Peter Pan was voted Best 
Show for Children and Young People in 1996. Jude Kelly has promoted the theatre's 
national profile to such an extent that Sir Ian McKellan, one of Britain's best known 
classical actors and a key figure at the Royal National Theatre in the 1980s and 1990s, 
chose the YvIYP as his temporary working base when he became disillusioned with 
white middle class audiences found at the RNT. 57 Jude Kelly's public profile has been 
enhanced by her becoming a popular choice for programmes such as BBC Radio 4's 
Any Questions and BBC-TV's Question Time. She was awarded the OBE for services 
to the theatre in 1997. She was also appointed Britain's cultural representative to 
UNESCO. According to polls conducted by The Stage in 1996 and 1997, Jude Kelly 
was named as the fourth most important person working in British Theatre. 
She was 
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discussed in the press as a strong candidate for the artistic directorship of the Royal 
National Theatre in the mid- I 990s. 
It is always difficult to judge the artistic standard of a particular theatre 
company. The Playhouse, however, has often been praised by the press for its high 
artistic quality. Even in the period of recession, it has been frequently discussed in the 
press as one of the few vital regional theatres. For instance, Michael Coveney valued 
Jude Kelly's efforts to reverse the trend of a nation-wide pattern of retrenchment and 
playing safe during the recession of the early 1990s. 58 In order to maintain artistic 
standards, Jude Kelly has done many things. She has tried to make the Playhouse keep 
atDreast of the times. For instance, she realised the importance of the digital generation 
emerging as a new cultural consumerist group. In consequence, she directed the 
multimedia internet play, Deadmeat (1999), by a maverick London street author named 
which integrated the spoken word with improvised jazz, dance, website visuals and 
DJ cuts shot in various locations in the Playhouse. She brought in the experienced 
director Ian Brown, the Artistic and Executive Director of the Traverse Theatre since 
1989, to direct John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men in 1997 and Irvine Welsh's You'll 
rr- 
nave Had Your Hole in 1998. She also engaged promising young directors such as 
Matthew Warchus. 
Here, it is useful to examine briefly Matthew Warchus's career in the 1990s, 
because he has exhibited the attitude of a new generation of directors in the 1990s 
which was examined in the previous chapter. Before working in the Playhouse, 
Warchus had been an assistant director for many companies, for instance, the RSC for 
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its 1991/92 season. He began working at the WYP in 1992. He was nominated, as a 
result of his production, Life is A Dream, as Best Director in the TMA/Martini awards 
in 1992. At the Playhouse, he directed several productions, chiefly, a classic, a musical, 
and plays from the established writers, and thus, safe, such as Life is A Dream by 
Calderon, Fiddler on the Roof (1992) by Joseph Stein, Death of Salemam (1994) by 
Arthur Miller, Betrayal (1995) by Harold Pinter. He left the Playhouse after redirecting 
the musical Peter Pan in 1996. The Guardian on 5th January 1996 praised him as "one 
of our most consistently inventive and assured young directors". After leaving the 
Playhouse, he worked at the RSC. His 1997 Hamlet was praised by Michael Billington 
on I Oth May 1997 as "one of the most exciting main-house Stratford productions in 
years". According to archivist Kathy Webster, currently in 2000 he was working in 
Hollywood as a film director. Certainly, he has characterised features of young 
directors in the 1990s - the search for money and fame. 
Jude Kelly's career in the Playhouse has also typified the general attitude of 
artistic directors in the post-Thatcherite period. Her successful career in the Playhouse 
seems to have been not so much to do with her artistic abilities as with her managerial 
skills. It is true that she has shown a genuine skill in running the Playhouse. It might be 
claimed, however, that Jude Kelly's managerial role has hindered her artistic 
development. She has directed on average 3 productions a year. Besides this, as Chief 
Executive, she has had to raise money, devise programmes and speak to the 
I and artistic director was community. She agreed that operating both as chief executive 
difficult; "The balance is tough. I can't always devote as much thought to directing as 
others can,,. 59 Perhaps for this reason her productions have been 
less than successful. 
For instance, her King Lear in 1995 was viewed as failure. John Harrison commented; 
225 
"She has done some excellent works. She has done some ghastly works. Her Seagull 
and The Merchant of Venice were very good. King Lear, as a whole, failed to move 
xiý 
6 
me .0 Harrison attributed her artistic 
inconsistency to huge managerial task she has 
had to undertake. In her own explanation, there was a strong sense that Jude Kelly 
regarded herself as Chief Executive rather than Artistic Director; 
Does the chief executive of the National Theatre have to direct? Jeremy 
Isaacs, the former television executive who runs the Royal Opera House, 
Covent Garden, is not expected to produce opera or dance. But in the small, 
gossipy world of the theatre you must be known to perform at the rock face, 
and to perform consistently. 61 
Jude Kelly's role in the 1990s somewhat demonstrates what D. Keith Peacock 
describes as a shift of the traditional role of artistic directors "from the aesthetic 
,, 62 towards the managerial'. To many such as Sir Peter Hall who have shown strong 
criticism against governments' arts policies and spending on the arts since Mrs 
Thatcher, for instance, the weighting of the role of artistic director from the aesthetic 
towards the managerial was undesirable. However, in the theatre economy of the 1990s 
in which running a theatre company is not dissimilar to running a business company, 
without giving a great deal of thought to theatre management, few theatre companies 
would have survived. The spirit of the progressive age, which had dictated the old 
Playhouse in the early 1970s; the assimilation of failures, the selection of plays with 
little consideration of the box office, and the constantly affordable ticket prices, is a 
thing of the past. Instead, the management of the WYP is dictated by a post-Thatcher 
theatre economy - "partnership with industry, commerce and political parties" - 
being 
now one of its missions. Thus, what the Playhouse did in the 1990s - Jude Kelly's 
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managerial approach, the theatre's deep involvement in outreach programmes for 
utilitarian social purposes beneficial also for obtaining commercial sponsorship, arts 
63 
subsidy and the lottery money, its increasing resort to musicals and transfers 
preferably to London where they produce money and enhance reputation, 64its frequent 
co-productions with other companies, and its willingness to work with stars such as 
Timothy West, Warren Mitchell and Sir Ian McKellen 65 _ was simply a slice of truth 
concerning the practices unavoidable in the British theatre of the 1990s. 
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Chapter VI: The Red Ladder Theatre Company 
One of the reasons why Red Ladder is so old compared to many other 
companies is that it changed with the times. ... In the 1990s it simply became a situation where it was no longer possible to do work in the same 
way that we had in the 1970s. Our major individual characteristic is the 
fact that we are the company who uniquely works with youth service 
touring nationally and working very strategically to access young people in 
a non-school environment. The space we perform is often a cultural desert 
into which few companies go -a tiny little building in the middle of 
housing estate in a rural area with a bunch of young people. We are 
probably the only company that exclusively goes to that area. ' 
Introduction 
This chapter will deal with the Red Ladder theatre company from agitprop 
theatre for the working class in the early 1970s to young people's theatre after 1985. 
The reason why Red Ladder has been chosen is that the company has continued to 
modify itself to the changing climate of the times as political, economic and cultural 
circumstances changed. An examination of the company's history will offer a detailed 
illustration of what this thesis has already explored - the collapse of the British 
political theatre after Thatcher's government. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to 
employ a case-study of the process of the company's deradicalisation over three 
decades to demonstrate the political, economic and cultural effect on the British 
political theatre explored in the previous chapters. 
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For this case-study, as with the West Yorkshire Playhouse, comprehensive 
materials such as pamphlets, programmes and annual reports of the Red Ladder 
company will be cited. An interview with the Artistic Director currently in post from 
1998, Wendy Harris, will be also quoted to both see its contemporary state and 
support what has been discovered from those materials. 
Red Ladder from A2itprop Theatre to Young People's Theatre 
From the late 1960s, Britain witnessed the proliferation of small-scale political 
theatre companies such as CAST (Cartoon Archetypical Slogan Theatre, 1968), 7: 84 
Theatre Company (1971). There are several reasons why these political companies 
came into being mostly from the late 1960s. The political climate of that time was one 
of them. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Britain was affluent and stable. Positive steps 
had also been made for social change, such as nationalisation and the creation of the 
welfare state. However, for many young people, particularly, for those who were 
affected by the 1944 Education Act, either from working class or from middle class, 
these steps were seen merely as "tokenism" or "revisionism" in a predominantly 
capitalist society. As Catherine Itzin has observed, they identified a "materialist 
myth"; "Young people could see clearly, often for the first time, the contradictions 
between what they had been educated to expect and the reality of the world around 
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them; they saw that their very standards of living were at the direct expense of the 
92 sub-standards of the imperialised third of the world' . Particularly, the young had 
great expectations of the 1964 Labour government. However, they were disillusioned 
by the government's inability to deal with such mythical social and economic 
injustice within Britain. From this disillusionment in Britain came the events of 1968. 
It is said that 1968 was the zenith of the political climate of the 1960s, 
triggering the concurrent outbreak of strong political activism world-wide; the 
Democratic Convention in Chicago with tear gas and tanks in the streets, world-wide 
anti-Vietnam demonstrations as the war reached its peak that were mounted in Britain 
by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign in Grosvenor Square with 30,000 demonstrators, 
and, most importantly, the Anarchist Events of May in Paris where numerous students 
joined forces with nine million striking workers to protest against the state. After the 
failure of the latter to radically change the state, in Britain, oppositional events did not 
remain random, but became a movement of the political left, appealing to Marx as a 
symbol of the revolutionary transformation of society. David Widgery drew a 
conclusion concerning this time; 
The ideas of the revolutionary Left, seeds carefully if somewhat dustily 
shielded from the light of twenty years' boom, returned again to the I 
working-class soil from which they had come. The books of Marx and 
Lenin, of Trotsky and Luxemburg began to find readers again in the 
movement which thought it had outgrown them thirty years ago. .... by the 473 
end of the sixties ... revolutionary trade-unionism 
had been reborn into a 
world of immense working-class possibilities ... out of the realities of the 
modem class struggle. 3 -D 
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This radical political climate was, in turn, reflected in the theatre, motivating a 
new generation of such politically conscious theatre workers as Chris Rawlence, 
Richard Seyd, and Richard Stourac to consider how to relate theatre to the political 
reality of the times. In this climate, a political touring company, AgitProp Street 
Players, later changed to Red Ladder Mobile Workers Theatre (Red Ladder), carne 
into being in London in July 1968. Richard Stourac, one of the founding members of 
Red Ladder who worked in the company mostly during the 1970s, spoke about the 
issues of "Why Red? " and "Why Ladder? ", at a Birmingham University 'Better 
Ladder' theatre conference in 1998, which was held to commemorate the 30th 
anniversary of Red Ladder; 
What we did share with the generation of political and cultural activists of 
the time was that we sincerely believed that we could achieve mental, 
radical, political, and social change in our life time. ... 
Parliament was seen 
as formal, superficial and alienated democratic operators for direct action 
and immediate change. ... 
So we made a decision that we would perform 
for working class people ideally at the point of struggle in order to directly Z: ' link our work to their daily struggle and their territory. ... We were anti- 
establishment red against bourgeois culture and ideology, social and 
political alienation, division of labour, hierarchies, and professional 
established theatre operators, but democratically red for collective 
creativity and responsibility, integrated culture - cultural politics and 
political culture. ... Ladder was a practical thing. 
For us visibility was 
important because we performed in non-theatre spaces with extremely 
large crowds of people. Ladder was useful visual theatre language to show 
ty. 4 hierarchy. It created visualisation of different levels that existed in socie 
The disintegration of industrial relations during the Heath govenunent 
recession gave Red Ladder an almost endless source of material. As a company 
internal document indicates, under the Heath government, class issues were strongly 
5 
"black and white", and the class struggle was "epic" in its nature. During the period 
1970-1974, millions of workers became involved in political and industrial struggle. 
233 
Tens of thousands of workers protested against the penal clauses of the 1971 
Industrial Relations Act, implemented after five dockers' shop stewards were jailed in 
Pentonville Prison for contempt of court in 1 ý72. The nation-wide miners strike in 
1972 and 1973 removed the credibility of the Heath government and led to the 
conditions which made a general election necessary. Edward Heath was defeated, and 
lamented; "Who governs Britain? Miners? " 
The company presented short sketches and plays that fed directly into its 
"ready-made audiences", who "were not a 'converted' militant few". Its early agitprop 
works included; tenants' plays such as The Rose-Tinted Spectacles (1969), Squatters 
Play (1969) about homeless people; Stuff Your Penal Up Your Bonus for the Fords 
workers' queuing for strike pay at Dagenham (1969); The Big Con (1970) about 
productivity bargaining; Happy Robots (1972), a technology play. The National Cake 
(1972), performed during the mass demonstration organised a few hours after the fifth 
dockers' shop steward had been imprisoned for acting against the Industrial Relations 
Act, clearly characterised the agitprop nature of the company's early work; 
Feeling is running high during this demonstration. One of the dockers shop ZD 
stewards introduces the performance of a Red Ladder as summing up the 
attitude of the imprisoned dockers to the Industrial Relations Act. ... On top 
of the cake sits the boss, heavily made up and wearing a union jack topper; C: - 
on his right stands the Tory with the head of Heath, on his left a giant 
puppet representing international capitalism. The workers are on the 
ground, the union official, with a huge FEATHER in his hat, is between 
top and bottom on the ladder. The whole is a visualisation of the class 
structure. As each layer of the cake goes on, the cooks receive their wages 
- large coloured moneybags marked 'WAGES' - and exchange them for a 
slice of the cake they have baked. ... Invariably the slice, eaten away 
by 
inflation, is too small to live on; they demand what they need - more cake. 
But the Tory, aware of imminent economic crisis, tells the employers not 
to grant the demand. The workers raise their giant knife - marked 
'STRIKE' - and threaten to plunge it into the national cake. Urged by the 
capitalist, the Tory frames the Industrial Relations Act to destroy the 
workers bargaining power and break their strike knife. ... Feather, the trade 
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union official, ... 
legally bound with a chain around his neck fie is forced to 
discipline hi., members - unaware of the pollc, ý helmet held above him - to 
call off an 'illegal' strike. The shop steward, defying Feather and the court 
order gets arrested and jailed. "Alright brothers and sisters", agitate the 
remaining workers, "one of us is in jail. ... 
All out strike! " and "General 
Strike! " comes from the audience getting more and more involved. ... 
The r, 
jail is dropped and the workers rise swinging the knife towards Heath's 
head held aloft by the trembling employer. The cyrnbal crash accentuates 
the beheading. head in hand the steward advances on the audience: "We 
don't just want more cake; we want the bloody bakery!!! "6 
However, from the mid-1970s, Red Ladder's radicalism was gradually 
lessened. This was mainly due to the changing political climate. While Red Ladder I Z:, 
could play an important role as an agitprop company at a particular period of history 
when class issues were much more "black and white", the agitprop style became 
inappropriate as political circumstances changed. 4: 1 
By 1974, the political climate began to alter. The mass confrontation of the 
past four years was almost over. Although important struggles continued in the next Z7ý 
few years, the overt evidence of class struggle was declining. This inevitably affected 
the composition of Red Ladder's audience. Chris Rawlence recalled; "After 1974 
there was a lessening of the struggle. Fewer people were actively involved. Fewer 4: ý ZD 
went to meetings. Our ready-made audiences began to dwindle to the 'committed' or 
' converted,,, 7 The company felt an urgent need to change. He added; 
We were Eced with a choice: to make a political theatre for the politically 
conscious sector of the working class - those who continued to be actively 
in-volved; or to seek a broad working-class audience which would be 
attracted to our shows first and foremost because they offered the prospect 
of a good night out. 'ý 
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After having a lengthy process of debate during 1973/74, the company opted 
for the latter - the creating of popular socialist theatre. To this end, the company, 
firstly, decided to deal with issues of women's oppression under patriarchy as equally 
important as those of class oppression under capitalism. This means that under the 
pressure of the gradual decrease in its "ready-made audiences", the company felt a 
need to turn to the then popular and crucial issues concerning women in order to keep 
the company moving forward. In thematic terms, this meant that the company did not 
now solely deal with radical class issues. 
In theatrical terms, the company also abandoned its sole reliance on the 
agitprop style. In its early agitprop period, the company regarded the nature of its 
work as "a means to an end" to change the political consciousness of its audiences. 9 
Chris Rawlence recalled this at a 'Better Red' conference; "We were consciously anti- 
artistic. Anything that was too cultural was conceived as a surplus in delivering our 
simple political message". 10 Richard Seyd added; 
we were unable to fulfil the artistic task of portraying and interpreting the 
way people operate, and why they operate in that particular way, revealing 
the contradictions as they grow out of the social, economic and political 
conditions of society itself ... because of 
its tendency towards 'St. George 
and the Dragonism' - the good guys and the bad guys. 
11 
4D 
In Chris Rawlence's words, these "political Frankensteins" became a problem 
to the company in the mid-1970S. Richard Seyd concluded; "the canonsation of agit- 
prop as the fonn of revolutionary socialist theatre is wrong. ... unless the audience is 
already relatively class conscious, agitprop falls on deaf ears". 
12 Seyd's argument 
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offered David Edgar grounds for his suspicion concerning the efficacy of the British 
political theatre in the 1970s. This will be examined later. 
Realising this problem under the changing political climate, the company felt a 
need for a theatrically different style with aesthetic considerations. For the first time) 
Red Ladder employed elements from, what it had previously called, the "bourgeois 
dramatic tradition" based on Aristotelian forms such as characterisation and the 
concept of place or time. It combined those with the Brechtian concept of Epic theatre 
as an antidote to the potential bourgeois individualism of those elements. In this way, 
the company began to "humanise" the "political Frankensteins", by means of a more 
sophisticated examination of character while trying not to lose the play's political 
message. Its production, A Women'S Work Is Never Done (1974), was a test bed to 
discover whether "art is reconcilable with politics". 13 
In addition to the change in dramatic form, there was another significant 
change. In 1976, Red Ladder, which until that time had been touring the South East, 
decided to settle down permanently in Leeds. The decision was, first of all, related to 
the general problem faced by small-scale touring companies. The company's 1977/78 Zý 
report said; 
The problem of touring nation-wide all the time, apart from the toll it takes 
physically and emotionally on performers, is that the company as a whole 
rarely develops ongoing working relationships with the same community: 
it is here today and gone tomorrow. As a result, genuinely productive 
collaboration between company and community/audience in the making 
and researching of a show, in its organisation and even in its performances, 
is inhibited. Red Ladder felt that it needed a more permanent presence 
on a region to overcome this problem. 
14 
2: 1 
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The company did not consider London to be a proper place to develop that 
presence, because of the disproportionate number of small-scale companies based in 
London as against the rest of the country. Catherine Itzin's 1975 Alternative Theatre 
TT- 
hatidbook listed 130 such companies. Of these, 70% were based in London. The 
decision to settle down was also closely related to the dwindling of its "ready-made 
audience" from the politically conscious sector. The evaporation, as Chris Rawlence 
pointed out, inevitably made the company shift towards a popular socialist theatre 
pursuing a broadly working class non-theatre-going public who were not necessarily 
politically conscious. Thus, the company hoped to establish itself as a community- 
based cultural resource in the Yorkshire area. To this end, Red Ladder made a ten- 
year strategy to open up seventy local venues where audiences did not necessarily 
support socialism or feminism such as working men's clubs and community halls. 
However, as the company admitted, this was far from easy; "Opening them up for our 
show was challenging and difficult. It often required months of painstaking 
negotiation with club committees, worried for their bar profits, doubtful about getting 
an audience". 15 In addition, although the company continuously raised and discussed 
the issues of how to reconcile art with politics, 16 and although there were shows which 
the company claimed as successful such as A Women's Work Is Never Done, it came 
to realise how difficult it was to reconcile art with politics with audiences who were 
often wary of the plays' political nature. Chris Rawlence and Steve Trafford recalled 
this with the production It Makes You Sick (1976) -a show about the political issues 
of the N. H. S; 
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... the balance between politics and entertainment is hard to gauge. A left- 
wing critic in London, seeing the show, declared that the red was wearing 
off the ladder, in an Otley working men's club we were paid off at half 
time - 'Commie rubbish'. 
17 
It is still difficult to gauge what cultural/political contribution the popular 
political theatre movement actually made. By the end of the 1970s, around the tenth 
anniversary of the political events of 1968, socialist theatre workers attempted, for the 
first time, to critically review its progress over these ten years. In 1979 David Edgar 
diagnosed a general crisis in the movement. He gave two main reasons for this - the 
collapse of organised working class action after 1974 and the lack of any 
revolutionary organisation and culture at the roots of the working class. Quoting 
Richard Seyd's account of Red Ladder - agitprop's being possible only alongside the 
militancy of the working class which was then evaporating, David Edgar argued that 
the intervention of socialist theatre into the working class struggle had been "patchy 
and peripheral". While he located some potential hope for its improvement in the 
"politically acute theatrical statements" of dramatists such Edward Bond, David Hare 
and Howard Brenton, it was futile, he argued, to search for an alternative source in 
British popular culture, because it had been "atrophied" under the dominant popular 
cultural fonns such as television which had shown reluctance to act as an agency for 
radical ideas, despite the efforts of dramatists such as Trevor Griffiths. Thus, David 
Edgar virtually dismissed the possibility of socialist touring groups' being able to 
create an alternative popular cultural discourse. 18 
There were also theatre workers, however, who did not agree with Edgar's 
argument. John McGrath had attempted to create a popular entertainment tradition 
within a socialist ideolog . In A Good 
Night Olit he claimed the efficacy of such , t, Y 
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small-scale socialist touring groups establishing a working class cultural discourse in 
opposition to dominant middle class culture during the 1970s. Indeed, he still believed 
in the oppositional-theatre movement during the Thatcher years when the working 
class was repressed. In his book, The Bone Won't Break (1990), he identified an "area 
of celebratory, public, all-inclusive theatre", for example, in such theatrical work as 
Ronconi's Teatro Libero and Jerome Savary's Grand Magic Circus, and in some of 
the British theatre companies such as Welfare State. 19 Nevertheless, from the 
viewpoint of Red Ladder's significant change in direction in 1985 from a big T' 
(Political) as a socialist feminist touring company to a small 'p' as a company 
working solely for young people, David Edgar's argument seems to have been 
vindicated by the company's progression. 
Red Ladder itself acknowledged that "By 1985 the company was to all intents 
,, 20 and purposes politically, artistically and financially bankrupt . Although there 
is 
little formally written about the reasons why the company went bankrupt, from the 
company's statement below, it may be possible to detect some clues from what 
happened to the company in the early 1980s; 
It appears that there was a shift way from the pioneering work in clubs 
towards playing in other venues, largely the Arts Centre circuit to which 
more and more companies were turning as sources of bookings, income 
and stability. Red Ladder also began to commission writers, rather than 
delegating the work of writing plays to particular members of the 
company. The company seemed locked into a fairly conventional 
relationship with a stereotypical, white, male working class audience and 
an uneasy alliance with its upwardly mobile supporters - teachers, social 
workers and other theatre people. 
21 
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According to the statement above, a couple of things can be detected. Firstly, 
the company, which had strictly prohibited itself from performing in theatre buildings 
and arts centres in the 1970s, began to perfon-n in those venues. Internal documents of 
the time verify this. For instance, its production, Safe With Us (1985), which 
questioned the Thatcher government's claim that the Health Service is 'safe with us', 
was presented in the Half Moon Arts Centre and the Unity Theatre in Liverpool. 22 
Although these two venues were associated with the Left, significantly, this was seen 
as the beginning of the decline of the company's anti-establishment theatrical 
practice. 
Closely related to this was a second factor - the company's failure to attract a 
wide-range of broadly working class audiences and the consequent financial 
problems. The company's "conventional relationship" and "alliance" with its 
audience directly reflected David Edgar's claim in 1981 that left-wing theatre had 
failed to attract a mass, working class audience, with its audience, in fact, consisting 
"largely (but not exclusively) of teachers, lecturers, social workers, health visitors, 
journalists, broadcasters, white collar workers, trade union researchers and officials, 
left party members, campaign supporters and so on". 23 
The British public lost interest in radical left-wing ideas after the mid- I 970s 
and the company found it difficult to attract audiences with its socialist ideology. 
Although it claimed a few claimed successful productions, such as Taking Our Time 
(1978) which was performed in forty different venues to over ten thousand people 
from January to June 1978, Red Ladder failed in its intention of extending the range 
Of its audiences. This was particularly true after the imposition of anti-socialist 
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policies by the Thatcher government. The conservative political climate in the early 
and mid-1980s eroded class consciousness and political activism. This led to a 
comprehensive decline of the company's targeted audience, which, in turn, led to its 
critical financial problem. 
The company normally mounted two or three productions a year. For instance, 
in 1984-85, at a time when the nation-wide miners' strike was on the verge of defeat 
by Thatcher's government, the company gave three productions amounting to I 10 
separate performances and workshops for about 16 weeks. Its audience figures for one 
week in that year showed, however, how seriously the company was suffering from 
the decline in its audiences; 
Total Paid-Audience Total Unpaid Total Audience 24 
Sunday August 19th 
Tickets at f2 
12 
Tickets at fI 
14 
Audience 
22 48 
Monday 8 1 11 20 
Tuesday 0 8 12 20 
Wednesday 22 6 13 41 
Thursday 8 3 32 43 
Friday 31 21 30 82 
Saturday 73 22 99 194 
Total 154 75 219 448 
Except on Friday and Saturday, the company could not even attract more than 
50 people. The average audience attendance figure per performance was 64. This was 
25 
a seriously reduced figure compared with the average figure of 150 in 1977/88 . 
From this, it is not difficult to see why the company had financial problems. 
According to Red Ladder's projected budget for one week in 1985, the total loss 
reached before subsidy was E5570. In addition, this loss was calculated by assuming 
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that the total paying-audience attendance would reach 1,150, paying in a total of 
fl, 725. If the total receipt from the above paying-audience - E383 - was applied, the 
loss in that week was around E6,900.26 If this was the case throughout its total 16 
weeks of performance, it is assumed by calculation that the total loss in 1984/85 
reached around f 110,000 equivalent to f 6,900 per perfonnance. Although it received 
E73,000 in arts subsidy, the company could not make ends meet as it had managed to 
do in the 1970s. 27 It is not known exactly how much its accumulated debt had reached 
by 1985, but it was obvious that the debt brought the company near to bankruptcy. 
Besides the company's failure to attract the audience it wished, there were 
other factors which negatively affected its finances. One was the Thatcher 
government's attack on socialist organisations. For instance, Trade Unions had not 
only sponsored the company, but also bought its productions on a weekly basis. 
However, after being systematically weakened by the right-wing government, Unions 
found it increasingly difficult to support companies like Red Ladder. The company 
recognised that; 
The rule of a Tory government is continuously increasing the pressure on 
the subsidised arts. 28 For Red Ladder Theatre Co. this means that the 
venues where we have a history of touring eg. Working Mens Clubs, 
Labour Party, Trade Union events and events sponsored by other political 
pressure groups, are finding it hard to meet our increasing fees; which 
stand today at 050 per show outside Yorkshire and E150 within 
Yorkshire. ... 
We do not believe that support from this area can be 
expanded in any dramatic way at a time when the Trade Unions themselves 
are under attack, and increased unemployment has led to diminishing 4D 
resources. 
29 
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Another adverse influence came from the increasingly politicised Arts Council 
under Sir William Rees-Mogg. By 1985, the company was concerned that the Arts 
Council, was moving towards a position where productions in Trade Union and 
Labour clubs were not recognised as public perfonnance. 30 It was also concerned that 
the Council was moving towards the Thatcherite business assessment procedures 
outlined in The Glory of the Garden. In addition, traditionally, the Arts Council, in 
distributing arts funding, had always put its priority on large building-based theatre 
companies which could attract a large audience, questioning, by contrast, the audience 
yielding capacity of small-scale touring companies. This was seen by Council's 
strategic decision of consolidating the role by setting up II regional "centres of 
excellence", as has been noted in Chapter 11. Baz Kershaw argued that 1985 was the 
key year in the development of alternative theatre. According to his analysis, unlike 
its expansion until the mid-1980s, the total number of alternative theatre "fell from 
313 in 1985 to 272 in 1990". The main reason for this was the blunt reduction in the 
small-scale touring groups, which dropped from 220 to 187. He saw the main reason 
for the reduction as "the result of new policies in the funding system; a fall in real 
ten'ns in the total grant available for theatre, forcing increased reliance on sponsorship 
and box-office income; greater competition encouraged by the general shift from 
annual revenue grants towards short-tenn project grants and 'incentive' funding 
schemes; the increased blurring of a distinction between alternative and mainstream, 
as financial shortage in both sectors encouraged a variety of collaborations and 
transfers". 31 All these had an adverse effect on small-scale touring companies -a loss 
of their raison d'etre, as has been noted in Chapter II by Gillian Hanna, a leading 
member of the Monstrous Regiment theatre company. 
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By 1985 in this politically conservative and financially constrained situation 
Red Ladder found it extremely difficult to continue its socialist mission to bring 
people together to discuss political ideas and cultural matters. Thus, with all these 
negative factors in the air it was time to change, or to die along with other political 
theatre companies of the time. 
Instead of liquidating the company, the Arts Council, together with Leeds City 
Council and Equity, set out to alter Red Ladder's direction. It proposed a rescue 
package on the condition that the company would change, first of all, its traditional 
collective working method - one of the general characteristics of political theatre in 
the 1970s which attempted to put socialist theory into practice in its own working 
methods and company structure. Until then, there had been no director, designer and 
writer within the Red Ladder company. In principle, the company had made plays 
collectively, perfonned collectively, and shared all tasks equally. After the change in 
1985ý the company's collective principle, which, in John Hoyland's view, had been 
the most "thorough" of all the political theatre companies, and been "an absolute 
model of democracy "1 32 was eradicated. It was replaced by a hierarchy, consisting of a 
board of directors which advertises the post of Artistic Director, who takes sole 
responsibility for running the company. The board also has the right to employ 
professional writers, designers and perfonners on a freelance basis. 33 
The demand of hierarchical management from the Arts Council can be seen to 
be in the line with what it had done to other political theatre companies during the 
1980s. Like Red Ladder, many companies such as CAST and 7: 84 (England and 
Scotland) ceased operating or were forced to alter the direction of their work. The 
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Council, threatening that any company with the name Red in its title or with a 
socialist ideology was likely to lose its funding, worked as an agent of the state by 
trying to weaken their ideological base and dissenting voices. The then current 
members of Red Ladder were all dismissed even though some of them still wished to 
continue to work. Just as 7: 84 (Scotland) was forced to alter its direction by 
dismissing John McGrath, so was Red Ladder by dismissing all of its members. 
In a sense, however, the company's abandonment of the collective working 
principle seemed unavoidable in terms of the dominant social and cultural agenda of 
the time. In the mid- I 980s Britain became a society where there was more individual 
thinking rather than collective thinking. The culture was very much about being 
successful. The tenn, yuppie - young urban professional - was bom as a key icon of 
the 1980s. As left-wing principles, such as collectively working together, were 
challenged, Red Ladder could not help but accept a hierarchy in which successful 
management reflected in the attainment of high audience figures, was a top priority. 
With the appointment of Rachel Feldberg as Artistic Director in 1985 the new 
Red Ladder was born. Although the issues with which the company dealt have 
changed with each new Artistic Director, the bottom line is that the company now 
works solely for young people, dealing with such issues as race, disability, gender and 
sexual orientation. The current Artistic Director from 1998, Wendy Harris, talked 
about Red Ladder as a young people's theatre which became fixed after the change; 
"What we are trying to do is to present entertaining experience which connects to 4D 
., 
eople, and makes them think about things they may have never thought young p ltý 
before, encouraging them to see the world with fresh eyes". 
34 The company's 
214 6 
productions include; On the Line (1986) about racism among young people; The Best 
(1988) about deaf issues; Bus Shelter Project (1990) which toured for young people 
on the street with issues of homelessness and poverty; Though the Heavens Fall 
(1992) about young people's feelings about justice and the law; Catight (1992) which 
dealt with issues of teenage pregnancy and young mothers; No Mean Street (1993) 
about HIV/Aids issues for African Caribbean black young people; The Wound (1994) 
which explored the nature of domestic violence and its passage from one generation to 
the next; Josie'S Boy (1996) about issues of single parenting; Wise Guys (1998) about 
contemporary young male issues such as male identity, male violence, drug culture, 
homelessness, and gangs and criminality. 
From a thematic point of view, however, the shift from theatre with socialist 
issues to theatre for particular interest groups such as young people can be seen as a 
process of deradicalisation, referred to by the postmodernist, Graham Holderness in 
Chapter 11. John McGrath also argued that the ideology of such groups was "based on 
the revision that abolished the 'dictatorship of the proletariat"'. 
After the changes instituted in 1985, Red Ladder has been forced to follow 
Videlines demanded by what the political theatre companies of the 1970s generally I-- 
regarded as an establishment bourgeois cultural institute - the Arts Council. The 
company's proposed three-year-business plan clearly demonstrated that Red Ladder 
was now assimilating practices of an enterprise culture. As has been mentioned in 
Chapter 11, in 1987 the Council welcomed the then Arts Minister Richard Luce's 
three-year-rol ling arts funding proposal. Accordingly, the Council demanded three- 
year-business plans from all its clients. Theatre companies which could not satisfy the 
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appraisal team which reviewed the plans would not be promoted to three-year secure 
funding status, and possibly could be demoted to project funding status. Red Ladder 
made its detailed three-year-plan from 1989/90 to 1991/92. It included the cornpanyýs 
policy, objectives, key areas for artistic and organisational development, a strategy for 
youth service, and the required income from arts funding bodies. By the end of the 
1990s, making a business plan has become a major task for the company. Wendy 
Harris talked about the problems of management; 
The funding bodies, which are essentially all government-led, were saying 
that you have to operate this way. ... I would 
love it if I could spend my 
time just working with writers and doing workshops, exploring 
possibilities creatively. But a lot of my work is about promoting the 
company, filling funding applications, filling strategic documents, and 
backing up those things such as a business plan. ... If the tour 
is not selling 
very well, I have to make sure that I have to get my eye on that. All these 
take me away from my dream for creativity. I personally believe that arts 
organisation should be run with artistic vision, not with financial books at 
35 hand. 
During the latter half of the 1980s, Red Ladder received a paltry increase in its 
level of arts funding which reflected the stingy increase in overall arts subsidy from 
the Thatcher government, from E73,000 in 1985/86 to E83,880 in 1989/90. Its subsidy 
level in the 1990s also reflected the post-Thatcher restraint in arts subsidy. Below is 
its subsidy list from 1993/94 to 1998/99; 
Arts Council Yorkshire and West Regional Arts 
36 
of England Z) 
Humberside Arts Yorkshire Grants Associations 
1993/94 Ll 32.653 f 10,000 E5,000 f 9,860 
1994/95 f 132.700 f 10,000 f5,350 f 8,700 
1995/96 E132,700 f 10,900 f 5,000 f 12,450 
1996/97 f 132,700 f 11,000 L5,000 f 500 
1997/98 E132,700 E10,000 EO EO 
1998/99 f 140,900 f 1,500 EO EO 
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According to the table above, just as the total arts subsidy was put on standstill 
by Major's and Blair's government, so was the subsidy received by Red Ladder. It is 
difficult to compare the subsidy received by one touring theatre company with that of 
others, because of the different scale of their work. However, it is interesting to note 
that unlike other companies such as the West Yorkshire Playhouse, in its financial 
statement documents during the period the company never mentioned anything about 
its financial difficulties or the problem of standstill subsidy. Indeed, it should be borne 
in mind that, as Wendy Harris admitted, Red Ladder was one of the few companies 
which has received a high level of arts funding among companies which have similar 
roots in the tradition of political theatre. 37 The company had 25% increase in arts 
subsidy in 1999/2000, and was expecting another increase in 2000/01.38 
In the early 1990s, the company went through another significant change. In 
1993 Red Ladder resumed performance in arts centres and theatre buildings. The 
company had occasionally performed in those venues in the early 1980s as has been 
mentioned earlier, but stopped this from 1984 to 1993. After changing its policy for 
young people in 1985, the company was reluctant to perform in Arts Centres and 
theatre buildings, because theatrical performances became less and less attractive to 
young people. Those venues were also reluctant to invite the company's productions 
mainly due to concern about potential financial loss. Red Ladder only performed in 
Youth Centres and similar venues which, with financial support from local authorities, 
could buy its productions on a weekly basis. After buying the productions, those 
venues were in charge of advertising them and attracting audiences. 
The performances 
were all closed shops, not open to the general public 
but only to young people and 
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their accompanying parents. In the 1990s, the Arts Council, for whom accessibility 
had hitherto been a top priority, increasingly encouraged Arts Centres and building- 
based theatre companies to target young people. 39 This is particularly true after the 
New Labour government repeatedly emphasised the importance of "Education, 
Education and Education! " Those venues were now forced to buy seemingly 
unpopular productions for young people, and were in charge of everything including 
their publicity and financial outcome. 40 Red Ladder, with its production Sleeping Dog 
(1993/94), resumed performing in such venues, now without left-wing associations, as 
the Wakefield Arts Centre and the Mercat Theatre in Glasgow. 
The company has significantly increased its performance in those venues. In its 
12-week tour from April to July in 1996,18 out of total 51 performances were given 
in such venues as the Warwick Arts Centre, the Gatehouse Theatre in Stafford and the 
Oval Theatre in London. From April to July in 1997, it gave 16 performances out of 
50 in the Harrow Arts Centre and the Theatre in Mill in Bradford. This trend was 
continuing in 1999. Its significance is that the company has been further assimilating 
itself into the established and mainstream theatrical climate. 
In terms of production- style, Red Ladder has followed the mainstream theatrical 
fashion of the 1990s. Its Mixed Blessings (1994) marked the beginning of the 
company's desire to explore visual and physical theatre. This was devised primarily 
by the choreographer Leo Hamilton and the musical director Edward Lynch, founding 
members of the Phoenix Dance Company. Wise Guys (1998), by award winning 
writer Philip Osment, was another show with a strong physical style. Its current 
touring production in 2000/01, Picture Me, written by Noel Greig, offered multi- 
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media photographic and moving imagery to its audience by using magic, live music 
and video installation. During the 1990s, the visual and physical theatre movement 
has, to a great extent, replaced the Popular political theatre movement of the previous 
generation. This does not necessarily mean that visual and physical theatre cannot be 
political. Volcano and DV8 have often dealt with sexual politics. Generally speaking, 
however, their shows lack narrative discourse, chiefly relying on physical vocabulary 
and sophisticated visual imagery. The general public may find it difficult to 
understand such shows which, therefore, appeal primarily to a particular group, for 
example, young people who are not interested in politics and impressed by the skilled 
physical-visual spectacle. Red Ladder's introduction of a visual and physical aesthetic 
shows that the company does not want to be left behind, in a world where established 
companies such as the West Yorkshire Playhouse mentioned earlier are trying to 
update their work for young people. This is particularly necessary for Red Ladder as 
its audience group consists chiefly of the young. 
After the appointment of an Asian woman, Kully Thiarai, as Artistic Director in 
1994, Red Ladder endeavoured to expand the scope of its activities for ethnic 
minorities. The company opened the First Asian Theatre School in Bradford in 1998, 
offering 20 Asian participants a five-day tuition in theatre craft including 
performance, movement, and Asian Theatre aesthetic, style and voice work. After the 
tuition, the company organised Masala Nights, where the participants came together 
to create a new play with the help of professionals. This was performed at the Theatre 
in the Mill, Bradford, with a large attendance by the Asian Conununity. Obviously, 
these activities are completely at odds with what the company had attempted to do in 
the 1970s. Instead of enhancing working-class solidarity, they could now be seen to 
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be following the same lines as main-stream theatres' strategy for the enhancement of 
the artistic, cultural and social life of the community, as the West Yorkshire 
Playhouse has done with its community work. At the same time, perhaps more 
importantly, these activities have ultimately proved beneficial for sponsorship and arts 
subsidy. 41 Wendy Harris claimed that the company "has not jumped through a 
particular hoop" for the subsidy, but she said; 
The increase in arts subsidy in 1999 and 2000 was possible because we are 
absolutely on the agenda of the govenunent and the Arts Council. They 
have prioritised an arts agenda on education, young people, social 
responsibility, and access. Actually, we have been doing these for years. 
42 They knew this, and said; 'We value you, and you deserve more money' . 
The priority for new writing has been a foremost concern of the company 
since its formation. When working on the basis of the collective principle in the 
1970s, the company did not commission writers. It created plays collectively. Plays 
produced during the period were all new. As has been noted earlier in this Chapter, 
the company slowly began to commission writers. After going through the big change 
of 1985, this has increasingly become a common practice. From the company's 
internal documents, it is not difficult to see the company's priority for new writing. In 
its Draft Artistic Policy in 1986, the company stated that it should commission at least 
one show from new writers during 1986/87. In the 1990s, with comparatively stable 
arts funding, the company, with only 3 full-time staff, has been able to take on one of 
the riskiest things in the post-Thatcher theatre economy -a commitment to new 
writing. All of its 20 national touring productions in the 1990s were new plays. Roy 
Williams's Josie's Boys (1996) came into being as a result of the first commission 
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from a young black playwright. The company was eager to find the new talent. In 
1995ý it hosted a workshop, 'World Within Words' as a young writers project. After 
the workshop, selected pieces were performed at such a high profile venues as the 
West Yorkshire Playhouse. In the 1996/97 season, Red Ladder mounted a 
participatory residency project in which young people, working with a team of 
professionals, created a performance piece which played to a sell-out audience in 
Shropshire. Wendy Harris claimed that "We strive to encourage young people to write 
for us and take risks with new writers, which are often things other companies could 
not afford to do". It appears true that Red Ladder has maintained the same role in the 
1990s as many touring companies had done in the 1970s to offer a training ground for 
unknown writers and inspire them to write for the company, a role which has almost 
disappeared under the theatre economy of the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that among the 20 new plays, 14 plays 
were written by established writers. Gilly Fraser, who wrote The Wound (1994) for 
the company, had written extensively for both film and television. She also wrote 
Domestic Affair for the Royal Court. Irish writer Lin Coghlan wrote Walking (1995) 
for the company. Before this, she had worked with many companies including Theatre 
Centre, Nottingham Roundabout and The Half Moon. In 1998, the company had 
commissioned award winning writer, Noel Greig, who had written many plays for the 
Sheffield Crucible Theatre in the early 1990s. Commissioning writers of high profile - 
at least locally and, preferably, nationally - has become the company's major concern, 
perhaps due to its initiation of performing inside theatre buildings to which the public 
could be attracted by plays written by established writers. 
Red Ladder, like other 
theatre companies, has reflected the theatre economy of the 
1990s by, perhaps 
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unconsciously, programming in terms of business. Despite the danger she pointed out 
earlier, Wendy Harris, who is the only person amongst the three full-time staff who 
takes the full responsibility for management, admitted the inevitability of running 
theatre as a business; 
Like any business, for survival, we are running a business. Personally, I am 
driven by the need for creative work, but I also seriously believe in the 
importance of good management. That goes right down from who I employ 
to how I employ them, and the way we operate as a team and the way we 
communicate. It is important to run our business effectively and efficiently. 
That does not necessarily impact directly on our creative work, but I think 
it creates a good environment for functioning. 43 
As the 1993 British Alternative Theatre Directory acknowledged, during the 
1990s it could not maintain the distinction between alternative and mainstream 
theatre. Indeed, in the case of my two case studies, there seems to be no significant 
difference between the WYP's work for young people and Red Ladder's. The 
difference is that issues concerning young people have been the only focus for Red 
Ladder, whereas such issues have been only one of many for the WYP. Another 
difference, as Wendy Harris claimed, is that whereas the VvIYP, with its Schools 
Company, tours schools in Leeds, Red Ladder ventures into the wider "cultural 
desert". 
By the end of the 1990s, it was impossible to detect, within Red Ladder, the 
progressive spirit of the 1960s and 1970s. As I have illustrated, Red Ladder 
has 
changed radically. It has lost its ideological sign, ficance as an alternative voice to 
capitalism and its cultural significance as an alternative to a 
dominant middle class 
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culture. Since 1985, Red Ladder's management has ceased to be collective and has 
moved towards a hierarchy. Red Ladder is still taking theatre to people who, 
otherwise, would not experience it, but not to the working class but to young people. 
The company still conducts its traditional post-performance audience participatory 
event, but it is not used for political activism but to provide an opportunity for a 
special constituencY audience to discuss the issues presented. In the 1990s, the 
company no longer embodies the term, 'socialist'. Wendy Harris summed up the 
current state of Red Ladder; 
We are not waving a red flag saying that we are a group of socialists. 
Rather, we would say that we are company who, in terms of sympathy, sits 
more on the left than it does anywhere else. We may call ourselves Lilac 
Ladder now, just as New Labour, wearing blue suits, decorated its first 
party conference with lilacs instead of red roses. 44 
In the 1990s, as was the case with the Red Ladder company, Political Theatre 
in tenns of a capital 'P' was seen as out-dated, harking back to a bygone era when the zn 
concept of class had definitive meaning. It is true that there are still a few committed 
political theatre companies such as Banner Theatre, but their work is isolated and of a 
much smaller scale. The changed political and cultural climate has made their work 
less evidently relevant. New Labour has accepted post-Thatcherite enterprise values, 
and its leader Tony Blair has significantly deradicalised the Labour movement by 
abolishing its traditional symbol of the commitment to socialist ideal - common 
ownership. Left/Right political activism is now viewed with apathy, and conflict has 
moved from party ideology to single interest groups. It is little Nvonder to see that by 
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the end of 2000, the Red Ladder company was in the process of changing its red 
ladder logo which has been a symbol for its big Political outlook since its formation. 
In the 1990s in The British Theatre Directory or The Alternative Theatre 
Directory, the category, Political Theatre, disappeared. It is inconceivable to envisage 
the revitalisation of political theatre in the foreseeable future, particularly under the 
dominance of global capitalism which, to many, is evidence of the victory of 
capitalism over socialism. The impetus which drove theatre companies such as Red 
Ladder in the 1970s has by the end of the 1990s been consigned to history. 
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Conclusion: An Argument for the Future 
This study has examined its main subject - theatre economics and management 
in the 1990s - in the light of such issues as Political Thatcherism and its impact on the 
Labour Party, economic Thatcherism and its impact on the Arts Council, ideological 
Thatcherism and its impact on political theatre. It has illustrated that, owing to the 
government dominant funding structure set up after World War 11, Government 
manipulation of arts subsidy has been the main cause for change in the British theatre 
during the past two decades. 
Following Margaret Thatcher's questioning of the need for arts subsidy; "Oh, 
you artists, we give you money and you go on. We cut your money and you still go 
on", ' the New Right, and subsequently even Tony Blair, have been less enthusiastic 
nil aDOUt the public funding of the British non-profit-making theatre. As has been 
mentioned, David Sawers, in his article, Should the Taxpayer Support the Arts?, 
argued that the arts in Britain have survived and flourished for centuries before the 
emergence of the Arts Council, and suggested that the government should take a finn 
action to dismantle arts subsidy by abolishing the Arts Council. Alan Collins and 
Chris Hand of the University of Portsmouth, in their article, Making a Crisis out of a 
Drama: Should we Continue Public Financial Support for the British Theatre?, 
concluded after their economic analysis of arts subsidy that; 
In short, the case for continued arts subsidy is certainly not compelling, 
especially with regard to the alleged external consumption 
benefits ... . 
Further, given the history of public services of much greater social and 
economic significance that have been subsidised to privatization and 
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deregulation, some experimentation of subsidy withdrawal with, say, the 
Royal Opera House, and auctioning it in the private sector, seems hardly 2 
radical. 
However, on what grounds, financial or managerial, is it necessary to halt Arts 
Council funding which, according to Lord Gowrie in 1995, equalled only 0.06% of 
total public expenditure? What this study has examined is that the move toward such a 
view has undesirably affected not only the structure and morale of the theatre business 
but also has altered the relationship between companies and their audiences, and has 
subtly changed dramatic and theatrical discourse. 
The most critical legacy of Thatcher's government on theatre in the 1990s was 
its pushing theatre into a market Place through its continuous restraint of arts subsidy. 
Since the publication of the Arts Council's strategic and internal documents in the 
mid-1980s such as The Glory of the Garden and Partnership: Making Arts Money 
Work Harder, that market ethic has steadily and firmly become a dominant force in 
the theatre world. The market ethic has no longer allowed theatre workers to place 
aesthetic and spiritual consideration of their productions as a top priority. For 
instance, artistic directors, under the financial pressure, have had to undertake such 
managerial tasks as making business plans and seeking diversified sources of funding. 
Jude Kelly cynically commented on the lingering impact of Thatcherite capitalism on 
her theatre management in the mid- I 990s; "Of course, one hopes for a future that 
doesn't include being obliged to spin the various plates of arts awards, 
lotteries, 
C) 
bursaries, charitable giving and EEC funding in order to balance the 
books". 3 
Under the dominance of the market ethic, failure of productions 
has been 
unthinkable. Artistic directors in the subsidised sector have begun to exhibit the 
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silnilar attitudes to those of 
directors in the commercial sector, considering their 
productions as commercial rather than public goods. Thus, there has been a growing 
inclination towards marketable safe programmes. This in turn. has been reflected in 
the theatrical conservatism and materialism of the Royal National and RSC's 
investment in the West End boom in musicals. By contrast, theatrical experimentation 
and room for new plays particularly by new writers has become increasingly rare. In 
1998, The National Campaign for the Arts revealed an unhealthy trend in the British 
regional theatres -a cut in in-house productions, reduction in cast size, reluctance to 
employ full-time actors, a sharp rise in ticket prices, more resort to musicals, and less 
and less interest in new plays. 
Despite the underlying questioning of the current necessity for Arts funding, in 
1999, the Cultural Minister, Chris Smith, still set out "ten goals for the arts aimed to 
bring the best things in life to the greatest number of people - excellence, innovation, 
a thriving arts sector, more consumption of the arts, more participation in the arts, 
more relevant training for the arts sector, better use of arts in education, combating 
social exclusion and promoting regeneration, improving public perceptions of the arts, 
and promoting British culture overseas". 4 However, theatres cannot be asked to carry 
so many social burdens to continue being part of the welfare state without the funding 
to match. 
The New Labour government, after its two years retention of 
Tory's spending 
Plans, increased arts subsidy for the year 1999-2000. Nevertheless, the effect of 
the 
long standstill in arts subsidy has been so severe that the 
increase was of little help to 
most theatre companies to fulfil the ten goals set out 
by Chris Smith. 
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In September 1999 the Arts Council commissioned a review of the role and 
function of 50 regional building-based producing theatres in England from the arts 
management consultants, Peter Boyden Associates Ltd. The Boyden Report's findings 
were shockingly gloomy. In January 2000, its preliminary report revealed that chronic 
underfunding since the Thatcher governments has given regional theatres "little 
chance of trading their way out of trouble". It warned that a failure to take risks for 
fear of further financial losses has cramped and strangled creativity; "The debilitating 
artistic impact of fragile balance sheets is a major constraint for producing theatres 
programmes tended to be conservative and innovation was discouraged". It confirmed 
detrimental aspects of the now widely-held concept of theatre as part of "industry" 
and that over-reliance on populist playwrights such as John Gobder and Alan 
Ayckbourn has been turning some regional theatres increasingly into "museums", 
looking to the past rather than the present. Forced to run the same marketable old 
reliable items, they have made the next generation of playwrights, who are dealing 
with current social concerns, look towards television and film. The report also pointed 
out that huge injection of money from the national lottery has been a mixed blessing 
"destabilising the trading environment" by favouring big companies in the bigger 
cities over those in smaller towns, while the increased costs of running new 
extravagant buildings put a further strain on already straitened budgets. However, the 
Report praised regional theatres for their devotion to educational work and projects 
to 
counter social exclusion. It added, , Many theatres lack the resources 
they need to 
fulfil their potential" in this area. It reported that the 
West Yorkshire Playhouse, 
which has a remarkable record of educational and community work, 
has been also in a 
state of financial crisis, even if it had a huge 
West End success with its musical, 
Spend, Spend, Spend and its high audience attendance 
figure in Leeds. 5 
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Regional theatre companies widely welcomed the findings of the Boyden 
Report. They did not hesitate to point out that a fundamental issue was to do with 
money. Maggie Saxon, Managing Director of the West Yorkshire Playhouse, said; 
"The case for more money is irrefutable at this stage. The report is an accurate 
appraisal of the current situation - it is just foolhardy not to invest in these theatres". 6 
Ted Craig, Artistic Director of Croydon Warehouse, which has been under a constant 
threat of closure by a property developer after its lottery application to build a new 
theatre was turned down, argued that "We never have seen any realistic increases in 
funding. Over 20 years this builds up. It's a now or never situation, I'm af 97 raid' . 
Theatre can play a valuable role in enhancing the aesthetic and spiritual 
quality of the life in the country. During the progressive age of the 1970s, British 
theatre made, more or less, a success of this role. However, under the pressure 
towards the market place by consecutive governments in the 1980s and 1990s, it 
seems that British theatre can no longer afford to maintain the role. In addition, it has 
been forced to abandon its progressive social role checking and balancing dominant 
capitalist values. The collapse of an ideologically altemative theatre after Thatcher 
has been potentially dangerous. Historical events such as the last two World Wars 
whose main cause was the dominance of capitalist economic imperialism are evidence 
of the serious consequences of the unchecked dominance of capitalism. 
The government must decide between theatre as commercial entertainment 
within the Arts as a province solely of an elite or as an integral part of the national 
culture as contributions to the aesthetic) spiritual, educational and cultural welfare of 
I the nation. I hope that this study, which has implicitly or explicitly suggested wa"'s 
to 
rescue theatre ftorn the unhealthy state mentioned above, will serve as a ground 
for a 
2 63 
debate concerning why theatre matters to society, and why it need to be suPported by 
subsidy rather than commerce. 
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I Margaret Thatcher on proposed cuts to the Arts Council, quoted from Andrew Sinclair, Op cit., p. 
372. 
2 Alan Collins and Chris Hand, 'Making a Crisis out of a Drama: Should we Continue Public Financial 
Support for the British Theatre? ', Economic Issues, vol. 3, part 2, September 1998, pp. 26-27. 
3jude Kelly, The Observe, 29 January 1995, p. 6. 
4 Quoted from the website of Department for Culture, Media and Sport; 
http: //www. culture. gov. uk/creative/index. htm 
5 The Boyden Report, London: Arts Council ofEngland, 2000. 
6Maggie Saxon, The Guardian, January 28 2000, p. 3. 
7 Ted Craig, Ibid. 
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